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1 Introduction 
 The scope of research  
There are several, often opposing, (mis)understandings which predominate academic 
studies on Lebanon. In particular, it is common to find both discussions of the contradictions 
of a system that appears to function but fails to produce, and – often in the same study – an 
incomprehension of this very system‟s mechanisms which simultaneously lead to economic 
growth and also to the unexpected, but frequent, manifestations of violent civil unrest - the 
latter reaching its apex during the Lebanese 17-year civil war(s)
1
.Although these discussions 
are often merely a rhetorical position leading to a deeper understanding and well-defined 
analysis and theory, they still reflect an important feature of the Lebanese system, and how it 
is narrated. The socio-economic reality of Lebanon is often treated by academics as quite 
distant from the official discourse. Separating from this discourse, and challenging it 
intellectually, is the domain of many Lebanese scholars
2
. 
Nevertheless, few studies have tackled these contradictions from the perspective of 
agriculture and territorial development: the present work, then, is concerned with these 
forgotten elements of the Lebanese economy. This dissertation will investigate the main 
problematics which arose from these forgotten components, in particular the structure of the 
agricultural sector, production technology, income distribution, poverty, food security, 
territorial development and local livelihood strategies. It will do so using quantitative 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling and a qualitative phenomenological case 
study analysis, both embedded in a critical review of the historical development of the 
political economy of Lebanon, and a structural analysis of its economy.  
 
                                                             
1 As examples: Owen (1976, eds), Shehadi and Mills (1998, eds), Debié and Pieter (2003 
2 As examples: Within the Marxist tradition: „Amil (1986), Traboulsi (1999, 2007); Post-Keynesians:   
Makdessi (2004) , Gaspar (2005). 
  On Lebanese economic choice(s) 
A crucial choice was made by the newly independent Lebanese state soon after World 
War II. At that time, the main economic concerns of developing countries focused on 
production and the national terms of trade in the now post-colonial international market. 
Development economists have seen agrarian reform, the mechanization of agriculture, 
industrialization and state activism as critical preconditions for growth. Although primary 
export in a post-colonial model of production remained widespread, the restructuring and 
industrialization of the economy were also occurring, either through policies of import 
substitution or export-oriented manufacturing. Relative success depended on the country‟s 
initial endowments, its comparative advantage and its position on the Cold War chessboard, 
as well as its cultural and historical background. Another important factor was the capacity of 
its ruling class in building state institutions able to support, supervise and even plan 
development strategies. Lebanon stood against the trend of increasing productivity and state 
activism, and chose a very specific outward-looking strategy (Gates, 1998): the commodity 
offered was neither raw materials nor manufactured goods, but rather trade and financial 
services. This strategy determined the economic policies of what became known as the 
Merchant Republic of Lebanon (1943-1958), the country‟s first period of economic growth.  
During that period, the Lebanese elite constructed a state corresponding to the chosen 
economic orientation. The country was seen as a link between the West and the East, an 
“entrepôt” for commodities transit and a safe place for capital. The minimalist – intentionally 
weak – state role was the preservation of a free market economy. Goods, currency and capital 
were free to move; economic agents would evolve and benefit from the state laissez-faire. In a 
region where interventionist totalitarian Arab governments and planned economies were the 
rule, Lebanon‟s consensual, multi-religious and multi-sect democracy appeared as a haven of 
political and economic freedom, modernity and growth.  
This political economy orientation per se appeared also to be the right choice for the 
Lebanese elite who were successful in forecasting and benefiting from the changes that 
occurred in the Middle East in the late 50‟s early 60‟s – mainly the creation of the state of 
Israel, which resulted in the Arab boycott of the Haifa port, to the benefit of Beirut and the 
transfer of Palestinian capital to Lebanon. Even more important, however, was the boom of 
the oil economy in the Arab Gulf that created a considerable capital surplus in search of safe 
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financial institutions. Nevertheless, the almost complete neglect of agriculture and rural 
development, the forgoing of several opportunities to undertake an industrialization process, 
and the rent-seeking and clientelist behavior of this laissez-faire à la libanaise were also all 
elements of a state ideology that became the source of both income inequality and unequal 
territorial economic development, creating economic bases for social unrest.  
Following political crisis and social unrest in 1958, the newly elected president, Fouad 
Chehab, introduced a series of reforms to the Merchant Republic system. These reforms were 
directed toward building state institutions and the strengthening of the state apparatus – 
including the army, the secret service(s) and the police. Although what became known as the 
Chehabist period (1958-1973) left the basis and foundations of the economic system mostly 
untouched, it did introduce some forms of socio-economic development. However, these 
changes were not able to withstand the growing social inequality, which, in addition to the 
geopolitical situation in the Middle East, led to the Lebanese civil war(s) of 1975-1990. 
Although the civil war altered the political equilibrium within the ruling class and brought 
forth a new territorial political economy, the post-war governments reproduced an economic 
orientation similar to that of the Merchant Republic. The policies of the “successive Hariri 
governments” (1992-2005) exacerbated the country‟s pre-existing regional disparities through 
a process of inequitable development, leading to the marginalization of certain regions, which 
have witnessed increasing levels of poverty. 
 The absence of agricultural policy 
Within the process of the Chehabist reforms, issues relating to agriculture and rural 
development were tackled for the first time in 1959. This year constituted a single and unique 
year of policies for these sectors, including the advent of the Regie libanaise des tabacs et 
tombacs, the Office of Wheat and Sugar Beet, and the Green Plan Directorate. 
The first entity, supervised by the Ministry of Finance, was the nationalized modern 
form of the prior Ottoman monopoly on tobacco, established in 1876, which was leased as a 
concession to a French company in 1884. The Regie libanaise des tabacs et tombacs was 
established to issue exclusive production licenses to farmers with predetermined quantities 
and prices. These licenses are not only used to control the supply of tobacco leaves, but also 
as electoral and clientelist tools by political elites. Meanwhile, the Office of Wheat and Sugar 
Beet, dependent on the Ministry of Economy, managed the stock and purchase of farmers‟ 
 production at subsidized prices. In 2005, subsidies for sugar beet production were stopped, 
and support for wheat production now requires an annual ministerial decree, and is thus 
dependant on political decisions.  
The Green Plan Directorate, under the tutelage of the Ministry of Agriculture, was 
created to fight desertification. Together with the Litani River Authority (LRA), dependent on 
the Ministry of Water and Energy, they can be considered as the entity in charge of rural 
development. As such, the major state infrastructure investments in agriculture and rural 
development included a series of irrigation projects supervised by the LRA – the most 
important being the creation of a dam on the Litani river – in 1959. The Green Plan and the 
LRA are still active administrations, however, their budget is low and therefore their impact 
on rural development is limited.  
Although a well-defined policy cannot be extracted from this sudden bourgeoning of 
administrations distributed across different ministries, the Chehabist reforms should not be 
discounted, especially when contrasted to the previous period. The little that was done 
nevertheless had an important effect on the rural areas left behind from the process of 
economic growth and development. Nevertheless, they were hampered by a ruling class of 
merchant and landlords who were possessive of their privileges and strove to maintain a 
certain financial stability indispensable for the attraction of capital. Furthermore, the 
Chehabist period was limited by what Debié and Pieter (2003:45) called “les effets 
d‟annonce”, whereby announcements of important development projects were regularly 
issued which were never actually implemented, due to the lack of funds and the absence of 
real political will – a phenomena still present today.  
Government spending on agriculture and rural development has remained limited, and 
public financing has focused on different priorities at different time. In the 60‟s, the share of 
agriculture in the national budget was around an average of 2.5%, while people working in 
the sector amounted for 50% of the working force (representing 11.6% of the GDP in 1964-
66)
3
. This contrast becomes even more striking given that the Lebanese government had a 
constant surplus budget since 1943. The surplus was used to buy gold and hard currency in 
order to protect and to maintain a strong Lebanese Pound (LBP). In the period 1992 to 2010, 
                                                             
3
Source: Report published by the Lebanese ministry of Planning 1962, cited by Gaspar (2005:221) 
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public finance showed a constant deficit, where most resources were used to repay the 
government debt and maintain the parity of the LBP versus the US dollar, one of the 
untouchable priorities of the government. During these years, the average share of agriculture 
in the national budget was of around 0.4%
4
, while the sector employed 7.5% of the working 
force in 2005 (representing only 5.2% of the GDP)
5
. 
Such a minimal share of the total budget clearly does not help in implementing the 
agriculture policy master plan published in cooperation with the European Union in 2003, or 
the local development plans prepared under the OMSAR
6
 project in 2005, or the 2009 
Ministerial Agricultural Strategy
7
. It is highly likely that, together with other initiatives, they 
will be categorized with those projects whose only effect was that of their “effets d‟annonce”. 
At present, agricultural policy at best takes the form of sporadic cooperation projects with 
external donors, and oscillates between the agenda of international organizations and the 
political will of the Lebanese government.  
 The research hypothesis 
Against this background, the research hypothesizes that under-development in 
Lebanese rural areas is not due to lack of resources, but rather is the consequence of political 
choices. This research further suggests that agriculture – in both its mainstream conventional 
and its innovative locally initiated forms of production – still represents important potential 
for inducing economic growth and development. In order to do so, Lebanon has to take full 
advantage of its human and territorial capital, by developing a rural development strategy 
based on two parallel sets of actions: one directed toward the support of local rural 
development initiatives, and the other directed toward intensive form of production. In 
addition to its economic returns, such a strategy would promote social and political stability. 
 
 
                                                             
4Source: Author‟s calculation from the Budget law and budget law proposal published by the Lebanese    
Ministry of Finance (2006)  
5Source: MOSA and UNDP (2006).  
6
 Office of the Minister of state for Administrative Reform. www.omsar.gov.lb 
7References: Franklin – AHT consortium (2003), OMSAR (2005) and Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture 
(2009) 
  A mixed methodology approach: four lines of analysis 
This research encapsulates a relatively wide range of issues: It presents an analysis of the 
mechanisms that led to the formation of the Lebanese ruling class and its policies, as well as 
the specific economic structure they induced; and it assesses the effect of these policies on 
agricultural production, on farmers‟ livelihood strategies and their adaptation to policy 
change. Therefore, the investigation strategy is built around four lines of analysis:  
1. A historical review of the political economy of Lebanon.  
2. A structural analysis of the Lebanese economy and agriculture based on a Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
3. A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) applied to Lebanon, which evaluates the 
impact of different agricultural trade policies and technical change scenarios on the 
overall economy, with a specific focus on household income. 
4. A quantitative phenomenological case study, investigating farmers‟ livelihood 
strategies in the Hermel region. 
Each line of analysis is presented as an independent Chapter, where the methodology is 
presented together with a review of the literature and the results of the analysis. Each Chapter 
will present part of the answer to this hypothesis, gradually building the overall picture.  
 Chapters' outline: Constructing an answer to the hypothesis 
Chapter 2 corresponds to the first axis of analysis. It starts by describing the rise of 
Beirut as a trade center and the integration of Mount Lebanon into the world commodities 
market and capital flows – through the development of the silk industry and the penetration of 
European capital during the end of the Ottoman period. The role of economic development as 
a catalyst of the agrarian revolts in 1840 and 1860 is discussed. The review then focuses on 
the formation of the Lebanese elite during the French Mandate of 1920-1943, especially 
within the newly annexed rural areas. A description of the recent history of Lebanon, 
including the Merchant Republic 1943-1958, the Chehabist period 1958-1973, the new 
territorial political economy that emerged after the civil war, and the post-war period 1990-
2010 is also provided. The Chapter concludes with a review of the specific political economy 
of the Hermel region.  
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This analysis will present insights into the historical and present bases for uneven 
regional development in Lebanon. The role of imperialism and foreign capital in accelerating 
or delaying the transition to capitalism, and the parallel agrarian changes which occurred, are 
highlighted. The mechanisms through which the modern Lebanese political economic system 
generates rural under-development and inequalities are described and evaluated. 
Chapters 3 and 4 constitute the quantitative core of the research.  
Chapter 3 presents a structural analysis of Lebanese capitalism premised on 
conclusions from the historical review of Chapter 2, on additional quantitative data, and on 
the overview of the economy as represented by a Lebanon Social Accounting Matrix of 2005 
(LEBSAM05). The construction of this matrix is described in detail, and its results analyzed. 
It presents a detailed analysis of the Lebanese industrial and agricultural sector at the national 
and regional levels, as well as a structural analysis of income and national and regional 
inequalities.  
This Chapter plays a key function for this dissertation, as the structural analysis links 
the political economy review and the CGE model. It shows how the political and economic 
choices of the Lebanese ruling class are translated into the economy‟s structure. The SAM 
also serves as a benchmark for the CGE modeling, which studies alternative policies and 
development paths.  
Chapter 4 presents and reviews the application of the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) CGE model developed by Lofgren et al. (2002), based on the 
neoclassical-structuralist approach adopted by Devis et al. (1982). The model is then used to 
simulate different policies and economics scenarios including: an increase of international 
food prices, an increase of the value-added tax, a change in tariffs, technical changes in 
agriculture production, and the combination of two or more scenarios. The analysis of the 
model‟s variables enables the drawing of policy conclusion in terms of growth, trade, 
agricultural output, labor, regional development, poverty and food security. The role that 
agriculture could play (both the conventional and the local initiatives) in Lebanon‟s economic 
development is emphasized, and the impact of different policies on different households 
groups is assessed.  
 Chapter 5 presents a qualitative study of the Hermel region – a marginal rural area. After 
describing the local context and the case study‟s methodology, it reports findings with regard 
to historical changes in local agricultural production paradigms, including: subsistence 
farming of the 1950s and stone fruits‟ production for export prior to the civil war, drug 
production during the disruption of the civil war period of 1975-1990, the subsequent 
intensification of horticulture production using drip irrigation and input intensification, and 
the recent emergence of local development initiatives and a partial abandonment of input 
intensification. Production strategies from the perspective of farmers‟ discourses are 
described, highlighting their experiences and the reasons behind their choices. These are 
analyzed within the Sustainable Livelihood Analytical Framework developed by Scoones 
(1998) in terms of relations with public and private extension services, as well as the 
problems faced in terms of marketing and agriculture policies. The case study results are 
contrasted with the results obtained from the simulated scenarios of the CGE model. Finally 
the Chapter demonstrates how the Lebanese political economic system has hampered the 
development of well-resourced rural areas.    
  The case study can be read independently of the rest of the dissertation, however, its 
findings mirror many issues discussed previously. The contrast between farmers‟ 
perception(s) of their reality and the results of the political economy, structural and CGE 
analysis will constitute the basis of the answers to this dissertation‟s problematic. 
Chapter 6 syntheses and discusses the research hypothesis on the bases of the findings of 
the four lines of analysis.   
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Note: Facts about Lebanon 
 Geography  
Lebanon‟s total area8 is 10,452 km2. It is bordered by Syria from the north and east, 
and by Israel from the south, and has a coastal line of 225 km along the Mediterranean Sea 
from the west. Its terrain is mostly mountainous, with the exception of a narrow coastal plain 
and the Bekaa valley, located between Mount Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. The 
Bekaa area is home to most of the agricultural activity in the country. Water covers 170 km
2
 
of the country‟s area, where the two major rivers are the Litani River and the Orontes River. 
Arable land covers 16.4% of the total area and permanent crops cover 14%. Irrigated land 
amounts to 1,040 km
2
.  
Lebanon enjoys a moderate Mediterranean climate, especially along its coastal areas 
where winters are cool and rainy, and the summers hot and humid. The more elevated 
mountainous areas witness sharp drops in temperature during winter and heavy snowfall, 
while summers are generally dry. The wide range of existing micro-climates allow for the 
cultivation of a large variety of crops.  
 Administrative division 
Lebanon is divided into 6 governorates (mohafazat): (1) Beirut, (2) Bekaa, (3) Mount 
Lebanon, (4) North Lebanon, (5) South Lebanon, and (6) Nabatiyyeh.  Two additional 
governorates, Akkar and Baalbeck-Hermel, were legislated in 2003, but they have not yet 
been implemented. The governorates, with the exception of Beirut, are further divided into 
Cazas (see Figure 1.1 below): 
 
 Mount Lebanon: Maten, Keserwan, Jbeil, Baabda, Shouf, and Aley 
 North Lebanon: Akkar, Minieh-Dennieh, Tripoli, Koura, Zgharta Batroun, and Bsharre 
 South Lebanon: Saida, Sour, and Jezzine  
 Nabatieh: Bint Jbeil, Marjaayoun, and Hasbaya  
 Bekaa: Hermel, Baalbeck, Zahle, West Bekaa, and Rashaya 
 
 
                                                             
8
 The source of all data in this Section is the Central Administration for Statistics (CAS) www.cas.gov.lb 
  Figure 1-1: Lebanon Administrative map 
 
Map Source: www.beirutspring.com 
 
 
The Household Living Conditions Survey HLCS (United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) and Central Administration for Statistics (CAS), 
2006a) has divided Lebanon into 15 strata based on socio-economical similar aspects. In the 
present research use the HLCS division. However, results of the CGE simulation are reported 
for marginal and central areas in addition to Beirut and to the strata of the qualitative case 
study. This division are report here by in Table 1-1: 
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Table 1-1:  Socio-economic division of Lebanese regions according to the HLCS 
Division used to report 
some of the CGE results 
The  15 HLCS strata 
Beirut 1 strata 
Beirut (BRT)                                              
Central  9 strata 
Tripoli city (TRI) 
Koura, Zgharta Batroun, and Bsharre (KZGB) 
Keserwan and Jbeil (KSJB) 
Maten (MATN) 
Baabda (BBDA) 
Chouf and Aley (CHAL) 
Saida and Jezzine (SDJZ) 
Nabatieh (NABA) 
Sour (SOUR) 
Marginal  4 strata 
Akkar /Mennieh-Dennieh (AKMD) 
Zahle (ZHLE) 
West Bekaa and Rashaya (WBRA) 
Bent Jbeil / Marjayyoun / Hasbayya (BJMR) 
Case Study 1 strata 
Hermel/Baalbak (HERBA) 
 Hermel Caza 
Hermel Caza is situated in the Lebanese inland, Norh-East of the Bekaa, at an altitude 
ranging from 607m to 1350 m for the main populated areas, reaching altitude above 2000 m 
for the more remote areas. The Orontes River rises in the area and crosses it for a distance of 
42 kilometers before reaching the Syrian borders. Hermel Caza can be divided into three main 
geographic and social entities: 1- Hermel city, which is the administrative capital and main 
populated center, 2- other small villages around Hermel city, 3- the mountainous region 
known as the Jerd
9
. 
 Population 
Lebanon has a population of 3,759,137 residents (2007 estimation). It is a generally 
young population, with 26% under the age of 14, 67% between 15 and 64 years of age, and 
7.2% are above 65 years. The population growth rate is estimated at 0.621% and the birth rate 
is 15.1/1000 population. Net migration rate stands at -2.43/1,000 population, where net 
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 In the Lebanese Arabic dialect the word “Jerd” refers to the remote mountainous areas – the valleys and 
plains that exist between the mountains at relatively high altitude.  
 migration is calculated as the difference between the number of persons entering and leaving 
a country during the year per 1,000 persons. The negative figure for Lebanon indicates that 
the number of people emigrating out of Lebanon is high. The majority of the population 
(87%) is concentrated in urban areas, where the urbanization rate, i.e. the projected average 
rate of change of the size of the urban population, has been estimated at 1.2% annually 
between the period of 2005 and 2010.  
There are 18 officially recognized religious sects in Lebanon. According to estimates 
based on electoral lists, Muslims represent approximately 60% of the population, mainly 
Shiites, Sunnis and Druze. The Latter form a minority in terms of their numbers, but 
constitute a politically powerful group. The Christian represent the remaining 40% of the 
population, mainly the Maronite Catholics and the Greek Orthodox. Several Armenian 
Christian churches are also present.  
 Government 
Lebanon follows a particular form parliamentary democracy known as confessionalist 
democracy, established under the French Mandate. This system aims at ensuring a balance of 
power through the representation of the various religious (sectarian) groups in the 
government. The national legislature is the unicameral Lebanese Parliament, which consists 
of 128 seats divided equally between Muslims and Christians, and further divided according 
to specific quotas between the various sects of each religion. This type of division is also 
applied to the high-ranking civil servants, and army and security forces officers. The three 
highest-ranking offices in the state are also divided on a religious base, whereby the President 
of the state is allocated to Christian Maronites, the Head of Parliament to Muslim Shiites, and 
the Prime Minister to Muslim Sunnis.  
 
 
  
2 The Political Economy of Lebanon 
 
 
 Chapter’s outline 
 
This Chapter reviews the political economy of Lebanon, focusing on the political and 
economic choices of the ruling class, and their implementation. The first part offers an 
analysis at the national level, and is divided into four main Sections: Section 2.1 describes the 
creation of Lebanon as a political economic entity; Section 2.3 discusses the Mandate period 
and the “elite formation” process undertaken by the French Mandatory power; Section 2.4 
draws comparisons and identifies similarities with Sicily; and Sections 2.5 and 2.6 review the 
pre- and post-civil war periods, respectively. The second part of the Chapter focuses on this 
dissertation‟s case study, the Hermel region. 
  
  
 
 
 
“The fate of a ruling class rests mainly in its own hands, i.e., the 
elite beneficiaries of a social order lose their privileged positions 
through conflicts with one another rather than through challenges 
from oppressed classes. By analyzing the ways in which conflicts 
among elites affect their capacity to rule, it becomes possible to 
determine when and how elites acquire an interest in transforming the 
relations of production, whether that be a transformation from 
feudalism to capitalism, or between other modes of productions”. 
 
Lachmann, (1990:398) on Mosca and Pareto Theories on the Ruling class 
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2.2 Creating Lebanon 
2.2.1 The rise of Beirut  
The Emirate of Mount Lebanon (1523-1840) was a relatively autonomous political 
entity within the Ottoman Empire and, in addition to Beirut, represented the core of what later 
became the Lebanese Republic. It grew in economic and political importance within the 
Empire through the development of the production and export of silk to Europe. This early 
colonial mode of production induced dynamics that still shape the political economy of 
Lebanon today. Thus, the Emirate‟s economic development was based on trade, its society 
was highly influenced by the wide cultural exposure to Europe, and its internal affairs were 
highly influenced by foreign powers and shaped within a context of competing interests 
between regional and international powers (Traboulsi, 2007). 
In 1832, eight years before its collapse, the Emirate fell under direct Egyptian 
administration. During these eight years, Muhammad Ali Pasha introduced a series of 
economic reforms that significantly impacted the social and economic structure of Mount 
Lebanon, and the region as a whole. With the aim of neutralizing European discontent about 
his Levantine conquests, the Egyptian ruler opened the markets of the region that were under 
his control to European commodities and investments. This led to a large increase in 
European investment in the silk industry, which grew rapidly in the mid-nineteenth century.  
According to Labaki (1984) and Gates (1998), this growth resulted in the integration of 
Mount Lebanon into the international commodities market, and the development of Beirut as 
an intermediary trade port between Europe and the Levantine hinterland. Beirut bourgeoisie 
started investing in agriculture for export, while life in the rural areas changed due to the 
specialization in silk and the consequential decrease of self-subsistence production. At the 
same time, urban manufacturers and traditional craftsmen suffered greatly from the 
competition of European imports.  
These processes strengthened the political power of traders in the cities and landlords 
in Mount Lebanon at the expense of middle class manufactures; this increased wealth and 
power of the merchant class was crucial in determining the future evolution of the country. 
Merchants prospered in close connection with European interests, gradually improving the 
diversification of their activities. This diversification allowed them to sustain their role and 
 influence; gradually the share of silk trade decreased and Beirut‟s intermediary function 
became more evident. Local merchants took advantage of new opportunities in re-exporting, 
becoming distributors of European merchandise to the hinterland. Beirut became an 
administrative, political and cultural center in which foreign institutions were established. 
“Simultaneously, the foundations of its future role were laid, and its westernization first 
became evident in the customs and habits of its bourgeoisie” (Gates, 1998:15).  
2.2.2 Peasant revolts and change in the agrarian structures in Mount Lebanon 
Industrialization in Europe, trade opportunities, and the integration of the 
Mediterranean countries into the world commodities market highly impacted the production 
structure and social relations in rural areas. The inability of Artisans and peasantry to adapt to 
the economic changes often erupted in the form of violent revolts that reshaped the political 
order. During a period of important increases in silk production, the consecutive commoners‟ 
revolts of 1821, 1840 and 1861 brought an end to the Emirate of Mount Lebanon and to the 
previous agrarian system. 
According to Burke (1993), the course of these agrarian changes defined the structure 
of the present modern state structures and the balance of power that sustains it. In general, he 
points out, looking at agrarian and/or social revolts is looking at society in action. 
Furthermore, he argues that in the Middle Eastern context, imperialism worked in two 
opposite directions: it undermined the legitimacy of local elites while, at the same time, it 
increased their power. In what follows, these arguments are illustrated by the review of the 
pre-French mandate period agrarian revolts. Section 2.2 sheds light on the role played by 
imperialism in shaping/creating Lebanese rural elites and strengthening their political power.  
 The ‘Amiyat of 1821 and 1840 and Tanious Chahine revolt of 1860 
Rural life in the Emirate of Mount Lebanon was based on the iqta„10 feudal system, 
whereby the Ottoman Empire authorities gave muqata„ji families relative autonomy over the 
administration of their iqta„, in exchange for the implementation of Ottoman tax collection, of 
which they would keep a share, and military order. Over time, a series of rural actions 
                                                             
10
 iqta„ refers to the unit on which the feudal system of the Ottoman Empire was based. The Empire 
authorities will grant administrative and military power to a muqata„ji family over an iqta„ of land. In principle 
subjects are free men and the muqata„ji do not own the land.  
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gradually broke this system. They are well described in Burke (1993), Traboulsi (2007), Saba 
(1976), Khatter (2001) and Labaki, (1984); their main dynamics are reviewed in the following 
discussion.  
The first modern rural action occurred in 1821, when Maronite and Druze commoners 
revolted against tax increases. It was known as the „Amiyat Antelias. However, capitalism – 
i.e., the silk industry – had not yet destabilized the old system and the agrarian structures 
remain unchanged. It was only after the reforms of Muhammad Ali Pasha that the social rural 
structure witnessed a series of accelerated changes. The effect of a closer integration to world 
markets sharply increased taxation. Taxes were now directed to a larger part of society, 
provoking the discontent of the peasantry, as well as the local elites. In 1839, the authorities 
had already withstood and repressed a Druze revolt with the help of the Maronite muqata„ji. 
In 1840 the next rural action, the „Amiyat revolt, brought an end to the Egyptian rule and 
introduced private ownership of land. Private property was a farmer and a bourgeoisie 
demand, as silk trade had created a new class of wealthy farmers able to buy their own land 
and of Beirut traders who invested in agriculture and emerged as a new class of absentee 
landlords. The bases of the old agrarian system were destabilized as peasants and urban 
merchants started challenging the muqata„ji authorities. Feudal leaders used sectarianism and 
intercommunity tensions in an attempt to retain power: Peasant revolts emerging from one 
community were presented as a threat to the other. Inter-religious violence clashes erupted 
and were stopped by the intervention of an Anglo-Austrian-Turkish expeditionary force in 
1841.  
The 1860-61 revolt, known as the Tanious Chahine revolt, was a return of the 1840 revolt, 
but one where all factors were amplified. Silk production and trade continued to grow; more 
farmers got wealthier, and absentee landlords investments in land increased, all of which lead 
to a bloody breakdown of the iqta„ system as Druze muqata„ji, in an effort to preserve their 
privileges, presented the revolt as a threat to the community. Bloody inter-communal fighting 
was stopped once more by European and Ottoman military intervention.  
 The Hinterland 
With the increase of the Beirut port‟s trade, and the construction of roads and 
infrastructure by French companies, the hinterland was in turn incorporated to international 
markets. Similarly to Mount Lebanon, the changes included the export of agricultural 
 commodities (wheat, in this case) and the import of European manufactured goods. Rural 
revolts erupted in 1889-90, in parallel with the Ottoman Empire‟s attempt to consolidate its 
control – at the extent of local landlords – as capitalism initiated its spread in these areas. 
However, the First World War interrupted this dynamic of transition to capitalism, and the 
post-war period of the French mandate in Syria and Lebanon would re-enforce the power of 
local landlords in the hinterland, creating different political and economic dynamics within 
the different regions of Lebanon.    
2.3 The French mandate: Elite and discourse creation 
The modern state of Lebanon within its present borders was created at the Versailles 
Conference in 1920, by a common accord between the French and the Maronite church. It 
added to the Mutasarrifiya
11
 the city of Beirut – which had not administratively belong to the 
Mutasarrifiya although it de-facto served as its economic and political capital – the Bekaa 
Valley, the region of Akkar and Tripoli in the North and Jabal Amal in the South.  
The French institutionalized the confessional power sharing system that emerged in 
1840 with the division of the qa‟am maqamiya12 between the Druze and Maronites, and the 
French and Ottoman agreement on the Maronite administration of the Mutasarrifiya. They 
confirmed the hegemony of Beirut over the mountains and the hinterland, and “strengthened a 
pattern of economic activity in which agriculture and industry had become more and more 
subordinate to banking and trade” (Owen 1976:24). However, if Mount Lebanon and Beirut 
had very closed social and economic relations, the other regions that were added to the new 
state had long-standing ties with the cities of the Syrian vicinity (Damascus and Homs) and 
the city of Haifa in Northern Palestine. The people of these regions did not have a sense of 
belonging to the new Lebanese entity. The French and the Christian elite were faced with 
strong opposition from the Muslims and Druze elite. The confessional power sharing system 
was instrumentalized by the French to gain the support of the urban Sunni elite which as well 
benefit from the trade economic orientation of the country. In doing so, the French gave 
power to a small class of landowner merchants and bankers whose position was further 
reinforced by the leadership of their respective religious communities” (Owen, 1976).  
                                                             
11 Name given to the autonomous administration of Mount Lebanon between 1861 and 1914, which 
translates roughly into “the autonomous (area)”  
12
 Name given to the autonomous administration that divided Mount Lebanon into two political autonomous 
entity – de facto one was under Druze and the other under Maronite muqata„ji‟s juridiction   
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Moreover, the new state found support from rural landlords by preserving their 
privileges. By failing to encourage rural economy, the French maintained the political and 
power structure in the Bekaa, north and south of Lebanon. This had the effect of widening the 
economic gap already present between that of Lebanon and Beirut and that of rest of the 
country (Firro, 2003). The French mandate period and the processes of power sharing 
between an elite of urban merchants and rural landlords, as well as the duality and contrast of 
the politics and economics of cities and rural areas in Lebanon, is well reported in Hourani 
(1976) Zamir (1985) and Firro (2003). This period witnessed the creation of the political 
fields of the new state: increased rule of traders and bankers, confessionalism, patron-client 
relationships, especially in the rural areas, and an economic gap between the core of Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon and the peripheries of Akkar, Jabal Amal and the Bekaa region.   
The social structures and the relations between landlords and peasants that prevailed at 
this time outside of Mount Lebanon were studied by a critical school of Lebanese and 
regional historians. For instance, Salih (1973) argues that the political power of landlords in 
south Lebanon remained intact until the 1970s, even throughout a period of rapid economic 
transition. Qbaysi (1986), describes how during the French rule, rural leaders who had 
negotiated their positions with French authority manipulated the cadastral survey - which they 
lobbied to introduce - to annex large part of mašā‟13 land to their own estates. He also 
described additional unofficial taxes imposed by landlords (khawa) and the violence and 
humiliation that accompanied khawa collection.  
2.4 Understanding rural Lebanon through a Sicilian lens 
The processes that governed the development of Lebanon during the nineteenth-
century are similar to the path taken by Sicily during the same period. The political economy 
of Sicily during that time has been analyzed by Schneider and Schneider (1976), who 
identified the following themes described below.  
 Trade terms: Wheat for manufactured goods 
Bourbon Sicily exported wheat to continental Italy and Spain in exchange for 
manufactured goods. This mode of production, similar to the Lebanese silk industry, offered 
important power to local landlords and traders, and hampered the development of industry. 
                                                             
13
 Public / common land. 
 The Island, although it was part of a larger monarchy, was ruled through autonomously – as 
was the Emirate of Mount Lebanon.  “Grain barons considered themselves Sicilian. (…) They 
did not think of rebelling against Spain, mainly because their power in the local arena, 
roughly equivalent to that of their Spanish governors, made revolt unnecessary” (Scheinder 
and Schenider 1976:42).  
 Resilience of social structures in rural area to economic changes 
The local elite preserved power by impeding change in the countryside social structure 
though violent means, and they continued to do also in more advanced periods of 
development. Like in Lebanon (after 1920), the newly unified Italian state (after 1861) needed 
the support of rural landlords, and supplied them with protection and patronage, which 
increased their power in the countryside. In the presence of a deliberately weak state, strong 
local elites were able to preserve their local powers regardless of the economic development 
in the continent. Like their Lebanese counterparts, they controlled means of violence and the 
working forces in rural areas, and organized parallel un-official tax collection. Violent 
political middlemen prospered in the space left between the weak state and peasantry; in both 
cases (Lebanon and Sicily), social structures in rural areas were maintained by violence and 
by the availability of emigration as a safety exit. Sicilian and Lebanese emigration was either 
internal migration Beirut/ North Italy or external to South America and the USA, (for 
example countries like Argentina and Venezuela both have important Lebanese and Italian 
communities that settled there at the end of the nineteenth century).    
“The term mafia [initially] refers to the leaseholders (Gabelloto) and field guard 
(campiere) who controlled rural estates on behalf of their absentee landowners. If we look at 
Lebanon through the Sicilian spectacles, the extent to which the countryside was controlled 
by similar social forces is striking: the Lebanese zu‟ama (leaders) and qabadayat („tough 
men‟). In Lebanon as in Sicily, the remedy for peasant insurgency was political violence by 
estate managers and their agents” (Burke, 1993:25, original emphasis).  
Of course these are elements of similarity, but not identical development paths. After 
the Second World War, Beirut and Mount Lebanon witnessed significant economic growth 
and began playing an important role in the Middle East regional economy. However, rural 
peripheral Lebanon was under-developed when compared to the core of the country. Rural 
landlords remained powerful, using violence and illegal economic activity. These regions 
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have been modernized without real economic development and despite persistently high 
unemployment. Their features remain similar to Sicily, although in a very different social, 
economical and historical context.   
2.5 The Political Economy of the independent state 1943-
1973 
2.5.1 Transfer of capital, trade and growth 
Lebanon did not witness changes to its ruling class following its independence in 
1943. The same elite of merchants, bankers and landlords who were in control during the 
French mandate remained in power. Bchara Al-khoury (a Maronite leader from Mount 
Lebanon) and Riad As-Soleh (from the City of Saida) agreed upon what became known as the 
National Pact
14
. The non-written agreement divided power between the various Lebanese 
communities. The choice for an outward oriented open economy based on financial and trade 
services was in continuity with the country‟s historic development (Gates, 1998). After 1943, 
Beirut‟s role as a trade platform between Europe and the Arab hinterland continued to grow, 
while its financial role started to emerge. However, ties with France and Syria were obstacles 
for the expansion of trade and financial activities as intended by the political leadership. The 
years between 1943 and 1958, known as the “Merchant Republic” period, would draw and 
implement the main economic reforms on which the Lebanese economic system is based (for 
a full description of this period, see Gates (1998)). 
 Therefore, the first important economic reforms undergone after independence were 
the cutting of monetary and financial links with France in 1948, and the dissolution of the 
Syrian-Lebanese customs and monetary union in 1950. These ruptures permitted the Lebanese 
state to design economic policies based on the free movement of goods and capital. 
Furthermore, it allowed Lebanon to adopt an independent orthodox monetary policy. National 
budgets showed a surplus from 1943 to 1975, with the exception of 1967, which would be 
used to accumulate gold reserves and to maintain a strong currency. These reforms were 
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 The distribution of state leadership between communities such that the Presidency of the Republic went to 
the Maronites, who held much of the power, while the Presidency of the Council of Ministers went to the 
Muslim Sunni‟s, and the Speaker of the House to a Shiite. Members of parliament were to be divided according 
to a 6 Christians/ 5 Muslim members ratio. In this division, based on a demographic and political balance of 
power, the role of the Shiite Speaker was very limited.  
 complemented by the bank secrecy law of 1950, and the bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements with the Arab countries of the Beirut hinterland. These policies helped in 
attracting capital from the Arab countries and from the Lebanese Diaspora, as well as 
increasing trade and service exports.   
The economy of Lebanon witnessed notable growth since 1943. It was aided by a 
series of regional political events that asserted and promoted Beirut role as a financial and 
trade platform. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the exile of thousands of 
refugees to Lebanon led to an influx of Palestinian bourgeoisie capital and competences, 
while businesses and economic activity took advantage of the Palestinian workers‟ conditions 
and readiness to work for low wages. A similar transfer of capital occurred with the change in 
political regimes and the establishment of quasi-socialist economies in Egypt, Syria and Iraq 
in the 1960‟s. However, the largest capital transfers were made by the emerging oil 
economies in the Gulf, and the openness of their markets to Lebanese agriculture and 
industrial exports and re-export. Finally, Beirut‟s role as a trade platform was enhanced with 
the Arab boycott of the Haifa port after 1948, and the closure of the Suez Canal between 1967 
and 1976, following the occupation of the Sinai by the Israeli Army. Thus, most of the trade 
with the Middle East was transited through Lebanon. All these elements induced fast growth, 
based on the tertiary sector, extraverted and therefore fragile (Labaki 1998). If regional events 
played in favor of Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, this trend would be reversed and, together 
with social internal tensions, would form the factors that led to the 1975-1990 civil war(s).  
2.5.2 Inequality and the Chehabist reforms  
Growth in Lebanon was distributed unequally between regions, and economic sectors 
of activity (Labaki, 1998). In addition to industry, agriculture and rural development have 
been neglected, thus deepening the gap between Beirut and Mount Lebanon and the rest of the 
country. In terms of household income, the country exhibited a high Gini index reflecting the 
high levels of inequality. Inequality increased between 1960 (Gini index of 0.51) and 1971 
(Gini index of 0.55)
15
. These figures do not represent the income inequality from the “real 
economy”, as unequal distribution has been mitigated by dynamics for redistribution coming 
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from both the state and from civil society (as well as by considerable remittances) (Labaki, 
1998); in fact, these dynamics are still present today (see Chapter 3 Section 3.2).  
After a political and social crisis in 1958, the newly elected president, Former Chief of 
the Lebanese Army General Fouad Chehab, enacted a series of reforms aiming at the 
redistribution of wealth and the re-enforcement of the state‟s administration (social security, 
Lebanese university, central bank), regulation (on the banking sectors and labor) and services 
(infrastructures, roads, schools). According to Debié and Pieter (2003:45), the Chehabist 
period was characterized by three political economy aspects that are still present nowadays: 
 “l‟inflation administrative au service de la transition politique”: a political 
process in which the multiplication of public administrations was used by the 
ruling class to provide employment to their followers, further asserting the 
dynamics of patron relations. This hampered the effectiveness of the Chehabist 
reforms by creating a complex distribution of jurisdiction that overloaded the 
administration with employees. However, this particular aspect was seen as a 
form of wealth redistribution in a system incapable of providing job 
opportunities within its productive sectors.  
 “la concentration des investissements sur les infrascructures”: in 1970, 70% 
of public expenses where directed towards main infrastructures: roads, 
electricity, and other types of construction.  
 “les effets d‟annonces”: an important number of development projects would 
be announced but never implemented.  
The Chehabist reforms had important impacts on the economy and the building of 
state administration. Nevertheless, they were hampered by the political system and by the 
prerogative of keeping a surplus budget and a strong currency. The country was modernized 
in terms of institutions and infrastructure, but the overall economic policy was kept the same. 
Therefore the distribution role that was played by the Lebanese state under Fouad Chehab – 
and instrumentalized by the Lebanese ruling class in the form of patron-client relationship – 
was not able to stop the aggravation of the social and economic factors that - in addition to the 
change in the political and military conjecture in the Middle East – led to the 1975-1991 civil 
war.  
 2.6 The Political Economy of the Second Republic 1991-
2011 
2.6.1 Hariri rise to power: reconstruction and new power sharing balance 
A detailed discussion of the political and economic dynamics of the Lebanese civil 
war is beyond the scope of this research. However, its consequences are of particular interest, 
and they can be divided into four main points: (i) the change in the balance of power between 
the community, which did not alter the basic mechanism of the state; (ii) the re-production of 
a similar economic system based on finance and trade; (iii) the Syrian hegemony and 
interference in state affairs up to 2005; and (iv) the growing power of Hezbollah. The 
combination of these factors led to a change in the political economy of the Lebanese 
territories, namely, the dynamics between the city and the rural areas.  
  The Khoury-Soleh National Pact of 1943 created the basis of the political contract 
between the Lebanese elite. The civil war was stopped when the Lebanese Parliament, in a 
meeting in the Saudi city of Taef, ratified a new constitution and set the outlines of future 
political reforms for what became known as the second Lebanese Republic. This time, the 
new political contract was made under Saudi hospice and with Syrian accord; two countries 
that continued to highly interfere in and influence the politics of Lebanon. The Taef Accord 
(1989) led to a redistribution of power between the Lebanese communities
16
, which benefited 
Muslims in general and Sunnis in particular, as much of the institutional power and 
jurisdiction was redirected towards the Sunni Prime Minister. It is within this new 
institutional context, and after a second monetary crisis in 1992
17
, that Rafic Hariri came to 
power.  
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 In institutional terms: the powers of the President, Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House where 
changed, and the Parliament was elected on a 1/1 ratio between Christians and Muslims members.  
17
 A strong currency was at the base of the financial policy of the Lebanese government after independence, 
the pillar of an economy based on finance and trade. The Lebanese Lira (LBP) was seen as a secure devise and 
Arab capital transfers to Lebanon were kept in LBP.  In 1972 and 1973, the central banks of India, and Algeria 
and the Word Bank issued securities in LBP. The Lebanese currency was able to withstand the civil war up to 
1986, when private bank speculation – against the opinion of the Central Bank and with the support of political 
leaders and warlords – devaluated the LBP in several shocks. Since then, the country‟s economy became highly 
dollarized. In 1992, the government injected important liquidity into the economy under the form public salaries, 
public works, ect. The LBP crashed from 900 LBP per US dollar in January to 3000 in August, at the benefit of 
dollar capital holders, e.g. warlords – an ultimate compensation for the disarming of the militias? 
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A close friend of the Saudi royal family, Rafic Hariri was a prominent businessman 
with a multi-billion fortune, and an international network of political and business 
connections.  He was acknowledged for his charitable work and investments in Lebanon‟s 
human capital, especially through the provision of scholarships to a large number of students. 
The majority of the Lebanese welcomed his appointment as Prime Minister, for he 
represented hope for better economic prospects after the civil war and the crisis of 1992 
(Najem, 2000). He served as prime minister from 1992 to 2004 (with a two-year interruption 
between 1998 and 2000); these years are often referred to as the “successive Hariri 
governments” period. He was assassinated on February 14th of 2005.  
The main goals of Hariri – and the aspirations of the Lebanese – were, the 
reconstruction of the country and the improvement of living standards.  If the achievement of 
these goals was to be considered as a measure for the success of the Hariri governments, then 
indeed he did succeed. However, these accomplishments came at a high cost, for the policies 
he followed led to an accumulation of a huge public debt, a further reassertion of the 
previously existing state patron-client relations, and the persistence of an inequitable 
development of the Lebanese regions. 
2.6.2 Hariri neo-liberal policies  
Hariri‟s policies were primarily based on the protection of the Lebanese currency, the 
reduction of tariffs, the opening of the market, and the heavy reliance on debt to finance 
reconstruction projects, mainly in Beirut. The rebuilding of the Beirut downtown area was 
financed through a private company, in which Hariri himself was a major shareholder, while 
public infrastructure and spending were financed through debt issued by national commercial 
banks, rendering bankers as the main beneficiaries from these policies.  
Hariri‟s plan was often criticized as being overly ambitious. It was argued that the 
newly appointed decision makers were highly influenced by a neoliberal orthodoxy, which 
was receiving acceptance and gaining support worldwide, and which advocated a minimal 
intervention of the government in adjusting economic imbalances
18
 and redistributing wealth 
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 The Central Bank was adjusting the LBP stocks, and preserving a fixed exchange rate of 1500 LBP/USD. 
It managed the public debt and issued T-Bills to finance it. On several occasions, the Central Bank issued 
securities despite the opposing opinion of the Minister of Finance (1998 and 2004).  
 across the different regions (Corm 1994). Public investment was primarily dedicated to 
rebuilding physical infrastructure such as roads, the airport, and the Beirut business and 
tourist district (downtown area). The government practices were aligned with the criteria of 
the neoliberal state as defined by David Harvey (2005), where it applied a regressive taxation 
system through the introduction of a Valued Added Tax of 10% (to compensate the tariff 
reductions of 2000 and 2003), encouraged rentier-based economic activities, financed 
economic activities through implementing restrictive financial and monetary policies (such as 
pegging the LBP with to the USD), promoted privatization of public institutions (postal 
services, telecommunication, ongoing effort to privatize Electricity), and weakened 
independent syndicates through limiting the liberty of action of the General Workers Union in 
1996, and resulted in the political fracturing of the Unions by the Ministry of Labor.  
Neo-liberal policies concentrate wealth in a small part of the population, thus 
increasing inequality (Harvey, 2005). In Lebanon, the Hariri policies have exacerbated the 
existing regional disparities between the various regions through a process of inequitable 
development, leading to the marginalization of certain regions that witnessed increasing levels 
of poverty. Poor households suffered from a 4% annual decrease in their purchasing power 
between 1992 and 1999 (Debié and Pieter, 2003). The negative effects of the Hariri policies 
were mitigated to a certain extent through continued emigration. The mismatch between the 
demand and supply of certain labor specializations led many young professionals to leave the 
country in search for better work opportunities. The increased wages abroad, especially in the 
sectors of telecommunication, engineering, computer technology and finance, led to a 
continued “brain drain” from Lebanon, thus easing the pressure of increased unemployment 
in the country 
2.6.3 Exacerbation of inequality and new political economy of the territories  
Hariri also re-produced a similar economic choice based on trade and finance. In 1920 
and 1943 the country‟s economical choices were led by traders, bankers and rural landlords; 
In 1992, landlords were substituted by warlords and the political parties emerging from the 
civil war – Amal and Hezbollah. However, the specificity of Lebanon did not allow for a full 
implementation of a neo-liberal state, for the state in its structure had to play a re-distributive 
role through its historical patron-client relationship dynamics. In addition to the economic and 
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social pressures coming from the streets, Hariri had to share power with political players who 
had interests in maintaining a large administration for their protégés.  
Furthermore, development was focused on Beirut – even the role of Mount Lebanon 
had regressed, as the country had inherited from the war of a new territorial political 
economy. Regions like Akkar and Baalback-Hermel were underdeveloped before the war, and 
did not witness any investment during the successive Hariri governments‟ period, apart from 
very limited infrastructure construction. The situation differed in the regions of the south, 
where the effects of this inequitable development were not as detrimental because local 
political leaders had made large investments in the infrastructure of those regions, which were 
also receiving significant transfers of capital from Diaspora in Africa.  
The civil war divided the Lebanese territory into regional cultural and political blocks 
under the control of the different militias / parties / religious communities. The territorial 
division went beyond the division of the mandate or that of independence, i.e. between Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon and the other regions. The civil war produced a mosaic of small 
territories and social spaces, in each of which the power of the state and the influences of the 
local political elite is relative. According to Debié and Pieter (2003:225), the state has 
gradually fought for its territory, bargaining and negotiating with powerful and less powerful 
political elites. However, today the state has to accept in several places the coexistence and 
the superposition of several political spaces (“espaces politiques”), and several systems of 
power, decision-making and legitimacy. One of these political space is the Hermel region. 
2.7 Introduction to the political economy of Hermel  
2.7.1 The muqata„ji resilience to political changes  
The city of Hermel
19
, although located in the Bekaa region, belonged administratively 
to the mutasarrifiya. This administrative status is explained by the presence of the muqata„ji 
Hamada family, which ruled over part of Mount Lebanon and fled after conflicts with the 
Maronite church (see Winter, 2010). However, they maintained good relation with the 
Ottoman High Porte and ruled Hermel in the same system of autonomy that prevailed in the 
mutasarriifya. Moreover, in addition to tax collection, the Ottoman regime used the Hamada 
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 See Chapter 1 Sub-section 1.6.3 for a geographical description of the Hermel Caza 
 for military control and thus ensured the repression of revolt in the Jerd and in the 
neighboring Christian villages, in the same function they had played in Mount Lebanon. 
Silk production was present in Hermel, but the distance of the city from the Beirut port 
did not allow for a large development. As a consequence, agricultural cultivation remained 
very traditional, with pulses, cereals and vegetables for home consumption. In this lightly 
monetized economy, there was very little surplus for re-investment in land, and most farmers 
were not able to buy land, unlike in Mount Lebanon after 1840, following the capitalization of 
production that emerged with the silk industry (see Khater, 2001). In Hermel, the power 
relations between the muqata„ji –who later became landlord - and the farmers remained the 
same throughout the nineteenth century. In fact, at present, sharecropping agreements 
between the Hamada and other family landlords and farmers still exist in Hermel, and on the 
family‟s land that became part of Syria after 192020. However, most agreements have evolved 
into informal leasing contracts, whereby sharecropper households take leasing contracts on 
the same parcels of land from the heirs of the landlords. The patron-client relations from the 
feudal system remain prevailing.  
The French mandate – which was in need of a support from a Shiite leader – entered 
the city in 1926 with a previous agreement with the Hamada. The French mandate authorities 
wanted to extend state power to the rural areas; as such, they worked at empowering the 
Hamada by integrating them to the state institutions. They nominated Sabri Hamada as a 
Member of Parliament, and several members of the family became officers in the French 
Army (Jendarma). In exchange for these political power and privileges, the Hamada 
continued to play a military role in helping to repress successive rural revolts in the Jerd 
(Hamada, 1982 and Khalil 1990). Taha (2006) report how the cadastral census undertaken by 
the Mandatory authorities was instrumentalized by feudal families – including the Hamada – 
to enlarge their land estate, in a similar manner to the that described by Qbaysi (1986) in the 
Shiite rural regions in South Lebanon.  
The Hamada family remained present in the Lebanese Parliament from 1925 to 1976. 
Sabri Hamada was elected Speaker of the House 21 times, holding the position for a 
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 The frontier of the Lebanese state as drawn by the French in 1920 divided the family estate into two parts, 
one in Lebanon and the other in Syria. In the latter, land reforms in the 1970‟s expropriated and redistributed a 
large part of this land to farmers.  
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discontinuous 21 years between 1943 and 1973. This highest position of power within the 
state for Shiites alternated between Hamada and Kamel Al-Assad, another feudal leader from 
South of Lebanon. Both stayed in power through their patron-client network, using state 
administrations to provide employment to their protégés. Just as the French needed support 
from the rural Shiite elite, the Maronite-Sunni National Pact also sought support from the 
same groups. To ensure the continuity of the existing coalition with the city merchants and 
bankers, as well as with the rural landlords, very little effort was made to develop rural areas. 
As such, rural landlords maintained their power and control over agricultural labor and 
farmers, as well as over their access to state service and employment. The rise of leftist and 
Arab nationalist political parties in Hermel and other rural areas did not succeed in totally 
breaking this dynamic, although they helped in raising the level of higher education through 
providing a large number of scholarships to students who studied in the Soviet Union and 
East Europe. The collapse of feudal political power within the Shiite community only came 
about during the civil war, with the rise of the Amal and Hezbollah political parties.  
2.7.2 The A‘shayer  
The A„shayer 21 (clans) gradually moved to the Jerd area with the gradual exile of the 
Hamada from Mount Lebanon. Although there were tribal bonds between them, their power 
relations changed when they moved to the Hermel areas. The A„shayer  were not farmers, and 
therefore not part of the sharecropping system on which the Hamada power and influences 
were based. Production relations in the Jerd were based on goat shepherding, which was the 
main economic activity of the A„shayer, with its own system of relations between the 
shepherds and the owners of the goats (the different types of goat shepherding agreements are 
reported in detail in Khalil, 1990). Under the protection of the Hamada, and because of 
transhumance, the A„shayer controlled large parcels of grazing land between the Jerd and the 
hills around Hermel city. They gradually started to farm part of this land as well.  
In 1926, the French supported to the traditional leadership of the Hamada rather than 
the growing power of the A„shayer, resulting in the A„shayer revolt, whereby the French 
Army entered Hermel and repressed the A„shayer. According to Khalil (1990), the major 
difference between these two potential leaderships lay in the fact that the Hamada would form 
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 Correct transliteration: Al-„šā‟r however A„shayer is used for simplified reading 
 a loyal ally to the Mandatory power, while the A„shayer  would pose serious threats due to its 
inherent tribal nature. However, what Khalil failed to observe is the incapability of the 
A„shayer  to control local labor forces and thus reassure their allegiance to the newly formed 
Lebanese state. As a consequence, the French failed to obtain the allegiance of the A„shayer. 
Moreover, since the 1926 failed revolution, relations between the A„shayer in Hermel‟s Jerd 
and the Lebanese state have witnessed regular violent clashes.  
After a major armed clash between the Lebanese Army and the A„shayer  in 1948, the 
state-A„shayer  relations became instrumented by Fouad Chehab and Army intelligence. Their 
aims were to control the A„shayer  and to create a power balance with Sabri Hamada 
leadership. Special relations were implemented, whereby the Ministry of Defense was directly 
responsible to solve the A„shayer  demands. Nevertheless, the issues tackled were not related 
to developmental matters, but rather were restricted to the exoneration of prisoners and 
outlaws, as well as requests for state employment. Backed by Chehab, the A„shayer  – through 
the election of their candidate to the Parliament – were thus integrated into the state 
institutions and to its patron-client mechanisms.  
During the civil war, the role of the A„shayer in the economy of the Hermel region 
grew rapidly, and illegal economic activity was an important source of income for the region. 
The A„shayer leaders were able to accumulate wealth from the cultivation of illegal drugs in 
the Jerd. Their links and influences with the Syrian and Lebanese Army officers – 
indispensable for drug smuggling – also helped them to grow in political power. Although 
this power growth is not comparable to the rise of Hezbollah – with whom they militarily 
clashed in 1986 – the A„shayer. The post-war period elections have witnessed a competition 
between the Hezbollah and the A„shayer electoral lists. However, the former has largely 
imposed itself on the political scene. Its dominance grew with time, and by 2009 the 
A„shayer‟s electoral power was marginal and did not constitute a real threat to Hezbollah 
dominancy.  
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2.7.3 The Rise of Hezbollah in Hermel  
 Post 2005 Hariri Hezbollah relationship 
Hariri‟s first government occurred during the dynamic of the peace process launched 
by the Madrid conference in 1991, in which Syria was participating. Many political and 
economical analysts considered that Hariri‟s political agenda speculated on the success of the 
Madrid equation, whereby the normalization of relations between the Arabs states and Israel 
was a key factor. As a consequence, relations between Hezbollah – opposed to the peace 
process and defined by its armed resistance against Israel – and Hariri became increasingly 
conflicting and tense. On September 13, 1993, the Lebanese Army open fired on a Hezbollah 
demonstration against the Oslo peace process. However, with the collapse of Madrid process, 
and the Syrian change in position, relations between the two Lebanese power brokers slowly 
normalized. During the 1996 Lebanon-Israeli war, and Hariri‟s successful efforts to stop it 
and to obtain an accord in favor of Lebanon, which de-facto recognized the right of the 
Lebanese resistance to fight and bear arms, relations improved further. 
Consensus between the two parties, premised on a construction-resistance slogan, was 
based on a mutual will for denial / cooperation. Hezbollah would keep a low profile on 
Hariri‟s economic reforms, and Hariri would accept the Shiite movement‟s armed resistance 
in the south. This equation held even after the Liberation of the South in 2000. However, 
“victorious” Hezbollah did not claim additional powers, and kept “denying” Hariri‟s 
economic actions, whereas Hariri would not raise the issues of the party‟s weapons. The 
priority of Hezbollah was focused on the preservation of the weapons of its resistance forces. 
Its strength was based in its popular support in the Bekaa region, in the South and the 
southern suburbs of Beirut, and its Syrian and Iranian affiliations.  
 The rise of Hezbollah in Hermel 
As a matter of fact, Hezbollah grew independently of the state apparatus, creating its 
own social institutions – including agricultural extension services – and charity networks, 
financed by Iran and wealthy Shiite community members. The party offered a political and 
social structure parallel to the one of the state (Charara, 2006), and an alternative to traditional 
Shiite leadership that was weakened by the war. It is through these institutions and its 
national-resistance discourse that the power of Hezbollah has been growing in Hermel since 
 1982 till the present. However, the priority given to the resistance against the Israeli 
occupation and the consequent accords with Hariri required from the party to put aside the 
socio-economic and developmental needs of the regions under its political influence. 
Since 1998 – date of the first municipal election after the civil war – Hezbollah 
controls the Hermel Caza municipalities. The role played by the party – through its social 
network and through the municipalities – in rural development in Hermel is discussed in 
Chapter 5. 
2.8 Synthesis 
It is worth noting two important characteristics of the political economy of Lebanon 
explored by this review: 
 The first is related to the different “intensities” of capital penetration between that 
of the core of the country – Beirut and Mount Lebanon – and that of the periphery 
of the country, mainly the areas added in 1920 by the French Mandate. The 
differences in capital penetration created a still-present disparity in economic 
development between these two regions.  
 The second characteristic is the re-production and deepening of territorial 
disparities with time and with the changes in ruling elite(s). 
 
Changes to the ruling class in Lebanon have followed the patterns described by Lachman 
(1990), mainly through violent confessional confrontations of elites, during which non-elite 
demands were delegitimized and confessional/religious minority fears were instrumentalized. 
This pattern of behavior was witnessed in 1841, 1861, 1958, and during the civil war(s) 
between 1975 and 1990. In post-war Lebanon, similar patterns of elite-elite conflict resolution 
are still present, as in the Sunni-Shiite clashes of May 2008. 
However, these violent changes have all kept intact the confessional system and the patron-
client relations that characterize both that between citizens and their political leadership and 
that between the political leadership and the state. The confessional system and the patron-
client relationships thereby allow successions of rulings elites (traders, bankers and rural 
landlords) to preserve a mode of production that serves their interests: a political economic 
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model based on the development of the country‟s core and at the expense of the rural 
periphery. This pattern of development has been repeated since 1943. Moreover, subsequent 
policies designed to challenge the status quo through implementing a more equal distribution 
of wealth were appropriated by the political leadership and used to maintain their power.  
Within this context, the rise of Hezbollah as a political force – despite its roots in the 
oppressed Shiite classes and its dethroning of the traditional landlord elites of the Shiite 
community – did not change the system. The party‟s particular organizational structure and 
the services is provides – independent and parallel to that of the state – as well as its 
prioritization of military issues, did not promote or allow for a dynamic of change to the 
socio-economic realities in the region under its influence, e.g. Hermel. 
The following Chapter discusses the issues of territorial inequalities apropos structural 
economics, together with an analysis of the main economic characteristics of the Lebanese 
model. 
  
   
 
  
3 Structural Analysis of Lebanon’s Economy  
 
 
 Chapter’s outline 
The present Chapter proposes a structural analysis of the Lebanese economy and 
agricultural sector using a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) based on the National Economic 
Account (NEA) 2005 (PCM, 2007) and the Household Living Condition Survey (HLCS) 
of the same year. The resulting 202x202 Social Accounting Matrix for Lebanon 2005 
(SAMLEB05) is the first estimation of a disaggregated accounting framework of that type for 
the country. It was constructed in order to highlights three elements: labor structure, income 
distribution and food consumption. (SAMLEB05 is fully annexed)  
The Chapter is divided into two main parts the first one condensed in a unique Section 
(3.1) present the methodology used for the estimation and the results organized in a 
meaningful manner in order to help in the analysis that is carried out on income distribution 
(Section 3.2), the service sector (3.3) on the labor and capital productivity n the industrial 
sector (Section 3.3); and the Features of the Lebanese agriculture in Section (3.5) and 
constitute the second part of the Chapter.  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
“They oppressed you, they made you hungry.  
They said „you are good for a minibus driver 
 or a gasoil smuggler.‟ 
 In Baalbak there are no job opportunities  
Cultivate a piece of land, you get broke 
Go to Beirut to work 
Kiss people‟s hands to get work with the Army or the Police 
Or work in a private security company as a statue  
[Or] in a restaurant as a servant. 
If you eat from the Sultan‟s bread, you get killed by his sword.” 
 
Toffar rap group from Hermel – expressing the “malaise” of youth in rural area 
Toffar (2010: CD track 01, author’s translation)   
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3.1 Methodology: construction of a SAM for Lebanon 2005  
3.1.1 From the Macro to the Micro SAM 
A Social Accounting Matrix is a comprehensive framework, registering all transaction 
flows within a national, or regional economy. It is constructed from input-output tables and 
expands the view of the economy by including households, government and saving-
investments, through integrating data from national accounts and household surveys in a 
comprehensive manner. It was first proposed by Stone (1966) and Pyatt and Round (1985). 
The SAM is a map of the economy at a certain point in time (usually a specific year). 
It shows the “transformation” and distribution of specific economic variables such as, the 
transformation of production costs into payments to factors of production and their 
redistribution as income to specific institutions - households, the government and the rest of 
the world. Then this income is transformed into household expenditures, savings and taxes. 
The SAM framework is flexible as it can be constructed at various disaggregation levels. 
Starting from a Macro-SAM and perform further disaggregation has been the 
methodology used by most IFPRI CGE modeling project (Round, 2003). However, 
disaggregation methodology is based on a series of assumption, especially in regard to 
distribution of income, as most data available are related to input-output tables and to 
consumptions. The assumptions are based on the specific structure of the economy and 
therefore the disaggregation process is country specific, although it follows a similar logic. 
Thiele and Piazolo (2002), Yusef (2006), Dorosh and Niazi (2006) describe in details the 
methodology used for the construction of a SAM for Bolivia, Indonesia and Pakistan 
respectively. The SAM presented in this research is the first disaggregated SAM done for 
Lebanon. Then it was not possible to contrast the matrix obtain with other studies, or apply an 
estimation approach already use in the literature. However several indicators show the 
accuracy of the estimation. The first one is the Gini index calculate based on income, which 
came out similar to the poverty index estimate based on consumption by the 2008 UNDP, 
MOSA poverty report (see Sub-section 3.3.1). The second indicator is the similar results 
obtained for the abolition of tariffs simulation, and the VAT increase simulation with previous 
literature (see Chapter 4 Section 4.4.3 and 4.4.4). The estimation methodology and the 
assumptions used for the construction of SAMLEB05 are described in the following. 
 3.1.2 Macro-SAM for Lebanon 2005 
Table 3-1 is the macro-SAM for Lebanon 2005. It has been elaborated using the 
Lebanese National Economic Accounts (NEA) 2005 (PCM, 2007), which constitutes the 
starting point for the construction of the 202x202 micro-SAM (see annex). However, some 
values in the Macro-SAM differ from the NEA values. These differences are due to: (1) 
Updates in  tax figures  and administration accounts in further publications by the Ministry of 
Finance (2006); (2) Updates to the input-output Table made after the publication of the NAE 
by the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers, which were communicated to the 
author personally; (3) Elaboration of the data in order to calculate GDP at factor cost using an 
income approach, and obtaining a different breakdown of tax accounts. 
The major change is in relation to the energy and water sector, which shows a negative 
added value in the NAE, to the budget deficit of Electricitè du Liban (EDL) and accounted for 
974 Billion LBP in 2005, this deficit is compensated by direct transfer from the Government -
mostly the gas oil bills of EDL
22
. In SAMLEB05 they are considered as a direct subsidy to the 
sector. Another important difference from NAE is related to the government asset 
depreciation which has been removed from government expenditure has it does not represent 
an income flow. 
As a matter of fact, the macro-SAM working draft extracted from the NAE data was 
refined in parallel with the disaggregation process, which consisted of three main steps: (1) 
the disaggregation of the input-output table; (2) the disaggregation of income,(3) the 
disaggregation of the household account. 
Finally the matrix obtained was balanced using a cross entropy method as included in the 
IFPRI model in GAMS. All data presented in this Chapter (including Table 1.1) is compiled 
from the final balanced SAM that was used as a benchmark for the CGE model presented in 
Chapter 4. The micro-SAM has 201 accounts (plus a TOTAL account), presented in Table 3-2 
hereby: 
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Table 3-1: Lebanon Macro-SAM 2005 
in LBP billions 
Activities Commodities Factors Households Government Capital ROW Total 
Activities 
  
Sales      
Total 
domestic 
Production 
  45.558           45.558 
Commodities 
Intermediate 
outputs 
Marketing 
margins 
 
Private 
consumption 
Gov. 
consumption 
Investment 
expenditures 
Exports 
Total 
marketed 
supply 
17,157 5,226   28,801 3,426 7,074 5,335 61,793 
Factors 
Value added       
Total 
factor 
income 
27,964             27,964 
Households 
    
Income  
Transfers 
from gov. 
 Remittances 
Total 
househ. 
income 
    24,464   3,605   7,849 35,918 
Government 
Indirect 
taxes 
Imports 
tariffs 
Gov 
income   
from 
factors 
Income  
taxes and 
other 
   
Total gov. 
income 
437 2,642 2,166 2,635       7,880 
Capital 
   
Households 
saving 
Government 
saving 
 
Foreign 
savings 
Total 
savings 
      4,482 -926   3,519 7,074 
ROW 
 Imports 
Factors 
income 
paid to 
ROW 
 
Gov. income 
paid to ROW 
  
Foreign 
ex.outlays 
  13,593 1,334   1,776     16,702 
Total 
Total cost of 
production 
Total 
absorption 
Total value 
added 
Total 
household 
expenditure 
Total gov. 
expenditure 
Total 
investment 
For. 
exchange 
earnings 
 
45,558 61,793 27,964 35,918 7,880 7,074 16,702   
Source: NEA and SAMLEB05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3-2: The SAMLEB05 202 accounts 
Macro SAM accounts Micro SAM accounts 
Activities 9 accounts 
Agriculture (AGR), agro-industry (AGIND), industry 
(IND), construction (CONS), energy and water (ENW), 
Transport and telecommunication (TTCOM), services 
(SER), trade (TRADE), public administration (ADMIN)                                                  
Commodities 24 accounts + 3 accounts for trade margins 
Agricultural commodities (7): cereals (CRL), fruits 
(FRT), industrial crops (INDCRP), vegetables (VEGT), 
livestock (LIVES), livestock products (LIVESPR), and 
fish (FISH). Agro-industrial commodities (10): fresh 
meat (FRMT), food preserves (FPR), dairy products 
(DAIRY), fat and oil (FATOL), pasta (PASTA), sugar-
chocolate- sweets (SGCHS), alcoholic beverages 
(ALBVRG), non-alcoholic beverages (NALBVRG), other 
food products (OTHER) and tobacco (TABAC). Each of 
the other 7 sectors produces one commodity 
respectively: CIND, CCONS, CENW, CTTCOM, CSER, 
CTRADE and CADMIN. Trade margins are divided 
into three accounts: domestic (TRNCSTDOM), on 
import (TRNCSTIMP) and on export (TRNCSTEXP) 
Factors 8 accounts 
Capital (1): (CAP), mixed income (2): Farm unit: 
(FARM) and self-employment (SELF). Labor (5): high 
skilled labor (HGSK), white collar (WHCL), blue collar 
(BLCL), armed forces (ARMED) and foreign labor 
(FGNLAB) 
Households 150 accounts 
Households are divided across 10 equals consumption 
deciles, which are in turn divided across 15 strata.  
Government 4 accounts  
The government account (GOV) and three tax 
accounts: direct taxes on households (YTAX), taxes on 
activities (ATAX) and tariffs (TAR) 
Capital 2 accounts 
Investments and savings (S-I) and changes in stocks 
(DSTK) 
ROW 1 account 
Rest of the world (ROW) 
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3.1.3 Disaggregation of the input-output table 
The output-input table allows to disaggregate the following cells of the macro-SAM: 
sales, intermediate inputs, trade margins (on domestic, imported and exported commodities 
assuming a constant ratio between total good value and trade margins), imports tariffs, 
imports, exports, investment expenditure (further disaggregated into GFCF and changes in 
stocks), and indirect taxes after correcting the value added data of the NAE in order to obtain 
factors cost values. 
The disaggregation of the input-output available in the NAE follows from the data 
obtained through personal communication with the Office of the President of the Council of 
Ministers (PCM). The original table published in the NAE takes into consideration eight 
sectors of economic activity; however, for the purpose of this research the industrial sector 
has been disaggregated into industry and agro-industry, resulting in a nine-sector output-input 
table that contains nine sectors of production, and 22 commodities.   
 Tables 3-3 and 3-4  shows the structure of use of goods in Lebanon in 2005 
  
  
Table 3-3: Structure of commodities uses and resources as percentage of total 
(2005) 
    USES 
Total 
uses = 
resources 
RESOURCES  
  Commodities Intermediate 
uses 
Final 
consumption 
(private + 
Gov) 
GFCF 
and 
DSTK 
Exports Output Imports Taxes 
on 
Imports 
Trade 
Margins 
AGR CRL 1.84 0.16 -0.57 0.02 0.53 0.21 1.48   0.65 
FRT 1.71 2.31   3.34 1.97 1.76 0.65 0.76 5.82 
INDCRP 1.01 0.11   1.69 0.49 0.23 0.98 0.45 1.00 
VEGT 0.76 2.51   0.97 1.60 1.37 1.04 2.42 3.06 
LIVES 3.02 0.00 0.28   0.87 0.67 1.64   0.23 
LIVESPR 0.02 0.91   0.36 0.51 0.49 0.04 0.04 1.72 
FISH 0.01 0.79   0.05 0.42 0.13 0.45 0.08 2.66 
TOTAL AGR 8.38 6.80 -0.28 6.42 6.39 4.84 6.28 3.75 15.13 
AGIND FRMT 0.00 3.54   0.13 1.86 1.80 0.68 0.19 4.42 
FPR 0.23 0.75   1.65 0.60 0.32 1.04 2.16 0.52 
DAIRY 0.38 2.23 -1.00 0.09 1.16 0.60 1.93 1.21 2.85 
FATOL 0.51 1.35   0.64 0.90 0.57 1.10 0.42 2.64 
PASTA 0.05 2.71   0.71 1.49 1.45 0.90 0.79 2.22 
SGCHS 0.92 0.59   1.48 0.69 0.50 1.11 0.98 0.44 
ALBVRG   0.41   0.43 0.25 0.11 0.40 0.87 0.54 
NALBVRG   1.15   0.62 0.66 0.76 0.07 0.11 0.92 
OTHER 0.37 1.46   0.81 0.93 0.73 0.93 0.72 1.88 
TABAC   1.75   0.06 0.92 0.05 1.35 8.97 2.39 
TOTAL AGIND 2.46 15.93 -1.00 6.62 9.45 6.87 9.50 16.43 18.81 
OTHER 
SECTORS 
CIND 37.76 21.22 33.46 58.62 30.44 13.38 60.61 52.23 59.27 
CCONS     68.67   7.86 10.66       
CENW 21.28 6.28 -0.85 0.19 9.10 2.92 23.61 27.59 6.79 
CTTCOM 13.34 7.61   3.81 8.00 10.85       
CSER 16.78 31.54   7.18 21.73 29.47       
CTRADE       17.17 1.48 13.48     -100 
CADMIN   10.63     5.54 7.52       
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
Source: author’s elaboration of National economic account data (PCM, 2007) 
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Table 3-4: Structure of uses and resources as percent of total uses for each 
commodity (2005) 
    USES 
Total 
uses = 
resources 
RESOURCES  
  Commodities Intermediate 
uses 
Final 
consumption 
(private + 
Gov) 
GFCF 
and 
DSTK 
Exports Output Imports Taxes 
on 
Imports 
Trade 
Margins 
AGR CRL 95.95 15.85 -12.17 0.36 100 28.59 61.13 0.00 10.27 
FRT 24.16 61.22   14.63 100 66.06 7.31 1.64 24.98 
INDCRP 58.00 12.00   30.00 100 34.33 44.33 4.00 17.33 
VEGT 13.12 81.63   5.25 100 63.07 14.33 6.46 16.15 
LIVES 96.28   3.72   100 56.32 41.45   2.23 
LIVESPR 1.26 92.74   5.99 100 69.72 1.58 0.32 28.39 
FISH 0.96 98.07   0.97 100 22.01 23.55 0.77 53.67 
TOTAL AGR 36.40 55.43 -0.51 8.67 100 55.86 21.62 2.51 20.02 
AGIND FRMT   99.39   0.61 100 71.43 8.01 0.43 20.12 
FPR 10.57 65.58   23.85 100 39.02 38.21 15.45 7.32 
DAIRY 9.05 100.14 -9.89 0.70 100 38.30 36.49 4.46 20.75 
FATOL 15.80 78.10   6.10 100 46.50 26.75 1.97 24.78 
PASTA 0.98 94.88   4.13 100 71.71 13.38 2.29 12.62 
SGCHS 37.09 44.37   18.54 100 53.05 35.45 6.10 5.40 
ALBVRG   85.06   14.94 100 31.17 35.72 14.94 18.18 
NALBVRG   91.85   8.15 100 85.19 2.22 0.74 11.85 
OTHER 10.94 81.60   7.47 100 57.81 21.88 3.30 17.01 
TABAC   99.45   0.55 100 3.88 32.28 41.80 22.04 
TOTAL AGIND 7.23 87.94 -1.22 6.05 100 53.62 22.11 7.43 16.83 
OTHER 
SECTORS 
CIND 34.44 36.35 12.58 16.62 100 32.40 43.80 7.34 16.47 
CCONS     100   100 100       
CENW 64.92 35.97 -1.07 0.18 100 23.67 57.06 12.96 6.31 
CTTCOM 46.30 49.60   4.11 100 100       
CSER 21.44 75.71   2.85 100 100       
CTRADE       100 100 670.52     -570.52 
CADMIN   100     100 100       
TOTAL 27.77 52.15 11.45 8.63 100 73.73 22.00 4.28   
Source: author’s elaboration of National economic account data (PCM, 2007) 
 
  
 3.1.4 The disaggregation of value added 
In the absence of data from household surveys, income is desegregated using 
estimation calculations based on variables of the Household Living Condition Survey 2004-
05 (HLCS) – average wages, expenditure per capita – and on data from various studies. For 
each activity, value added at factor cost has been disaggregated following the rationale of 
income distribution between the main agents in the economy: the government, the enterprises 
and the workers. As shown in equation 1, value added is the sum of government return on 
capital, profit and mixed income of enterprises, and workers‟ wages. In the process, three 
types of enterprises are considered: 
Equation 1: Disaggregation of value added 
                                                  
   
             
   
 
                                                                
                                                       
                                                      
                                     
                                                                     
                                                                    
                                               
Companies owned by employers and having waged workers. In that case employers 
receive profit from capital: (factor of production CAP). 
Farms, exploited by farmers and their households or by landowners employing farm 
tenants. In that case, farmers receive mixed income from their labor and from land, while 
landowners receive profits, (both under the factor of production FARM). Note that tenants 
receive wages.  
Self-employed agents who receive mixed income from their labor and form their 
returns on investment (factor of production: SELF).  
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Lebanese workers receive wages from four categories of labor: 
 High skilled labor (HGSKL) which includes specialists and corporate 
managers according to the household living condition (HLCS) survey 
categories (MOSA; 2004), (HGSKL) 
 White colt labor (WHTcl) which includes  intermediate professionals, and 
office employees HLCS categories  
 Blue colt labor (BLUct) which includes service/sales labor, skilled labor, and 
unskilled labor HLCS categories 
 Armed forces labor (ARMED) which includes the same category in the HLCS 
 Foreign workers receive wages that are then paid to the rest of the world 
(ROW) from the FGNLAB factors of production.  
The total income for each labor factor is determined through a two-step process 
synthesized in equation 2. First total labor income for each activity is determined by 
multiplying the total number of workers by the average wage in the sector of activity (data 
extracted and adapted from the HLCS). Then this total amount is distributed across different 
factors of production used by the activity and weighted by the specific wage of the labor type, 
as shown in equation 2. 
Equation 2: Estimation of Labor factor income for activity a and labor l 
              
   
  
     
                                        
                                      
                             
                                 
Government income from capital factors of production being given (NAE data), 
enterprise profits are determined by first calculating the total amount for each activity by 
subtracting government and workers‟ income from total value added. As no data on the 
income of employers, self-employed, and farmers were made available by public institutions, 
the share of each enterprise was estimated simultaneously with the distribution of – CAP, 
 FARM, SELF – factors income to household groups. Each household receives a share of total 
capital income as a weighted average of the number of employers and self-employed within 
each household group (Unpublished elaborated data from HLCS). The weight used for this 
average is the value added per region for each type of enterprise, (see the small and medium 
enterprise survey Hamdan (2005) and per household consumption (HLCS unpublished 
elaborated data). Equation 3 synthesizes this process.  
Equation 3: Distribution of household capital and mixed income.  
                                             
   
  
               
                   
         
                             
                                                              
                                                               
                                                              
                                                 
Hereby, Table 3-5 show distribution of production cost, and Tables 3-6 and 3-7 present 
the result of the disaggregation of value added across factors of production. 
Table 3-5: Distribution of production cost across inputs, factors and taxes as 
percentage of total cost (2005) 
    AGR AGIND IND CONS ENW TTCOM SER TRADE ADMIN TOTAL 
Intermediate inputs 22.47 52.89 60.42 45.06 114.05 52.27 18.63 20.37 37.36 37.66 
Factors of production 77.48 45.23 37.86 53.19 58.38 46.22 77.36 70.87 62.64 61.38 
Taxes 0.05 1.88 1.72 1.75 -72.43 1.52 4.01 8.76   0.96 
Total output value 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: author’s elaboration of National economic account data (PCM, 2007) 
Note on Table: 3-5 In theory, taxes on activities - apart from agriculture - should be more/around 10%, which is the VAT 
tax rate, to which several administrative taxes are added. However, tax rates are lower because enterprises with turnover 
rates under a certain level are exempted from taxes, and the government, despite some recent improvements, still faces 
difficulties in collecting taxes. The very low tax rate for industry is indicative of the significantly large informal sector, 
and the burgeoning of very small entrepreneurship. This situation is similar in the other sectors where the level of self-
employment is high; an example could be the large number of self-employed taxis and mini-bus drivers in private 
transportation. The state ownership of telecommunication creates a situation government income from the TTCOM sector 
is not considered as a tax but as a payment from CAP factor of production to the government. 
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Table 3-6: Disaggregation of value added across factors of production aspercentage 
share of total for each sector (2005) 
    AGR AGIND IND CONS ENW TTCOM SER TRADE ADMIN TOTAL 
Capital    71.59 41.47 43.30 91.44 63.75 41.02 44.16   40.90 
Mixed 
income 
Farm 73.85                 4.52 
Self-empl.    10.79 24.16 22.07  22.99 25.59 26.25   20.05 
Labor  HGSKL   0.76 1.48 0.61 0.42 0.82 6.23 1.27 39.59 5.84 
WHTcl   3.95 7.79 2.30 2.22 8.82 14.73 7.64 10.01 9.27 
BLUcl 10.70 11.92 23.18 12.26 5.91 3.63 8.60 18.16 13.27 11.80 
ARMED                 37.13 2.85 
FNGLAB 15.45 0.99 1.92 19.46     3.84 2.52   4.77 
Total Labor 26.15 17.62 34.38 34.63 8.56 13.27 33.39 29.59 100 35.53 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Source: SAMLEB05 
Table 3-7: Disaggregation of value added across factors of production as percentage 
share of total for each factor (2005) 
  
  AGR AGIND IND CONS ENW TTCOM SER TRADE ADMIN TOTAL 
Capital    8.86 8.36 9.78 6.21 12.73 37.25 16.81   100 
Mixed 
income 
Farm 100                 100 
Self-empl.    2.72 9.94 10.17 0.00 9.36 47.42 20.38   100 
Labor  HGSKL   0.66 2.09 0.96 0.20 1.14 39.58 3.38 51.99 100 
WHTcl   2.16 6.94 2.30 0.67 7.77 59.04 12.83 8.29 100 
BLUcl 5.54 5.11 16.20 9.60 1.39 2.51 27.06 23.95 8.63 100 
ARMED                 100 100 
FNGLAB 19.81 1.05 3.32 37.71     29.87 8.24   100 
Total Labor 4.63 2.58 8.21 9.27 0.69 3.14 35.92 13.34 22.22 100 
Total GDP SHARE 6.12 5.06 8.25 9.24 2.78 8.17 37.14 15.57 7.67 100 
Source: SAMLEB05         
3.1.5 Disaggregation of the household account 
The household account of the Macro-SAM has been disaggregated into 150 household 
types in a two-step process. First the household survey raw data were elaborated to obtain 15 
household groups according to geographical distribution, or strata. Then from the first 
disaggregation households were distributed into deciles of equal size, based on their per-
capita consumption, Table 3-8 shows the distribution of the deciles groups across the different 
strata.  
 Household income is the sum of the household share of each of the factor income, 
transfers from the government (to employees and as interest payment of government 
securities), and remittances from the rest of the world. Government transfers to employees 
(other than wages) are directly extracted from national accounts and distributed proportionally 
according to the number of government employees in each household group. Households are 
assumed to invest their savings in government securities; therefore, each household group 
receives a share of government interest domestic payment proportional to its savings prior to 
the interest payment. The latter assumption holds because of the important borrowing policies 
undertaken by the government starting from 1992. 
Equation 4 below shows the estimation method used for the distribution of factor 
income across different households. 
Equation 4: Household income 
               
           
                   
      
 
          
     
   
      
                     
         
      
  
                  
     
         
       
                            
                                                       
                                                     
                                                         
                                                                       
                                                                 
                                          
The result of the disaggregation of the households account into consumption deciles is 
presented in Tables 3-9 and 3-10, and in Tables 3-11 and 3-13 by strata. Table 3-14 shows 
households deciles consumptions shares. Data on income and consumption of the 150 
households groups can be extracted from SAMLEB05 (see annex).  
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Table 3-8: Distribution of household deciles across strata (2005) 
  HHD_1 HHD_2 HHD_3 HHD_4 HHD_5 HHD_6 HHD_7 HHD_8 HHD_9 HHD_10 Total  
North Lebanon Akkar/minieh-dennieh 28.82 22.04 12.88 12.03 6.41 4.84 3.06 1.88 1.05 0.71 9.95 
Tripoly city 14.36 7.95 4.48 4.97 4.01 2.28 2.35 1.94 3.46 0.93 5.00 
Koura/Zgharta/Batroun/Bsharre 1.45 1.60 2.35 1.51 3.21 2.74 3.24 2.13 2.28 4.20 3.57 
Total 44.64 31.60 19.70 18.51 13.63 9.86 8.64 5.95 6.79 5.84 18.52 
Mont Lebanon Keserwan/jbeil 0.22 0.22 1.27 2.50 4.01 4.50 5.53 9.53 7.65 14.67 5.41 
Maten 0.59 0.89 2.19 3.42 4.50 7.31 9.12 10.79 11.00 11.34 9.87 
Baabda 8.20 9.93 14.64 15.12 15.60 14.57 18.22 14.16 13.14 9.97 14.71 
Shouf/Aley 5.15 10.57 9.42 9.29 12.43 12.32 11.05 11.32 11.91 10.31 12.30 
Total 14.15 21.61 27.51 30.33 36.54 38.70 43.92 45.80 43.71 46.29 42.29 
Beirut city 0,34 1.48 3.03 2.68 4.66 6.96 6.73 8.88 15.12 20.75 11.40 
South Lebanon Jezzine/Saida 13.50 15.94 11.92 6.39 7.52 5.39 4.88 5.24 4.38 4.94 7.29 
Sour 5.52 5.80 8.09 7.62 4.90 4.74 4.08 3.33 2.59 1.76 2.85 
Total  19.02 21.73 20.01 14.01 12.43 10.14 8.95 8.57 6.97 6.70 10.14 
Nabatieh 
Administration 
Nabatieh 0.80 3.70 4.57 5.06 4.87 8.13 8.89 9.16 6.20 6.11 3.18 
Bent Jbeil/Marjaayoun/Hasbayya 1.91 3.67 5.31 6.85 5.61 5.02 5.31 4.23 3.67 1.85 2.73 
Total  2.71 7.37 9.88 11.91 10.48 13.15 14.20 13.39 9.87 7.97 5.91 
Bekaa  West Bekaa/Rashayya 5.92 6.23 6.55 8.27 8.70 6.72 6.45 8.42 8.33 4.35 4.47 
Zahle 3.85 2.68 3.77 4.41 5.67 5.88 5.40 5.09 6.70 6.70 3.28 
Hermel/Baalbek 9.37 7.31 9.54 9.87 7.89 8.60 5.68 3.89 2.50 1.39 5.03 
Total  19.14 16.21 19.86 22.55 22.26 21.20 17.54 17.40 17.53 12.44 12.78 
TOTAL HHD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: SAMLEB05 
 
 Table 3-9: Distribution of income across household deciles as percentage of total factors income (2005) 
  Factors of production  
Factors 
Gov 
Transfers 
Remittances 
Grand 
Total CAP FARM SELFempl. HGSKL WHTcl BLUcl ARMED TOTAL   
HHD_1 0.16 8.56 2.14 1.12 2.27 12.18 3.58 3.07 3.07 2.33 7.29 3.92 
HHD_2 0.63 7.80 3.65 1.34 2.61 11.33 6.76 3.59 3.59 3.45 9.07 4.77 
HHD_3 0.70 11.73 4.22 2.04 3.86 11.18 6.85 4.11 4.11 3.41 9.72 5.27 
HHD_4 1.15 10.45 5.49 2.86 6.41 8.68 9.85 4.59 4.59 4.32 10.36 5.83 
HHD_5 2.25 11.38 6.21 5.94 7.44 10.60 12.97 5.90 5.90 6.31 9.79 6.79 
HHD_6 3.26 9.38 7.06 7.65 9.61 9.53 12.12 6.54 6.54 6.53 11.76 7.68 
HHD_7 6.14 10.02 9.33 10.45 12.32 9.07 14.99 8.70 8.70 8.08 10.12 8.94 
HHD_8 9.59 10.65 10.75 13.09 14.04 10.29 14.80 10.88 10.88 9.49 9.84 10.51 
HHD_9 11.81 10.60 16.08 18.59 18.53 8.26 11.43 13.40 13.40 10.40 14.19 13.27 
HHD_10 64.31 9.43 35.09 36.92 22.91 8.87 6.66 39.22 39.22 45.67 7.87 33.01 
TOTAL HHD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Households 81.07 100 100 100 100 71.22 100 87.49     
GOV 18.93         7.75     
ROW         28.78  4.77     
TOTAL  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100     
Source: SAMLEB05 
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Table 3-10: Distribution of income across household deciles as percentage of total deciles income (2005) 
  Factors of production  
Factors 
Gov 
Transfers 
Remittances 
Grand 
Total CAP FARM SELFempl. HGSKL WHTcl BLUcl ARMED TOTAL   
HHD_1 2.00 14.40 16.01 2.44 7.83 53.53 3.80 100 53.38 5.96 40.66 100 
HHD_2 6.96 11.20 23.27 2.49 7.69 42.54 6.12 100 51.26 7.25 41.50 100 
HHD_3 6.41 14.72 23.52 3.32 9.94 36.66 5.42 100 53.18 6.50 40.32 100 
HHD_4 9.52 11.73 27.36 4.16 14.76 25.48 6.98 100 53.71 7.45 38.84 100 
HHD_5 14.44 9.96 24.11 6.73 13.36 24.24 7.16 100 59.16 9.33 31.51 100 
HHD_6 18.87 7.40 24.71 7.81 15.54 19.65 6.03 100 58.03 8.54 33.43 100 
HHD_7 26.79 5.94 24.57 8.02 15.00 14.06 5.61 100 66.23 9.06 24.71 100 
HHD_8 33.42 5.05 22.63 8.03 13.66 12.76 4.43 100 70.48 9.08 20..40 100 
HHD_9 33.43 4.08 27.49 9.26 14.65 8.32 2.78 100 68.77 7.87 23.36 100 
HHD_10 62.19 1.24 20.50 6.29 6.18 3.05 0.55 100 80.91 13.88 5.21 100 
TOTAL HHD 37.92 5.16 22.91 6.68 10.59 13.49 3.26 100 68.12 10.04 21.85 100 
Households 37.92 5.16 22.91 6.68 10.59 13.49 3.26 100     
GOV 100         100     
ROW           100   100     
TOTAL  40.92 4.51 20.04 5.84 9.26 16.57 2.85 100     
Source: SAMLEB05 
 
 
 
 Table 3-11: Distribution of income across strata as percentage of total strata income (2005) 
   Factors of production  Factors  Gov 
transfers 
Remittances Grand 
total  
CAP FARM SELFempl. HGSKL WHTcl BLUcl ARMED TOTAL   
North Lebanon Akkar/minieh-dennieh 11.18 14.22 20.44 6.38 10.28 24.11 13.39 100 56.61 12.05 31.33 100 
Tripoly city 11.83 4.25 21.82 14.06 16.09 26.54 5.41 100 61.88 11.70 26.43 100 
Koura/Zgharta/Batroun/Bsharre 27.58 16.44 14.55 8.17 10.87 17.21 5.17 100 59.11 16.18 24.70 100 
Total 15.61 11.88 19.32 9.09 12.13 23.04 8.93 100 58.72 13.01 28.27 100 
Mont Lebanon Keserwan/Jbeil 45.28 2.69 28.57 5.10 9.51 7.84 1.02 100 78.18 11.90 9.92 100 
Maten 45.57 0.99 19.85 5.72 12.35 12.96 2.57 100 74.09 10.06 15.85 100 
Baabda 27.73 0.21 25.55 8.51 14.87 19.63 3.49 100 63.82 5.60 30.58 100 
Shouf/Aley 45.35 1.85 19.21 5.40 11.49 13.30 3.41 100 73.15 9.28 17.58 100 
Total 40.49 1.39 23.29 6.27 12.16 13.71 2.68 100 71.52 8.86 19.61 100 
Beirut city 56,89  22.48 5.69 7.38 7.12 0.44 100 78.27 11.38 10.09 100 
South Lebanon Jezzine/Saida 19.22 3.49 30.11 7.37 12.75 24.15 2.91 100 65.28 8.13 26.60 100 
Sour 13.62 14.08 34.01 9.22 11.27 16.38 1.42 100 60.90 8.26 30.84 100 
Total  17.02 7.65 31.64 8.09 12.17 21.10 2.33 100 63.48 8.18 28.33 100 
Nabatieh Administration Nabatieh 16.27 4.20 43.82 11.71 10.45 10.88 2.67 100 54.42 9.85 35.73 100 
Bent Jbeil/Marjaayoun/Hasbayya 24.58 20.15 28.74 3.61 9.43 11.54 1.95 100 60.76 12.75 26.49 100 
Total  19.78 10.94 37.45 8.29 10.02 11.16 2.37 100 56.93 11.00 32.07 100 
Bekaa  West Bekaa/Rashayya 38.52 15.50 11.25 6.37 8.01 11.44 8.91 100 57.12 10.16 37.81 100 
Zahle 41.50 17.73 13.32 5.38 8.93 8.83 4.31 100 62.68 8.42 22.85 100 
Hermel/Baalbek 23.49 36.35 12.34 5.98 5.26 10.11 6.46 100 54.60 9.06 36.34 100 
Total  35.69 21.90 12.34 5.88 7.63 10.08 6.48 100 58.23 9.28 32.49 100 
TOTAL HHD 37,92 5.16 22.91 6.68 10.59 13.49 3.26 100 68.12 10.04 21.85 100 
Source: SAMLEB05 
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Table 3-12: Distribution of income across strata as percentage of total factor income (2005) 
   Factors of production  Factors  Gov 
transfers 
Remittances Grand 
total  
CAP FARM SELFempl. HGSKL WHTcl BLUcl ARMED TOTAL   
North Lebanon Akkar/minieh-dennieh 1.61 15.05 4.87 5.22 5.30 9.76 22.45 5.46 5.46 7.89 9.42 6.57 
Tripoly city 1.11 2.93 3.39 7.50 5.42 7.01 5.93 3.56 3.56 4.57 4.75 3.92 
Koura/Zgharta/Batroun/Bsharre 2.29 10.01 2.00 3.85 3.23 4.01 4.99 3.14 3.14 5.84 4.10 3.62 
Total 15.61 28.01 10.26 16.57 13.94 20.79 33.37 12.17 12.17 18.31 18.26 14.12 
Mont Lebanon Keserwan/Jbeil 12.34 5.38 12.89 7.89 9.28 6.01 3.24 10.33 10.33 10.68 4.09 9.00 
Maten 12.16 1.94 8.77 8.67 11.80 9.73 7.98 10.12 10.12 9.33 6.75 9.31 
Baabda 9.02 0.50 13.76 15.72 17.33 17.96 13.21 12.34 12.34 7.34 18.43 13.17 
Shouf/Aley 13.94 4.18 9.77 9.42 12.64 11.49 12.21 11.66 11.66 10.03 8.73 10.85 
Total 47.46 12.00 45.19 41.71 51.06 45.18 36.64 44.45 44.45 37.38 38.01 42.33 
Beirut city 33,09  21.64 18.78 15.38 11.65 2.95 22.06 22.06 21.69 9.13 19.20 
South Lebanon Jezzine/Saida 2.28 3.05 5.92 4.97 5.43 8.07 4.03 4.51 4.51 3.81 5.72 4.70 
Sour 1.05 7.95 4.33 4.02 3.10 3.54 1.27 2.91 2.91 2.68 4.60 3.26 
Total  3.33 11.00 10.25 9.00 8.53 11.61 5.31 7.42 7.42 6.49 10.33 7.96 
Nabatieh Administration Nabatieh 1.17 2.22 5.21 4.78 2.69 2.20 2.24 2.73 2.73 3.35 5.58 3.41 
Bent Jbeil/Marjaayoun/Hasbayya 1.29 7.78 2.50 1.08 1.77 1.70 1.19 1.99 1.99 2.84 2.71 2.23 
Total  2.46 10.00 7.71 5.86 4.46 3.90 3.43 4.72 4.72 6.19 8.29 5.65 
Bekaa  West Bekaa/Rashayya 3.25 9.60 1.57 3.05 2.42 2.71 8.75 3.20 3.20 4.23 7.24 4.18 
Zahle 3.89 12.22 2.07 2.86 3.00 2.33 4.71 3.56 3.56 2.96 3.69 3.52 
Hermel/Baalbak 1.51 17.18 1.31 2.18 1.21 1.83 4.84 2.44 2.44 2.75 5.06 3.04 
Total  8.65 38.99 4.95 8.09 6.63 6.87 18.30 9.19 9.19 9.94 15.99 10.75 
TOTAL HHD 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: SAMLEB05 
 Table 3-13: Households deciles consumption shares (2005) 
 HHD_1 HHD_2 HHD_3 HHD_4 HHD_5 HHD_6 HHD_7 HHD_8 HHD_9 HHD_10 Lebanon 
Total Food  40.34 36.49 34.22 32.41 30.28 28.53 26.70 25.12 22.38 16.38 25.43 
of which: Cereals. breads. pasta 19.52 16.13 14.94 14.34 13.54 12.65 12.25 11.81 11.25 10.54 13.11 
Fruits and vegetables 21.03 20.04 20.78 20.66 20.72 21.29 21.17 21.50 22.09 21.68 21.22 
Dairy and livestock prd 12.14 13.17 13.56 13.91 13.72 13.98 14.71 14.70 14.74 13.13 13.83 
Fish 2.93 2.59 2.25 2.61 2.91 2.74 3.11 3.24 4.00 5.64 3.47 
Meat 11.80 15.00 15.54 15.68 15.15 15.95 16.75 16.30 16.35 15.61 15.58 
Fats and oil 4.54 5.16 4.95 5.02 5.94 5.98 5.13 6.51 6.08 7.68 5.94 
Food conserves  12.53 11.77 11.23 10.79 10.82 9.61 9.61 9.34 8.32 7.36 9.72 
Sweets  2.86 2.65 2.32 2.55 2.42 2.49 2.46 2.59 2.55 2.79 2.58 
Alcoholic beverages 0.14 0.48 0.18 0.56 1.29 1.15 1.43 1.96 2.72 4.32 1.79 
Beverages 4.11 4.34 4.78 4.59 4.87 5.11 5.27 5.35 5.38 5.73 5.08 
Tabacco  8.40 8.67 9.46 9.29 8.62 9.06 8.10 6.70 6.53 5.50 7.70 
Total Food  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Manufactured goods 16.73 19.25 19.67 19.44 20.43 20.82 21.36 22.97 23.98 30.45 23.74 
Energy and water 10.12 9.13 8.66 8.54 8.29 7.82 7.50 6.88 6.40 5.04 7.02 
Transport and telecom. 3.83 5.16 6.01 7.41 7.94 9.20 9.90 9.87 10.04 8.79 8.51 
Services 28.97 29.97 31.45 32.19 33.05 33.62 34.55 35.15 37.20 39.34 35.29 
Total HHD consumption 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:  Household Living conditions survey HLCS  raw data elaborated by the author 
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3.2 Inequality in wealth distribution 
3.2.1 Household income inequality 
The Lebanese economy is an economy that consumes more than it produces. It relies 
on significant capital transfers from abroad, which form up to 21.85% of total households 
income, at least around 40% for the bottom four deciles, and more than 30% of total income 
for all marginal areas (refers to Tables 3-9 and 3-10). This data not only demonstrates the 
gravity of the inequality generated by Lebanese capitalism - the richest deciles concentrate 
64.31% of total capital return, 35.09% of SELF and 36.92% of HGSKL, 39.21% of total 
factor income and 33.01% of total income (see Table 3-11). Furthermore 68% of savings are 
concentrated within the richest deciles (data extracted from SAMLEB05) - but also reflects 
the mechanism of capital transfer through which the system is able to sustain itself. As a 
matter of fact, remittances are not just money sent by expatriates in order to remediate to the 
basic needs of their families back home, they represent an important source of savings, non-
subsistence and/or luxury consumption for middle and upper-class households. As shown in 
Figure 3-1 capital transfers from abroad help in reducing inequality reflected in the 
adjustment the Lorenz curve caused by reduction in the Gini index from 0.445 to 0.358
23
.  
Figure 3-1: Lorenz income curve for Lebanon 2005 
 
Source:  author’s calculation based on SAMLEB05 
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 Respectively calculated with and without considering remittances, own estimation based on income 
distribution resulting from the SAM estimation. The UNDP, MOSA 2008 poverty report, based on 
consumption data from the households survey, estimate Gini index at 0.375 and at 0.361 when deflated for 
specific households price index.  
 Household consumption has been extracted from the elaborated data of the household 
survey. Table 3.12 below presents the consumption budget share of each of the commodity 
types, with a specific focus on food commodities, it shows clearly than half of the Lebanese 
population (deciles 1 to 5) used more than 30% of their income on food consumption, up to 
30.34% for the poorest deciles.  
3.2.2 Regional inequalities  
Table 3-10 and 3-11 clearly show the inequality in regional development.  80.85% of 
return on capital is concentrated in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (respectively 33.09% and 
47.46%), and 66.51% of total factor income (respectively 22.06% and 44.45%).  
As a matter of fact, Table 3-10, who shows that 44.64 of poor deciles (HHD_1) is 
concentrated in the north of the country. Furthermore the table shows distribution of poverty 
into 2 main groups: 
 Urban poverty (14.36%, and 14.15% of HHD_1 live in Tripoli city, and Mount 
Lebanon respectively (concentrate in Beirut Suburbs that administratively belong 
to Mount Lebanon) 
 Rural Poverty 28.82% of HHD_1 lives in Akkar and 9.37% in Baalbak and 
Hermel strata. In these region income from FARM factor of production still 
represent 14.22% and 36.35% of total income of households (Table 3-10). The 
high percentage of income from agriculture in Baalbak and Hermel Strata 
explained the choice for the case study.  
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3.3 The service economy 
The share of the tertiary sector accounts for 66.52% of total GDP at factor cost, and 
constitutes up to 77.26% when including construction. The share of agriculture is still 
relatively large (6.12%) compared to the share of agro-industry (5.06%) and of industry 
(8.15%,), summing to a share of 19.33%  of GDP for the primary and the secondary sectors – 
construction excluded (Table 3-7).  
Furthermore, Table 3-4 shows that the output value of agriculture, agro-industry and 
industry represent only 55.86%, 53.62% and 32.40% of the total value uses and resources in 
the respective sectors, thus creating an economy that is highly dependent on import of 
commodities. Looking at the data, an important question arises: how is the system able to 
create economic growth while not producing? Nahas (2000) offers a caricatured but 
meaningful answer. He pictures Lebanon as a country where households receive capital from 
the rest of the word (28.15% of total income Table 3-11) without any counterpart. Even if the 
country does not produce, economic necessity will impose the provision of a large range of 
services, of which the management of the capital flow, and therefore the development of the 
banking and financial sector will flourish the most (25.6% of total marketed service (SER) 
valued added (PCM; 2007). Consequently, capital and people will invest in the economic 
activity created by the flows of remittances. A part of this capital will be invested in real 
estate, on which the commercial and entertainment centers, and offices that are necessary for 
the services‟ domestic activity will be constructed. This will generate important fixed capital 
(CONS sector represents 66.67% of total investments Table 3-3). Services that cannot be 
imported will be dependent on domestic economic equilibrium. Demand will raise prices and 
quantities followed by a raise in the price of factors
24
, consequently capital and labor will be 
redirected towards services.  
Flow of capital has maintained the growth of the Lebanese economy based on the tertiary 
sector. In the following Section the effect of the availability of capital on the industrial sector 
is discussed. 
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 Elaborating on the data of the HLCS, using the wage of agricultural workers (not farmers) as index equal 
to one, the following figures for wages distortion between sectors are obtain: agriculture: 1, industry:1.99, 
construction:1.46, Trade:1.89, transport and telecommunication: 2.98, services: 2.641 
 3.4 Lebanon Industrial development 
3.4.1 Low productivity of labor insights from Pasinetti  
Several left-wing Lebanese scholars have criticized Lebanon‟s trade-based economic 
orientation, e.g. Corm (1994), Trabousli (1999), Gaspar, (2004). They argue that the country 
had several possibility to undergo an industrialization process, either during the increase in 
silk production in the mid-eighteenth-century or just after independence as the industry had 
shown an important growth during World War II. Liberal policies have not created a growth 
much higher than the growth witnessed in developing countries that have opted for an 
industrial development. As Lebanon elites moved toward liberal policies, the Lebanese 
industry was not able to compete with imports. Thus the development of this sector was based 
on agro-industrial commodities that were preferred by local consumer and in the Arab Gulf 
market (Gates, 1998).  
The negligence of the industrial sector in Lebanon was mirrored in the incapacity of 
the Lebanese capitalism to generate employment for waged skilled workers. These labor 
structural problems are clear in the distribution of the labor force represented by the high 
percentage of self-employment (1959: 32%, 1970:24%, and 1997:25%, 2005:28.5%) and of 
state employment (1959:7%, 1970:8% and 1997:14%, 2005:12.9%
25
. Furthermore in 2005, 
income from self-employment
26
 constituted 20.05% of total factors income (24.57% if 
farmers income is added) while return on capital represented 40.90% of income and waged 
labor only 35.53% (Table 3-6).   
In his book “Structural Change and Economic Growth”, Pasinetti (1981) analyses the 
long-term growth of economies within a structural dynamic based on the processes of capital 
intensification and mechanization
27
. In this context, Pasinetti presents the capital to labor ratio 
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 Data reported by Gaspar (2004) except 2005 data form HLCS 
26
 Recall that SELF and FARM factor of production are mixed (labor and return on  capital) income.  
27
 In his analysis, Pasinetti studies the economy within an alternative paradigm based on the “pure 
production model” as opposed to the paradigm of pure exchange, within which mainstream economic analysis 
operates, and is based on the Walrasian theory of utility maximization. The technological process of production 
built around the division and specialization of labor lies at the heart of the production paradigm. In this model 
there is no automatic mechanism that can lead to achievement of equilibrium in the economic system, where 
prices carry all the information needed for the achievement of such equilibrium. Instead, in the pure production 
model, prices are not the only factor at play, but there is a mechanism of “effective demand” through which 
physical quantities rather than prices adapt to imbalances between the demand and productive capacity. 
Therefore, the production model requires the study of additional institutional relations to analyze the inter-
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(K/L) as an indicator of mechanization, and uses it to explain issues related to employment. 
He presents the capital to output ratio (K/Q) as an indicator of capital intensity, and uses it to 
interpret issues related to prices and trade. This framework of analysis illustrates that the high 
levels of capital intensity observed in industries of developing countries, which may even be 
utilizing the same levels of mechanization and capital as developed countries, are mainly due 
to their low levels of labor productivity and lower wages. One of the main conclusions of 
Pasinetti‟s model is that technological progress, and the development of knowledge and 
learning are the pillars of growth of an economy. In other words, it is the rise in levels of 
labor productivity that instigates growth as opposed to capital intensification processes.  
Table 3-6 above showed the distribution of value added between factors of production, 
the ratio capital / mixed income (self employment) / labor is for agro-industry: 71.59% / 
10.79% / 17.62%, for industry 41.47% / 24.16% / 34.63%. The low productivity of industrial 
labor has hampered growth in the industrial sector.  
3.4.2 Historical development based on Capital  
Gaspard (2004) uses these concepts of capital intensity and mechanization to analyze 
the process of industrialization in Lebanon.  The low cost of capital, and the high demand for 
Lebanese goods at the Arab markets favored the process of industrialization in the country. 
Up until the mid 1980‟s, capital in Lebanon was readily available, loans in foreign currency 
were given without restrictions, and thus capital could be obtained at low cost. This facilitated 
the process of industrial mechanization during that period, which compensated for the 
shortage in skilled labor and the overall low levels of productivity. Therefore, capital 
accumulation helped in the development of the industrial sector when skilled productive labor 
was lacking, and enhanced the competitive power of local production, especially at the Arab 
markets for agro-industrial products.    
Until the mid 1960‟s, the industrial sector witnessed significant growth in capital 
accumulation levels of 9.3% annually, in mechanization (5.8% annually), while labor 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
relations between prices and quantities of output. In Chapter 4, the CGE model is based on a Walrasian 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, as it is a structural model (based on a SAM), its output will be analysis within the 
structural dynamics described by Pasinetti, assuming equilibrium as given. 
 
 productivity growth lagged behind with an increase of 2.5% annually. However, this growth 
gradually slowed down in the following period until 1998, where labor productivity kept 
moving at a slower rate than the rest of the indicators.   
Gaspard argues that a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the fact that 
Lebanon did not make use of the opportunities it had to undergo a true industrialization 
process, but followed a different economic path centered around trade and services, requires 
an analysis of behavioral issues pertaining to the strategic investment choices and decisions of 
Lebanese business owners.  
Industrial investment remained low despite the high levels of profit and access to 
export markets. profit levels in 1975 reached up to 35%. However, wage rates remained quite 
low
28
 in comparison with the services and trade sectors or the public sector. However, 
industrial investment never exceeded one third of profits, and reached at most 11% of net 
industrial capital stock. This type of investment behavior could not, and cannot, lead to the 
creation of a well developed and prospering industrial sector. Within the existing liberal 
economic system, Lebanese industrialists did not have the proper incentives or willingness to 
take risks and invest in their industries, but rather preferred to use the larger parts of their 
profits for reinvestment in the service sector or simply for consumption purposes. As much as 
the process of mechanization and capital accumulation played a major role in sustaining 
industry in Lebanon, it could not lead to its further development without an accompanying 
process of increasing productivity, for it is namely productivity and skill enhancement that are 
at the core of industrial growth.  
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 Recall that Lebanese industrial profited from the presence of Palestinian refugees and Lebanese that had 
migrated from rural areas and were ready to work for a low wage.  
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3.5 The Lebanese agriculture 
3.5.1 Commodities uses and resources and structure of the agricultural 
production  
The structure of the Lebanese agricultural trade is typical of that of developing 
countries. It is characterized by a significant deficit in cereals, industrial crops and livestock. 
This deficit is due to a combination of increasing local demand, weak competitiveness of 
national agriculture and low prices of origin-subsidized imports. Furthermore, surplus in 
agricultural export of fruits (and vegetables) is shrinking (Pingali, 2006)
29
. In addition to 
being essential food requirements, these commodities are used as intermediate inputs either 
for agriculture or for agro-industry (95.95% of CRL, 58.00% of INDCRP and 96.28% of 
LIVES uses). The dependence of these sectors on imported inputs constitutes one of their 
major structural problems. A pertinent example to illustrate this problem is the large 
investments made recently in the dairy sector that relies on imported livestock ,  and whose 
price constitutes a large entry cost for most small holders willing to engage in dairy 
production. Choosing local breeds is not economically sustainable due to their lower 
productivity; however,  this remains a choice for subsistence farmers willing to invest in local 
breed livestock as a capital asset working as a safety net.   
As a matter of fact, agro-industry faces serious problems regarding the supply of 
inputs, as contract farming exists only in well developed sectors like poultry and winery. 
Apart from that, there is a gap between what agriculture produces and what agro-industry 
requires. This situation arises mainly from a lack of public policy, a deficiency in 
management and coordination, the pre-dominance of small agro-industrial businesses (self 
employed constitute 30% of the working force in agro-industry
30
 received 10.79% of total 
factor income (Table 3-6), and from the fact that  agriculture has followed an export-led 
development where raw products (fruits and vegetables) constitute its main comparative 
advantage.  
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 Note that in relation to the reduction of export of fruits the Lebanese situation is coherent with Pingali 
conclusion, although the reasons (breakdown of the postwar export infrastructure) and the export market (Europe 
and North America for most developing countries and the Arab gulf for Lebanon) are different.  
30
 HLCS data 2005 
 The second important characteristic of agricultural markets is the high trade margins 
compared to those of agro-industry and industry. This is mainly due to farmers‟ weak 
marketing skills, the absence of functioning cooperatives, and the archaic organization of 
farmer wholesale markets. Direct sales contracts are rare and agricultural products have to 
pass through several intermediaries and middle-men before reaching the final retailer. 
3.5.2 The heterogeneity of the Lebanese agriculture  
The agricultural sector in Lebanon is characterized by a high heterogeneity and by the 
penetration of capital downstream the supply chain (large agro-industry, trade) and in 
subsectors like poultry, diary production and wine, as well as large fruits and vegetables 
cultivations. This part of agriculture is highly competitive, but still represent a minority of 
agricultural holdings. Large investments in the sector were – and still are – a source of 
important return and capital accumulation. The regional comparative advantage of Lebanese 
production allowed a high return in trade investment in export of fruits and vegetables to the 
Arab Gulf (Gates 1998). In agro-industry and in subsectors, high returns because of high entry 
cost of competitors. As pointed out by Debiè and Petier (2003) entrepreneurs need to invest 
their own-capital, to have an important social network and political connections in order to 
reduce costs and be protected from competitors.  
The political economy orientation of the Lebanese state created inter-governorate 
disparities in economic development and permitted the control of much of the economic life 
in rural areas - including large agricultural, agro-industrial and agro-trade holdings – by a 
small minority of local elites. According to the 2008 poverty report on Lebanon, “inequality 
within governorates accounted for most of the inequality in Lebanon”, about 87% of 
inequalities is due to with-in region inequality (UNDP and MOSA 2008:34). In other words, 
the spatial distribution of inequality is not a simple dichotomy between a rich core and a poor 
periphery, but a more complex structure were the core and rural local elites share political 
power and economic wealth.  Poverty is spatially distributed between rural areas and their 
corresponding urban suburbs. 
As a matter of fact, the major part of agriculture holdings remain undercapitalized small 
family exploitations with no access to credit and/or limited access to informal forms of money 
lending. They are highly impacted by price fluctuations, high margins of middlemen and 
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traders, high costs of production, low capitalization, and lack of functioning cooperative 
structures. Many of these are still very traditional, especially in olive productions 
(representing 21.5% planted surface area and an average of 4.2% of total agricultural output
31
, 
a ratio yield/hectare equivalent to 23.5% of that of the Italian production
32
). In recent years, 
many local initiatives – which might be compare to the European LEADER type initiatives – 
have been successful in enhancing the livelihoods of agricultural households; however, the 
impact of such projects remains limited and the sector is in need of significant support, 
innovations and structural changes. 
3.5.3 Agriculture from the lens of farmers’ income  
 Distribution of farm income and holders 
Table 3-14 below show the distribution FARM income within central and marginal 
areas of Lebanon. This table is the starting point of a further breakdown of the agricultural 
sector. In Sub-section 3.61, elements of analysis have been presented in terms of trade and 
production structure. In what follows, the focal point is the different types of production 
systems within each of the Lebanese regions.  
 Table 3-14: Distribution of FARM income and holders across consumption 
quintiles, for selected regions (2005) 
  
Central Akkar 
Bent Jbeil/ 
Marjaayoun/ 
Hasbayya 
West Bekaa/ 
Rashayya 
Zahle 
Hermel/ 
Baalbek 
Holders Income Holders Income Holders Income Holders Income Holders Income Holders Income 
Q_1 9.62 5.46 66.21 57.05 13.64 6.82 19.70 10.05 18.52 8.37 27.18 18.46 
Q_2 26.92 21.20 20.01 22.26 27.27 22.67 27.27 18.74 18.52 11.41 36.89 33.64 
Q_3 26.92 22.74 5.95 7.88 34.09 35.21 13.64 12.17 22.22 19.49 23.30 26.77 
Q_4 23.08 26.34 6.04 9.09 17.05 21.57 13.64 15.96 25.93 30.06 8.74 13.79 
Q_5 13.46 24.27 1.79 3.71 7.95 13.72 25.76 43.08 14.81 30.68 3.88 7.33 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: SAMLEB05 and Household living conditions survey raw data elaborated by the author.  
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Source: PCM (2007). Data of the National Economic Accounts 2005. Share of olives output of agriculture 
5.6% in 2004 and 2.7% in 2005. Change are due to the natural seasonality cycle of the olive tree.  
32
Source: FAOSTAT 2007 
  Central areas 
In terms of agricultural production, central areas of Lebanon have been divided into 17 
agricultural homogenous zones by the ministry of agriculture (MOA, 2006). However, The 
analysis of the region can be synthesized through the study of three main types of farming 
systems: mountainous apple and stone fruit production, medium altitude intensive olive 
production
33
 and coastal citrus and banana farming systems. Because of the specificity of 
micro-climates distributed across the Mount Lebanon region, these farming systems have 
benefited from an important regional comparative advantage. Farmers have accumulated both 
know-how and capital. And apart from the diminution of farmed land due to growing 
urbanization in the area, few changes have occurred in these production systems. 
Furthermore, mountainous and medium altitude regions have witnessed the introduction of 
green house vegetable production. As a result, farmers in these areas are middle class or rich 
farmers; poor farmers (Q_1) represent 9.62%
34
 of holders in these regions. 
 Akkar / Minieh-dennieh  
Income from FARM factor represents 8.05%
35
 of total income of the Akkar / Minieh-
Dennieh Strata. It corresponds to 15.05% of total payments to FARM. Poor farmers represent 
66.21% of total holders in Akkar. In addition, data suggests the absence of a dynamic of 
agricultural accumulation, as the percentage of farmers in rich deciles is low. This reflects the 
overall economic situation in these areas, which have the highest poverty rate in the country 
(see UNDP and MOSA 2008). Akkar and Minieh-Dennieh have been neglected by state 
economic policy and development projects. A FAO MAO report (MOA, 2006) lists the main 
constraints to agricultural development of which are, the high level of illiterate holders (28%), 
the weakness of extension services, and the lack of resources of public institutions (laboratory 
for the agricultural research institute, staff for vocational agricultural schools). Although there 
is a clear lack of adequate public support to farmers, the region has favorable conditions for 
agricultural production, including green houses production
36. Akkar‟s fertile plain is rich with 
water, where 43% of agricultural land is irrigated. Its central part convenient for non-irrigated 
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 Olive production is relatively more intensive in the Northern part of Lebanon 
(Koura/Zghrata/Batroun/Bchare strata) in comparison to the system of production present in the South of the 
country (Sour, Nabatieh strata) although planted area are greater in the latter.  
34
 Data on distribution of farmers across households quintiles within specific areas, have been compiled by 
the author based on HLCS 
35
 Figures calculated based on SAMLEB 2005. Correspond to 14.22% of income of the strata from factors 
of production alone, i.e. without taking in consideration government transfer and remittances (see Table 3-11)  
36
 Represent 22% of total Lebanese under protective covers production 
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crops –olives and cereals - and starting from 800m of altitude, apples and stone fruits are wide 
spread. The interrelationship between poverty and agriculture is not a dynamic of low land 
productivity leading to low farmer income, but is rather related to a poor supply chain 
organization from one side and the lack of other employment alternatives for agricultural 
households. Instead of undergoing a process of capital accumulation, farmers have to use 
farm income to support larger families in the presence of high unemployment levels.  
 Bent Jbeil / Marjayyoun / Hasbayya  
Bent Jbeil / Marjayyoun / Hasbayya farmers are concentrated within the middle class 
quintiles (34.09% of holders belong to Q_3). Olive trees are spread over around 50% of the 
agricultural land. The other main crop is tobacco, in addition to stone fruits on higher 
altitudes, while vegetable production is limited. Here also, dynamics of farmer capital 
accumulation are limited as only 7.95% of farmers in the region belong to the richest 
quintiles. Distribution of farmers across national quintiles of consumption seems to be related 
to the produced crop. Tobacco farmers tend to be poor, olive farmers belong to the middle 
class, and fruits and vegetables farmers tend to show a dynamic of capital and land 
accumulation, especially in the region of Marjayyoun. As a matter of fact, this division is 
highly related to the availability of other forms of income. Olive orchards are managed in a 
very extensive traditional way, where few inputs are added and owners of these orchards 
usually rely on other sources of income and remittances. Gain from the olive season comes as 
an additional income and is relatively high considering that very limited inputs had been 
added. Tobacco production is very traditional as well, but it involves most family members in 
the different stages of production – usually, the man would manage the field, while his wife 
and children would take care of the post-harvest handling of the tobacco leaves. Often income 
from the Regie of tobacco and tombac is the main significant income of the family and is 
received on an annual basis. Although limited compared to other crops, the main advantage of 
tobacco farming is that it provides a secure income. 
 West Bekaa / Rashayya  Zahle 
West Bekaa / Rashayya and Zahle strata show the most significant level of capital and 
land accumulation, where 25.76% of farmers in WBRA and 14.81% in Zahle fall within  the 
richest quintile, catching 43.08% and 30.68% of the regions‟ farming income. The average 
size of individual holdings is the highest in Lebanon (4.65 ha for Zahle and 5.86 ha for West 
 Bekaa
37
). Besides the citrus and banana farming system of the coastal zones, central Bekaa is 
the most intensive agricultural area in the country. The agricultural supply chain has an 
adequate infrastructure- inputs suppliers, marketing outlets, warehouses, as well as academic 
centers (public and private university agricultural campuses and research facilities); in 
addition, agricultural credit facilities are present in these strata. The dam on the Litani River 
built in 1969 is the most important irrigation project undertaken by the Lebanese government, 
from which a large number of agricultural holdings benefit. Moreover, the link between 
agriculture and agro-industry is stronger in these areas than in the other region in Lebanon.  It 
could be argued that it is the only place where this link does indeed exist. The most well 
coordinated subsector is that of grapes and wineries, with two leading companies Ksara 
(Zahle) and Kefraya (West Bekaa). However, better performance in terms of output and 
export levels is depicted in the food conserves industry. Nevertheless, the “agricultural 
economy” of these regions still generates poverty, where19.70% (West Bekaa /Rashayya) and 
18.52%  (Zahle) of farmers belong to the poorest quintile. This state of poverty is not caused 
by the presence of more extensive systems of production like fruits trees in Zahle 
mountainous regions and olive systems in Rashayya – much similar to the Bent Jbeil / 
Marjayyoun / Hasbayya mode of production. In this context, the inability of farmers to rise 
above poverty lines is due to problems related to the high prices of imported inputs and to the 
absence of cooperatives and other forms of farmers‟ groups marketing strategy resulting in a 
much high bargaining power of agro-industrials and traders in price negotiations. Farmers 
suffer from the other side of the medial from intensive agriculture; for example, potatoes  are 
produced in high quantities, but  secure export outlets are lacking.  Due to weaknesses in the 
organization of the exports channels and sanitary requirements, production output is absorbed 
by the agro-industry and local markets at very low prices. Crises in potato production repeat 
themselves almost every year, where reasons alternate between problems in inputs and 
problems in marketing outlets. Often political intervention is needed to satisfy voters, 
knowing that these areas form very sensitive electoral districts
38
. 
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 1.78 ha for Rashayya, where agriculture become more extensive and rely on honey and olive production. 
However number of holders are low and the analysis of the West Bekaa / Rashayya can be focused on intensive 
agriculture without losing accuracy.  
38
 Refer to marketing study Salibi (2006) and newspaper review like the Daily Star articles on Jan, 21
st
; May 
14
th
 2010; As-Safir news paper article Jan, 11
th
 2011 
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 Baalbak/ Al-Hermel  
In the Baalbak/ Al-Hermel strata, farmers are concentrated in the lower middle class 
(36.89% of farmers in Q_2 and 23.30% in Q_3) and poor quintiles (27.18% for Q_1). Rich 
and upper middle class farmers represent a small percentage of total holders. Income from 
farming remains relatively low in these areas because of the high cost of inputs especially 
those of irrigation . In the absence of adequate infrastructure, such as the dam on the Orontes 
River, irrigation relies on expensive and energy consuming pumping from artesian wells (100 
to 400 meter depth). In addition, supply chain infrastructure to support agriculture is almost 
nonexistent in the area. Agriculture in Hermel will be discussed in more details in Chapter 5 
Section 5.3.1 when presenting the context of the case study 
3.6 Synthesis 
This Chapter developed an estimation methodology for the construction of Social 
Accounting Matrix for Lebanon. The methodology is less specific to Lebanon than indicative 
of the data available in Lebanon, i.e., the National Economic Account (NEA) and the 
Household Living Condition Survey (HLCS). The disaggregated SAM for Lebanon 
(SAMLEB05) has an income distribution  distributional purpose, and the accuracy of the 
estimation methodology was confirmed by the calculation of the Gini index
39
 in terms of 
income distribution. Moreover, the disaggregation of the value-added reflects the data of the 
NEA, and is confirmed in the relevant literature. Finally, the estimation methodology used in 
this dissertation allows for the construction of differently organized SAMs for Lebanon. 
SAMLEB05 represents the first attempt to engage in this specific type of macro-economic 
accounting; particularly given the limitations of the available data, further research will 
certainly improve the estimation methodology. 
The analysis of the data extracted from the SAM describes the economic structure 
generated by the political choices of the Lebanese elite – an economy that consumes more 
than it produces and which perpetuates inequalities. The disaggregation of the households‟ 
accounts demonstrates a clear inequality in income and in consumption between the different 
household deciles and in terms of regional strata, as well as an inequality within strata and 
between farmers. 
                                                             
39
 Findings similar to that of the UNDP, MOSA (2008) poverty report, which used a different methodology  
  The analysis also emphasizes the role played by capital flows in structuring economic 
activity, boosting the services and trade sectors while hampering productive activities. Such 
an economic system can only beneficiate the classes of people who have access to capital 
and/or are highly skilled – in essence, the richer deciles. Lower deciles remain dependent on 
low-waged industrial labor, and precarious forms of unskilled labor and self-employment with 
relatively low entry cost (taxi / minibus drivers, small trade retailers). Against that 
background, public administration employment becomes, both a good, waged opportunity for 
many people and a powerful tool for the political elites. This economic system thus allows the 
political elites to control a large part of the labor force through the mechanism of a patron-
client relationship that informally “regulates” the public function.   
As was shown in this Chapter, in an economy that provides low wages and high returns on 
capital, agriculture represents both an important source of income for poor rural households 
and an opportunity for capital accumulation for rich farmer landlords and entrepreneurs 
willing to invest in competitive subsectors. Lebanon‟s agricultural sector mirrors the overall 
political system, then, with high capital accumulation in intensive production agri-businesses, 
versus low inputs in small-parcel family farms with limited revenues.  
SAMs offer a picture of an economy at a certain moment of time, at its equilibrium point.  
In the following Chapter, the CGE model will analyze the effects of changes in production, 
trade and policies “shocks” to that equilibrium. 
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4 The Lebanese Agriculture in the Framework of a 
Computable General Equilibrium 
 
 
 Chapter’s outline 
This Chapter presents the International Food policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model framework and its application to Lebanon. 
The first Section (4.1) presents a review of the literature and focuses on the application of the 
CGE model to issues related to agriculture and income distribution. Relevant research 
undertaken by the IFPRI and the World Bank is reviewed, as well as several publications of 
specific relevance to the research are outlined. This Section also addresses the application of 
CGE modeling to Lebanon is also discussed. Section 4.2 then presents the main characteristic 
of the IFPRI model. 
Following these introductory Sections different scenarios are simulated and their results 
are analyzed. Section 4.3, which constitutes the core of the present Chapter, analyzes the 
structural dynamics (as defined by Pasinetti, 1981) induced by both the technological changes 
in agriculture production and the variation in domestic and international terms of trade. 
Section 4.4 investigates the potential impact of tariffs and taxes policies currently on the 
agenda of Lebanese policy makers. Section 4.5 discusses the effects of an increase in 
international prices of food on household welfare. Finally, Section 4.6 synthesizes the results. 
In the analysis, specific attention is paid to households in the Baalbak Al-Hermel strata, as 
the results of these simulations will subsequently be contrasted with the findings of the 
qualitative case study carried out in the Hermel region 
  
 
 
 
 
“Policy relevance requires modelers to address issues of interest in the 
policy debate. An academic perspective might lead to a focus on indicators 
of aggregate welfare, such as equivalent or compensating variation. 
Policy debates, however, are rarely concerned with such aggregate 
measures and tend, instead, to focus on identifying the winners and losers 
from proposed policy changes. Political reality, not to mention good 
welfare economics, requires us to identify who is affected by policy 
changes in order to determine if compensation schemes are feasible to 
generate ex post Pareto improvements and, if not, to understand the 
tradeoffs between distributional and aggregate impacts. For policy 
analysis, tracing out the impact of shocks on changes in the structure of 
production, trade, and employment is at least as important as generating 
aggregate welfare measures.” 
 
 
 
Derejavan and Robinson (2002:2)      
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4.1 Review of the Literature  
4.1.1 The IFPRI modeling framework 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) is a class of models that builds  on the 
tradition of multi-sector input-output models, which were first developed by Leontief (1951) 
and [1966]. It is based on the Walrasian general equilibrium theory [1874] presented in 
Walker (2006) and derives its conceptualization from the works of Arrow and Debreu (1954) 
on the modern modeling framework of equilibrium theory. In mathematical terms, CGE 
consists of a system of simultaneous non-linear equations that model the overall economy of a 
country based on the assumptions of neo-classical theory. Today these models have become a 
standard tool for empirical economic analysis and have been used by the IFPRI and the World 
Bank (WB) to study agricultural issues from the perspective of trade liberalization, poverty 
alleviation and food security. Both institutions have developed specific recent research lines 
based on CGE analysis, in cooperation with the World Bank research line on Distortions to 
Agricultural Incentives see Anderson (2009, ed. and 2010, ed.). According to Devarajan and 
Robinson (2002), CGE models have stepped outside the strict academic sphere to reach such 
institutions thanks to their potential capacity to analyze the impact of policies and provide 
insights for the design of more adequate ones. Furthermore, the structural base of these 
models allows policy makers to identify winners and losers from  certain policy schemes, and 
anticipate possible compensation schemes that would generate ex-post Pareto improvements. 
Thus CGE modeling has been used with the aim of analyzing and debating policy measures – 
with a specific focus on international trade.   
CGE modeling strategies have been developed either through a direct application of a 
static CGE model, e.g. Samuel et al. (2008) on agricultural growth and poverty reduction in 
Uganda; Dorosh and Thurlow (2009) on similar issues. Or by linking it to global economic 
models like the LINKAGE model (van der Mensbrugghe, 2005), e.g. Cororaton (2006) for the 
Philippines, Ardnt and Thrulow (2009) for Mozambique, and Warr (2010) who used both 
approaches to analyze the effect of trade liberalization on the Indonesian economy. The 
originally static model has been modified to allow dynamic analysis, e.g. Thurlow (2004) for 
South Africa and Breisinger et al. (2008) for Ghana. The framework has also been applied in 
combination with micro-simulations based on household surveys; for instance, Jansen et al. 
 (2007) used this approach to study the impact of the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
on the textile industry. In most cases, these researches have concluded with results showing a 
positive impact of trade liberalization on poverty alleviation, poor households‟ income and 
food consumption, thus reflecting the pro-trade liberalization discourse of international 
economic institutions.  
4.1.2 CGE application to MENA 
It is beyond the scope of this Chapter to review the significant amount of literature on 
CGE model analysis done by the IFPRI and the World Bank. However, Minot et al. (2010) is 
particularly pertinent with respect to the Lebanese context, as it focuses on trade liberalization 
and poverty in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including case studies of 
Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Morocco. These countries are characterized by their high levels of 
tariffs and highly protected economies. It was established that, for the case of Egypt, an 
increase in the international price of wheat, sugar and cotton would raise the income of 
growers of these commodities but would have a limited impact on overall poverty. For 
Tunisia, the study concludes that higher levels of trade liberalization would lead to more 
significant reductions in poverty. In Syria removal of government wheat subsidies would be 
beneficial to high income households, while low income groups would be negatively affected 
–although at absolute levels lower than 1% and at -1.3% for wheat farmers. Nevertheless, the 
macro-balance of the Syrian economy including government saving will be positively 
affected. The study encourages abolition of subsidies and proposes to remediate losses of 
wheat farmers  through time-limited income support programs funded by the additional 
government savings. In Morocco both a static and a dynamic CGE model have been used to 
affirm the positive impact of global trade liberalization on exports, and the national income 
increase that would be large enough to compensate the negative effect on unskilled 
agricultural labor. However, according to Minot et al. (2010) a partial liberalization would not 
sufficiently raise national income to offset the decrease of unskilled agricultural labor income. 
In January of 2011, one month after the publication of Minot et al. (2010), people in Tunisia 
and Egypt demonstrated and over threw the existing regimes. Regardless of the results of the 
IFPRI study, these events show  that in an unstable political context, economic models cannot 
be used as a single tool of analysis, for they need to be coupled with sufficient understanding 
of the political economy of the country and be analyzed within that context. 
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4.1.3 CGE application to technical changes and middle income countries  
CGE models  have also been used as  policy analysis tools outside the circle of 
international institutions. The following is a review of a limited selection of articles of 
specific interest to this research in terms of their relevance to the topics discussed, or the 
similarities of economic structures between Lebanon and the countries under study, or the 
presence of qualitative analysis that allows for contrasting the results of the model.  
Annabi et al. (2005) used a micro-simulation dynamic CGE analysis to study the 
effect of trade liberalization on growth and poverty in Senegal. The authors conclude that in 
the short run, trade liberalization would lead to small increases in poverty and contraction in 
the originally protected sectors (industry and agriculture). However, on the long run it would 
enhance capital accumulation, increase welfare and reduce poverty, even though it would 
create more inequalities as the accumulation process benefits the non-poor. The particular 
interest in Annabi et al. (2005) arises from the possibility to compare it to a qualitative study 
carried out by Oya (2001) on groundnut farmers‟ strategy to adapt to the context of 
liberalization. Of one Oya‟s focus was the accumulation process, where he found that the 
context of liberalization has “offered opportunities of accumulation and success to a small 
group (…), whereas the bulk of small-and middle-scale farmers become more marginalized 
and force to look for alternatives to farming, or are otherwise doomed to produce at ever-
decreasing levels of productivity” (Oya 2001: 155 author emphasis).  
Salami et al. (1998) used a CGE model to study the effects of a change in production 
technology in the Iranian agricultural sector. They differentiate between labor-saving and 
capital-saving technical changes. Their findings illustrate a positive impact on the overall 
Iranian economy, although conditioned by an increase in output, which if unchanged will lead 
to negative effects. They highlight that a policy designed to limit the expansion of urban 
population could see labor-intensive technology as a potential strategy for the development of 
rural areas. Within the same line of research Salami (2006) studied the impact of land 
productivity improvement in a context of trade liberalization. He shows that enhancing 
agricultural productivity while implementing trade policy reforms would expand the output of 
the agricultural sector, leading to growth and reduction of unemployment.  
  IFPRI publications focus on agriculture in countries where this sector still 
represents an important share of GDP, employment and trade. However, CGE analysis can 
also be applied to middle income countries, in which the economic structure is similar to the 
one in Lebanon. Raúl O'Ryan and Sebastián Miller (2003) applied a CGE analysis to study 
the role of the Chilean agriculture in economic development and income distribution on 10 
deciles of households groups. They showed that an increase in labor productivity in 
agriculture has a positive impact on the poorest deciles; however the increase in labor 
productivity needs  to be high in order to alleviate poverty. They found that in the CGE 
framework, agriculture and agro-industry generate few linkages towards the rest of the 
economy – lower than linkage coefficients calculated using traditional linkage measures 
(Hirshman and Hazell Linkages coefficients). Furthermore, they show that an increase in 
agricultural output has a higher impact on the growth of the agro-industrial sector than does 
an increase in agro-industrial output on the growth of the agricultural sector.  
4.1.4 The Lebanese economy through the lens of CGE analysis 
Two recent studies have been conducted on Lebanon using CGE modeling methods;  a 
Word bank discussion paper by Dessus and Ghaleb in 2006 and a scientific journal article by 
Lucke et al. in 2007. They both address issues related to public fiscal reforms, public debt 
service and trade issues from the perspective of a forthcoming WTO membership. Their 
models factored in and analyzed some key elements that are known to have a significant 
impact on the Lebanese economy, namely, dependence of the government revenues on tariffs, 
non-competitive domestic markets, and political stability. 
Dessus and Ghaleb (2006) suggest that a reduction in the number of monopolistic 
firms position, through raising national competition, would be more effective than a tariff 
reduction policy, and would result in higher investment opportunities and would benefit the 
working force. They argue that such policy efforts geared towards enhancing domestic 
competition “would provide Lebanon greater chances to successfully address its 
macroeconomic imbalance” (Dessus and Ghaleb, 2006: 14). 
Lucke et al. (2007), working within a dynamic framework, looked at a scenario of 
fiscal reforms (through simulating a change in tariff rates) that could be adopted by the 
Lebanese government in response to imbalances caused by trade liberalization. They argue 
The Lebanese Agriculture in the Framework of a CGE 
 
75 
 
that the “urgency of Fiscal reforms (…) depends decisively on the speed of adjustment in the 
economy – that is, on the speed by which new capital is accumulated” (Lucke et al. 2007:37).  
The authors suggest that this itself depends on the integration of the economy in the capital 
world market and therefore on its capacity to lend and borrow; this is closely related to the 
fraction of actual capital stock that can be used as the required collateral for external debt . 
They conclude that “trade liberalization brings about no more than moderate effects on GDP, 
though it heavily affects public revenue” (Lucke et al. 2007:54). On the other hand, political 
stability was shown to have a significant effect on the economy as it leads the way to higher 
levels of investment. 
In what follows, the IFPRI CGE modeling framework is applied to Lebanon in order 
to simulate and analyze a number of development and policy scenarios related to agriculture 
in Lebanon .  
  
 4.2 Presentation of the Model  
Lebanon is modeled as a small open economy structured in 9 sectors of activities: 
Agriculture (AGR), agro-industry (AGIND), industry (IND), construction (CONS), energy 
and water (ENW), transport and telecommunication (TTCOM), services (SER), trade 
(TRADE) and public administration (ADMIN).  
Producers are assumed to maximize profits subject to a two level production 
technology. On the bottom level, a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function models 
the added value in relation to primary factors of production
40
. Each sector uses a set of factors 
until the marginal revenue product of each factor is equal to its wage. On the other hand, a 
Leontief function relates demand for intermediate input to total composite commodities 
(import and domestic). On the top level, a CES function links final output to intermediate 
input and value added
41
.  
All commodities enter markets. The first stage in modeling commodity flows is to 
generate aggregated domestic output; this stage also models the amount/share of output of 
different commodities coming from one single activity (which is the case for agriculture and 
agro-industry). In the next stage, aggregated domestic output is allocated between export and 
domestic sales, assuming that suppliers maximize sales revenues for any given aggregate 
output level. This stage is expressed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET
42
) 
function. Domestic sales and imports constitute the composite commodity. The demand for 
domestic output versus imports is derived on the assumption that domestic demanders 
minimize expenditures subject to imperfect substitutability. This is expressed by a CES 
function (Armington function
43
). 
Institutions are represented by households (150 household groups), government (tax 
accounts are separated from the main government accounts), and the Rest Of the World 
(ROW).  
Households receive income payments from labor factors of production, transfers from 
the government and remittances from the ROW. They use their income to pay direct taxes – 
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 CES elasticity bottom of technology nest is set to 0.75 for agriculture and to 0.9 for the other sectors 
41
 CES elasticity top of technology nest is set to 0.9 
42
 CET elasticity is set to 1.1 for all commodities  
43
 Armington elasticity is set to 2  
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activities accounts pay indirect taxes, and commodities accounts pay taxes on imports – save 
and consume. Household consumption is allocated across commodities according to a linear 
expenditure system (LES
44
) derived from maximization of a Stone-Geary utility function. The 
Government collects taxes and receives transfers from activities (publicly owned companies 
in the telecommunication and the energy sectors). It transfers its income to other institutions; 
Government savings are a flexible residual (a deficit in the case of Lebanon ).  
The CGE model includes three macroeconomic balances: the (current) government 
balance, the external balance (the current account of the balance of payments, which includes 
the trade balance), and the savings investment balance. The framework allows  for different 
closure models. In our analysis, government savings are flexible and direct tax rates are fixed, 
exchange rate is fixed and ROW savings flexible, capital formation is flexible, and we assume 
a fixed marginal propensity to save for all non-governmental institutions. 
Mathematically, the model is formulated as a system of 48 simultaneous non-linear 
equation blocks defined over 4 main sets (activities, factors of production, commodities, and 
institutions), which are in turn divided into 13 subsets. There are 43 aggregated endogenous 
variables, 9 exogenous aggregated variables and 47 aggregated parameters. The detailed 
equations can be found in (Lofgren et al., 2002). The model is run using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) version 23.3.All variables and most parameters are 
extracted and initialized from the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). 
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 Frisch parameter is set to -1.75. Elasticity of market demand for commodity C by households H are set as 
follow respectively for households deciles 1;2;3 / deciles 4;5;6;7 / deciles 8;9;10: cereals, bread and pasta: 0.55 / 
0.41 / 0.2 ; fruits and vegetables: 0.6 / 0.33 / 0.13 ; dairy and livestock products: 0.8 / 0.65 / 0.35 ; fish: 0.84 / 
0.68 / 0.37 ; meat: 0.77 / 0.63 / 0.37 ; fats and oils: 0.6 / 0.49 / 0.26 ; food conserves and sweets: 0.77 / 0.63 / 
0.34 : beverages and tobacco:  1.18 / 0.82 / 0.442. For manufactured goods: 1.01 for all households, Services: 1.7 
/ 1.38 / 1.27 ; transport and communication: 1.21 / 1.17 / 1.15 ; energy and water: 1.25 / 1.19 / 1.16. choice on 
elasticity were based on Seale  et al. (2003) 
 4.3 Changes in production technology  
4.3.1 What role for agriculture in Lebanon 
Since Kuznets (1955) and Johnston and Mellor (1961), the impact of agriculture on 
the overall economy has been widely discussed by economists. Up to the present, the decline 
GDP share of agriculture is taken as a – rough – indicator of economic growth. The 
specificities of the underlying causes for this decline are of great importance. Lower shares of 
agriculture in GDP can result from policies biased against agriculture or the promotion of 
increases in productivity and structural transformation , and this could arguably represent the 
difference between growth and development. The 60-70‟s Green Revolution was pushed 
primarily by the fear of a Malthusian Catastrophe and the increased need to produce more 
food for a rapidly growing world population, as well as   the economic opportunity that the 
technological innovation in agriculture offered for both developed and developing countries
45
. 
If technological innovation made the Green revolution possible, the acceleration of its pace is 
largely due to the rise of a worldwide sense of crisis in food, especially after the bad harvest 
of rice in Pakistan and India (Saito, 1971).  
Nowadays, agricultural paradigms are changing, where maximizing and optimizing 
output is not viewed as essential anymore, and different paradigms of sustainability, quality, 
and alternative food networks have emerged. More significantly, globalization has presented 
developing countries with subsidized-staple-food at price levels lower than tariffs-
unprotected-local production
.
 This has forced local farmers to adjust and made consumers and 
national food security contingent on speculations on the prices of main food commodities and 
volatilities in the international financial markets 
Within this context of globalization and the changing of agricultural paradigms,  the 
following Section  discusses development scenarios and their effect the Lebanese economy. 
The question of agriculture is discussed around three main axes: technological changes in 
production, tariffs policy, and food security.  
 
                                                             
45 Recalling some of the first objectives of the CAP set in the Rome Treaty 1957:  increasing productivity by 
promoting technical progress and ensuring the rational development of agriculture production; to guarantee a 
secure supply of foods.   
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4.3.2 The production technology and trade scenarios  
With the aim of looking at the effect of a “late” rise in agricultural productivity of the 
Lebanese economy, three types of technical changes in agricultural production are simulated. 
They refer to possible development paths for agricultural production in terms of the potential 
efficiency of public projects and extension services. They also represent possible farmer 
strategies.   
The first scenario assumes an equal increase in productivity of all factors of 
production (neutral technical change NTC) leading to a 10% rise in agricultural output. It 
presumes the implementation of projects leading to a rise in land productivity, e.g. irrigation 
projects and a more efficient knowledge transfer from the part of extension services - without 
promoting intensification of input use. It does not presume changes in farmers‟ conception of 
the management of their farms in terms of maximizing their output or enhancing the quality 
of their products  
The second scenario, factor use intensification (FUI), simulates a shift in production 
technology leading to a more intensive use of factors of production with regards to 
intermediate inputs, while keeping agricultural output value constant. It presumes a change in 
farmers‟ perceptions towards the valorization of local resources, and closed-cycle 
management. It requires land rehabilitation and small-scale irrigation projects to mitigate 
possible productivity losses. In terms of savoir-faire there is need for a redirection and 
adaptation of the “innovation package” promoted by extension services towards a more 
rational use of inputs, and specific support to integrated pest management (IPM) and organic 
modes of production.   
The third Inputs Use Intensification (IUI) scenario is the “mainstream” intensification 
and mechanization development of agricultural production leading to a 10% increase in 
agricultural output due to an intensification of input utilization. It necessitates an enhanced 
financial and credit institutional support to farming activities, and more efficient supply chain 
management.  
In addition to technological changes, simulations involving changes in trade policies 
and international prices are analyzed. These scenarios introduce direct changes in the price 
 and demand structure. They hypothesize action directed towards increasing the quality of 
agricultural production together with institutional efforts supporting the re-organization of the 
export marketing channels (with the aim of getting access to different export markets along 
with the assumption of a 10% premium on the actual price). The potential impact of the re-
organization of domestic markets for agricultural products, leading to a reduction of trade 
margins and the consequent redistribution of value added to the advantage of farmers is  
investigated as well.   
Trade scenarios include a 30% reduction in domestic trade margins on agricultural 
commodities and a 10% rise in export prices received by Lebanese producers. They are 
studied individually and then linked to the technology scenarios. The reduction of domestic 
trade margins simulation (TRM) is linked to the FUI scenario following the rationale that 
these changes are both related to the  re-organization of the agriculture supply chain. While 
changes in received export price (EXP) – assumed to result from a better organization of the 
export channels and an increased attention to quality schemes and standards – is linked the 
NTC scenario. It is hypothesized  that changes in foreign and domestic terms of trade could 
help in balancing the effects of technical changes in agricultural production. These effects 
include a  reduction in returns on land and on agricultural labor which in turn would lead to 
the reduction of farmers‟ income and favor migration towards urban centers in search for 
employment.  
Parameters of simulated scenarios are summarized in Table 4-1
46
.  
Table 4-1: Technical changes scenario parameters 
  NTC FUI IUI EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
 Change in agricultural output +10%   +10%   +10%     
Ration of intermediate inputs / 
value added for agriculture 
0.25 0.2 0.4 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Agricultural commodities export 
prices 
      +10% +10%     
Domestic trade margins on 
agricultural commodities 
          -30% -30% 
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 Note that in the following simulations, agricultural output is a fixed endogenous variable (either at base output 
level or at a 10% rise from base). 
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4.3.3 Pasinetti structural dynamics  
The analysis focuses on the structural dynamics induced by a change in agricultural 
production technology. The simulations are run on a short-medium term framework. It is 
assumed that all agricultural producers undertake the technological innovations and possess 
the underlying required knowledge. Labor is mobile across sectors of activities in a context of 
unemployment, while capital is activity-specific, setting back growth and structural changes 
for the purpose of a medium term analysis. According to Pasinetti (1981), production 
innovations– i.e. producing more using less labor47 induces changes in the structure of prices, 
demand and employment.  
The relative price of a commodity is related to the relative cost of producing it in 
relation to the cost of other commodities. If relative production costs are changing, relative 
prices should change as well. As the economy grows income per capita rises, and demand 
changes, behaving differently for each commodity. As a consequence, each sector of 
production grows at a different rate. Although, less striking in terms of amplitude, changes in 
the structure of the labor force remain an important indicator of the functioning of the 
economy. Technological innovation will necessarily lead to unemployment, “full employment 
will be maintained, only if the economic system is able to carry out successfully a continuous 
process of structural redistribution of employment from one sector to another, in accordance 
with the pattern shaped by the structural dynamics of technology and demand” (Pasinetti 
1981: 227). It is this ability of the Lebanese economic system that was already questioned in 
Chapter 3 Section 3.4, and will be further analyzed in the framework of the CGE.  
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 Producing more with less labor, but the specific context of agriculture and rural development things are 
different and therefore the second scenario assume a reduction of cost through the reduction of intermediate 
input.  
 4.3.4 Results of Simulations NTC, FUI and IUI 
The following tables present the results of the NTC, FUI and IUI simulations. All figures 
represent percentage change from base equilibrium (e.g. from SAMLEB05).   
Table 4-2 presents changes in production 
Table 4-3 presents changes in the prices structure and Table 4-4 changes in demand 
Table 4-6 presents changes in factor income and Table 4-7 changes in labor demand  
Tables 4-7 presents changes in real income for regions, national deciles and case study 
deciles. 
 Changes in production 
Table 4-2: Changes in activity output and added value - production technology 
scenarios 
Commodities Intermediate uses Added Value                               
(nominal GDP at f.c.) 
Output 
NTC FUI IUI NTC FUI IUI NTC FUI IUI 
CAGR -2.01 -18.35 37.74 -3.77 4.13 -12.88 10.00   10.00 
CAGIND 3.95 0.52 2.88 0.25 0.05 0.15 2.23 0.31 1.61 
CIND -0.10 -0.07 0.07 0.25 -0.03 0.33 0.04 -0.06 0.17 
CCONS 2.33 0.32 1.70 1.64 0.19 1.27 1.95 0.25 1.47 
CENW 1.61 0.16 1.31 0.17 0.02 0.14 1.12 0.11 0.91 
CTTCOM 3.23 0.30 2.66 1.57 0.14 1.30 2.44 0.23 2.02 
CSER 3.09 0.28 2.57 2.51 0.22 2.11 2.62 0.23 2.20 
CTRADE 1.85 -0.12 2.12 1.88 0.01 1.89 1.87 -0.02 1.94 
CADMIN 1.36 0.20 0.96 2.82 0.32 2.20 2.27 0.28 1.74 
TOTAL 1.95 -0.32 2.69 3.02 0.50 2.00 2.34 0.16 2.06 
Real GDP        1.53 0.39 0.72       
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 Changes in the structures of prices and demand 
 
Table 4-3: Changes in demand prices - production technology scenarios 
  
  
Commodities demand prices 
NTC FUI IUI 
CRL -4.63 -2.35 0.07 
FRT -12.34 -1.45 -9.92 
INDCRP -2.69 -0.87 -0.92 
VEGT -10.95 -0.64 -9.79 
LIVES -6.88 -0.36 -6.13 
LIVESPR -15.84 -0.10 -15.82 
FISH -5.89 0.03 -5.94 
FRMT -1.47 -0.18 -1.11 
FPR -0.15 -0.01 -0.12 
DAIRY -0.10 -0.04   
FATOL -0.32 -0.06 -0.19 
PASTA -1.97 -0.23 -1.54 
SGCHS 0.20 0.02 0.17 
ALBVRG -0.02 -0.07 0.13 
NALBVRG -0.60 -0.05 -0.50 
OTHER -0.39 -0.04 -0.30 
TABAC 0.08 0.02 0.04 
CIND 1.20 0.01 1.20 
CCONS 1.05 0.10 0.86 
CENW 1.00 0.07 0.87 
CTTCOM 2.20 0.20 1.84 
CSER 1.87 0.16 1.57 
CTRADE 1.94 0.04 1.89 
CADMIN 0.60 0.05 0.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4-4: Changes in commodity market – production technology scenarios 
Commodities 
Domestic aggregate 
demand 
Exports Imports 
NTC FUI IUI NTC FUI IUI NTC FUI IUI 
CRL 9.93 -0.02 10.02 16.81 2.94 10.19 -0.41 -4.68 9.73 
FRT 6.49 -0.30 7.34 28.86 1.82 24.67 -18.85 -3.19 -13.61 
INDCRP 7.88 -0.70 9.49 10.99 0.34 10.26 1.50 -2.44 6.80 
VEGT 8.74 -0.04 8.90 26.91 0.81 24.91 -14.19 -1.32 -11.81 
LIVES 10.01 0.01 10.02       -4.71 -0.71 -3.16 
LIVESPR 8.07 0.01 8.08 41.34 0.144 41.33 -24.19 -0.21 -24.14 
FISH 10.06 0.02 10.07       -4.50 0.03 -4.56 
TOTAL AGR 8.16 -0.13 8.54 23.86 1.15 21.23 -6.38 -2.18 -1.93 
FRMT 2.21 0.30 1.60 4.13 0.56 2.99 -1.51 -0.08 -1.37 
FPR 2.15 0.30 1.55 2.28 0.31 1.65 1.60 0.26 1.07 
DAIRY 2.23 0.31 1.61 1.76 0.36 1.02 0.98 0.20 0.59 
FATOL 2.19 0.30 1.59 2.53 0.38 1.76 1.01 0.16 0.70 
PASTA 2.10 0.29 1.51 4.65 0.58 3.46 -2.32 -0.18 -2.00 
SGCHS 2.31 0.31 1.68 2.06 0.29 1.47 2.51 0.34 1.82 
ALBVRG 2.34 0.28 1.79 2.00 0.36 1.25 1.68 0.12 1.46 
NALBVRG 2.17 0.30 1.56 2.89 0.36 2.15 0.58 0.20 0.20 
OTHER 2.19 0.30 1.58 2.57 0.35 1.84 0.78 0.20 0.37 
TABAC 2.34 0.31 1.72 0.26 0.23 -0.23 1.68 0.34 1.00 
TOTAL AGIND 2.18 0.30 1.58 2.59 0.36 1.86 0.95 0.19 0.55 
CIND 0.74 -0.05 0.88 -1.02 -0.07 -0.88 2.56 -0.04 2.71 
CCONS 1.95 0.25 1.47             
CENW 1.13 0.11 0.92 -0.08 0.02 -0.13 2.92 0.26 2.45 
CTTCOM 2.54 0.24 2.10 0.11 0.02 0.08       
CSER 2.68 0.24 2.24 0.61 0.06 0.51       
CTRADE 2.30 -0.01 2.36 -0.61 -0.07 -0.47       
CADMIN 2.27 0.28 1.74             
TOTAL 2.50 0.17 2.20 0.83 0.04 0.73 1.95 -0.07 2.16 
 
  
  
  
 Changes in labor structure and in income 
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Table 4-5: Changes in factor income - production 
technology scenarios 
Scenarios  Factor income  
  NTC FUI IUI 
CAP       3.62 0.28 3.11 
FARM -3.77 4.13 -12.88 
SELF 3.50 0.25 3.04 
HGHSK 3.38 0.33 2.76 
WHTcl 3.68 0.29 3.14 
BLUcl 2.37 0.59 1.13 
ARMED 2.82 0.32 2.20 
 
Table 4-6: Changes in labor demand by 
activities – production technology scenarios 
  
  
Labor demand by activities 
NTC FUI IUI 
AGR -3.77 4.13 -12.88 
AGIND 0.87 0.18 0.51 
IND 0.42 -0.06 0.57 
CONS 2.91 0.34 2.25 
ENW 1.96 0.18 1.62 
TTCOM 4.39 0.40 3.64 
SER 4.30 0.38 3.60 
TRADE 3.39 0.01 3.42 
ADMIN 2.82 0.32 2.20 
TOTAL 2.42 0.68 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
 Table 4-7: Changes in households real income by region  - production technology 
scenarios 
 
 Real income 
NTC FUI IUI 
Areas Marginal 0.70 0.53 -0.44 
Central  1.22 0.24 0,71 
Beirut  1.64 0.16 1,34 
Case study -0.16 0.90 -2.11 
Deciles (all Lebanon) HHD_1 0.92 0.57 -0.31 
HHD_2 0.91 0.47 -0.05 
HHD_3 0.75 0.52 -0.33 
HHD_4 0.76 0.40 -0.13 
HHD_5 0.95 0.40 0.08 
HHD_6 0.97 0.31 0.25 
HHD_7 1.14 0.30 0.50 
HHD_8 1.09 0.27 0.47 
HHD_9 1.00 0.25 0.49 
HHD_10 1.59 0.16 1.26 
Deciles Baalbak Al Hermel  HERBA_HHD_1 -0.36 0.88 -2.48 
HERBA_HHD_2 -0.80 1.33 -3.62 
HERBA_HHD_3 -0.72 1.38 -3.63 
HERBA_HHD_4 -0.38 1.23 -2.97 
HERBA_HHD_5 -0.15 1.03 -2.29 
HERBA_HHD_6 -0.37 0.87 -2.35 
HERBA_HHD_7 0.28 0.85 -1.46 
HERBA_HHD_8 -0.16 0.29 -0.87 
HERBA_HHD_9 0.54 0.61 -0.75 
HERBA_HHD_10 0.81 0.32 0.06 
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4.3.5 Analysis of the results of simulations NTC, FUI and IUI 
For each of the NTC, FUI and IUI scenarios, the results of the simulation show an 
increase of real GDP of 1.53%, 0.39% and 0.72% respectively as shown in Table 4-2. 
 Growth and value added 
In IUI the increase in GDP is inferior to unity as the rise in output is offset by the 
significant increase in demand for intermediate inputs (2.69% for aggregate demand and 
37.74% for agriculture). This high increase in the demand for agricultural inputs is not to be 
looked at as unrealistic. Lebanese agricultural production technology remains traditional in 
many of the cases; intermediate input utilization and mechanization use is low but expensive. 
In that context, the development scenario of increasing productivity through a large increase 
of input use and/or its diminution of 18.35%, as in the case of FUI, are both realistic scenarios 
for Lebanese farmers.  
Among the three production technology scenarios only FUI helps in increasing 
agricultural added value by 4.13%. NTC reduces added value by 3.77% and IUI by 12.88%, 
once again due to the important reliance on inputs. However, FUI has a very low impact on 
other sectors in terms of output and value added creation – even negative or close to zero, for 
industry and trade. In contrast, the increase in output generated by NTC and IUI has an 
important effect on the other sectors of the economy. 
 Prices and demand 
Looking at the change in price structures shown in table 4-3 and change in the 
structure of demand in Table 4-4 helps in illustrating the mechanisms that hamper or facilitate 
growth in other sectors.  
FUI scenario induces a relatively low decrease in demand prices of agricultural 
commodities, and has a direct effect on the price of agro-industrial commodities – the largest 
and most substantial decrease being for CRL (-2.35%) and FRT (-1.45%). In the FUI 
scenario, the decrease in prices of agricultural commodities is due to a decrease in the demand 
for agricultural intermediate inputs. It does not induce a real change in consumption from the 
part of households and therefore has a limited effect on overall demand (a decrease of 0.13% 
for CAGR and an overall increase of 0.17%). The latter is met by an increase in domestic 
 output by 0.16%; while imports and exports remain almost constant, -0.07% and +0.04% 
respectively. On the other hand, the important price reduction in agricultural and agro-
industrial commodities resulting from the NTC and IUI scenarios has significantly pushed 
demand and stimulatingly increased prices of other commodities. These scenarios increase 
demand by 2.50% and 2.20% respectively, an increase of demand met by the increase of both 
domestic output, 1.94% and 1.63% (Table 4-2); and import, 2.34% and 2.06% (Table 4-4).  
An important emerging issue from the structural dynamic induced by the scenarios 
analyzed is related to the industrial sector. In all simulations it shows a relatively low ability 
to capture the opportunity and to expand both in terms of output and of added value. This is 
caused by the redistribution of the working forces toward other sectors, the tertiary sector and 
the main fixed capital formation sector, i.e. construction (refer to Table 4-5 and Table 4-6, 
which show change in factor income and labor demand). This is explained by low wages in 
the industrial sector and therefore the tendency of the labor force to go toward the tertiary 
sector, mainly trade and transport
48
. The significant increase in demand for manufactured 
goods is met by a similarly significant increase in imports, and by a decrease in exports.  
Industry is not able to increase output because it is able to cope with the cost of labor; it 
redirects part of its output toward the local market. Agro-industry witnesses the same 
dynamic, although a bit less evident as it is mitigated by the decrease in the price of 
agricultural commodities used as intermediate inputs, which in turn translate into a decrease 
in the output price of agro-industry. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient and increased demand 
remains to be met by imports.  
 Income 
In terms of factor income, the three scenarios witness an overall increase, with the 
exception of farmers‟ income, which shows important differences. The 4.13% increase in FUI 
is clearly understandable as the scenario itself aimed at increasing farmers‟ income through a 
production technology that relies more on labor and on land productivity than on input use. 
The issue in discussion was whether a more labor demanding agriculture would negatively 
                                                             
48 The ability of sector like TRADE and TTCOM to attract excessive agricultural labor and farmers is explained 
by the model by the important wage premium in those sectors. It is furthermore confirmed by qualitative 
analysis. The relatively low entry cost and investment needed to work as a - self-employed - taxi or minibus 
driver or as a small shop manager, make it an important exit door for many farmers for which the agricultural 
exploitation is no longer sustainable.    
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impact the other sectors. The results shows that - apart from industry and for reasons related 
to the archaic structure of the sector - the overall impact is positive.  
As for NTC, results change and show a decrease of farmers‟ income of 3.77% due to 
the important increase of output and the subsequent decrease in price. While the dramatic 
12.88% decrease income of the IUI scenario is explained by the important use of input and 
the decrease in prices (which in that case of a lower magnitude than the NTC scenarios).   
A well functioning economy would be able to compensate the loss of farmers‟ income 
by creating new job opportunities in other sectors. Agriculture would employ less labor and 
fewer farmers, while other sectors would absorb this “technological unemployment”. Tables 
4-7 shows that for both NTC and IUI overall household income in Lebanon increases by 
1.18% and 0.54% respectively  
Nevertheless, disaggregated data for the IUI scenario gives another picture. Real 
income of marginal areas
49
 decreases (-0.44%) especially in the region of the case study - 
Baalbek- Al-Hermel (-2.11%) , which is very sensitive to the change in income of farmers. A 
similar dependency on farm income is found for poor and lower middle-classes, i.e. deciles 1 
to 4, which shows a fall in real income at the national level and a significant decrease, from (-
0.75%) for HERBA_HHD_1 to (-3.63%) for HERBA_HHD_3 (-1.26%), in the case study for 
all deciles except HERBA_HHD_1. Furthermore the data from the simulation shows that the 
beneficiary of the increase of agricultural output will be the richer deciles at the national level 
(+ 1.59% in NTC and + 1.26% in IUI) and Beirut (+1.64% in NTC and +1.34% in IUI). As a 
matter of fact an improvement of technology based on a the improvement of productivity of 
both agriculture labor and land would be the most efficient in terms of increasing real income 
at the national level– although it shows a slight decrease for some deciles of the case study 
region.  
As a matter of fact, the concentration of economic activities and jobs in Beirut and 
central Lebanon creates a situation where most job opportunities are within the TRADE, 
TTCOM and CONS sectors-. Although the model simulation suggests that the economy is 
able to create an amount of jobs higher that the jobs lost due to technological improvement in 
                                                             
49 Refer to Section 1.6.2 for the Administrative division of Lebanon, and the Household living conditions 
survey division into 15 strata, as well as the research division into marginal and central area, in addition to Beirut 
and the Case study.  
 agriculture, (+2.42% for NTC and + 1.00% for IUI, see Table 4-6) it is creating those jobs in 
sectors and regions away from the rural marginal areas. In turn, this is leading people to 
migrate to the city in search for employment. Although the model framework used is not an 
adequate tool for showing the dynamics of internal migration of labor, the results of Table 4-6 
give us a clear idea of how growth in the economy is directed.  
The results of the model simulations indicate that intensification of agricultural 
production, through the intensification of input use – IUI scenario – has a positive effect on 
the overall economy. The effects on rural households and the income of farmers are negative. 
These effects are mitigated if the choice is made toward a NTC development. However, in the 
absence of political intervention and large irrigation as well as land remediation towards 
projects that would increase productivity and reduce farmer costs, the NTC scenario is hardly 
feasible. Up till now extension services have promoted intensification and better use of input 
as a way for increasing production – new seeds varieties, drip irrigation, chemical based soil 
management and pest control techniques.  
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4.3.6 Results of simulations EXP, NTCexp, TRM, and FUItrm 
The following tables present the results of the NTC, FUI and IUI simulations. All figures 
represent percentage change from base equilibrium (e.g. from SAMLEB05).   
Table 4-8 presents changes in production 
Table 4-9 presents changes in the prices structure and Table 4-10 changes in demand 
Table 4-11 presents changes in factor income and Table 4-12 changes in labor demand  
Tables 4-13  present changes in real income for regions, national deciles and case study 
deciles respectively 
 Changes in production 
Table 4-8: Changes in activity output and added value - trade and mixed 
scenarios 
Commodities Intermediate uses Added Value                                                         
(nominal GDP at f.c.) 
Output 
EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
CAGR 3.55 2.35 6.85 -12.77 3.99 -8.76 6.70 11.06   10     
CAGIND -0.61 3.23 0.52 1.09 -0.05 0.08 0.15 0.20 -0.35 1.19 0.35 0.68 
CIND -0.14 -0.25 1.34 1.26 -0.13 0.19 0.70 0.67 -0.14 -0.12 1.09 1.03 
CCONS -0.55 1.70 0.91 1.26 -0.36 0.82 0.44 0.65 -0.44 1.45 0.65 0.93 
CENW -0.35 1.22 0.74 0.91 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.08 -0.24 0.85 0.51 0.63 
CTTCOM -0.65 2.48 0.34 0.67 -0.32 0.91 0.16 0.32 -0.50 1.88 0.26 0.51 
CSER -0.68 2.32 0.71 1.02 -0.54 1.45 0.47 0.71 -0.56 1.99 0.51 0.77 
CTRADE 0.11 1.95 -2.93 -3.05 -0.11 1.74 -1.57 -1.56 -0.06 1.79 -1.88 -1.89 
CADMIN -0.30 1.01 0.47 0.69 -0.60 1.44 0.67 1.03 -0.49 1.71 0.60 0.90 
TOTAL -0.31 1.60 0.66 0.32 -0.36 2.61 0.58 1.13 -0.36 1.93 0.23 0.40 
Real GDP          -0.09 1.44 0.51 0.93         
  
  
  
  
  
  Changes in the structure of prices and demand 
Table 4-9: Changes in demand prices - trade and mixed scenarios 
  
  
Commodities demand prices 
EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
CRL 0.24 -4.34 1.14 -1.36 
FRT 4.10 -8.01 -1.23 -2.87 
INDCRP 3.78 1.08 -0.29 -1.22 
VEGT 1.25 -9.48 0.08 -0.62 
LIVES -0.51 -7.43 0.88 0.51 
LIVESPR 1.86 -13.68 -0.23 -0.34 
FISH 0.52 -5.32 -0.14 -0.10 
FRMT 0.21 -1.24 -0.03 -0.23 
FPR 0.02 -0.12 0.01 -0.01 
DAIRY 0.03 -0.07 -0.20 -0.24 
FATOL 0.03 -0.29 -0.07 -0.14 
PASTA 0.35 -1.59 -0.19 -0.44 
SGCHS -0.05 0.15 0.05 0.07 
ALBVRG -0.07 -0.10 -0.06 -0.13 
NALBVRG 0.05 -0.55 0.24 0.19 
OTHER 0.06 -0.32   -0.05 
TABAC 0.01 0.10 -0.05 -0.03 
CIND -0.18 1.00 -0.20 -0.19 
CCONS -0.21 0.81 0.13 0.24 
CENW -0.18 0.80 0.11 0.20 
CTTCOM -0.44 1.70 0.22 0.44 
CSER -0.39 1.43 0.32 0.50 
CTRADE -0.18 1.73 -1.22 -1.17 
CADMIN -0.12 0.46 0.09 0.14 
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Table 4-10: Changes in commodity markets - trade and mixed scenarios 
Commodities 
Aggregated domestic demand Exports Imports 
EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
CRL -0.13 9.76 0.07 0.06 10.57 29.01 -4.92 -2.08 0.39 0.10 2.62 -2.39 
FRT -1.54 4.61 1.08 0.81 8.63 37.78 -6.44 -4.61 6.79 -12.14 -0.85 -4.40 
INDCRP -6.01 1.31 1.52 0.81 2.71 13.87 -0.69 -0.32 1.29 2.90 1.35 -1.25 
VEGT -0.83 7.61 0.42 0.39 11.28 40.20 -5.83 -5.05 1.70 -12.22 0.88 -0.56 
LIVES 0.01 10.01 0.02 0.04         -1.01 -5.82 1.86 1.11 
LIVESPR -0.83 6.76 0.54 0.56 14.27 58.98 -10.04 -9.90 2.98 -21.14 0.70 0.45 
FISH -0.95 8.86 0.04 0.07         0.26 -4.18 1.08 1.12 
TOTAL AGR -1.00 6.87 0.59 0.48 7.75 32.32 -4.83 -3.68 0.26 -4.18 1.08 1.12 
FRMT -0.35 1.81 0.35 0.68 -0.62 3.41 0.51 1.11 0.14 -1.36 0.76 0.67 
FPR -0.34 1.76 0.34 0.66 -0.36 1.86 0.36 0.70 -0.27 1.29 0.50 0.79 
DAIRY -0.35 1.82 0.34 0.67 -0.34 1.38 1.03 1.42 -0.21 0.75 0.60 0.82 
FATOL -0.35 1.78 0.33 0.66 -0.38 2.09 0.47 0.88 -0.24 0.74 0.52 0.69 
PASTA -0.33 1.72 0.34 0.65 -0.76 3.75 0.62 1.25 0.40 -1.88 0.23 0.03 
SGCHS -0.37 1.88 0.37 0.71 -0.32 1.69 0.31 0.63 -0.44 2.00 0.59 0.97 
ALBVRG -0.40 1.88 0.24 0.54 -0.27 1.69 0.55 0.94 -0.48 1.13 0.51 0.65 
NALBVRG -0.35 1.76 0.37 0.70 -0.40 2.42 0.10 0.49 -0.23 0.34 1.09 1.30 
OTHER -0.35 1.79 0.34 0.67 -0.41 2.09 0.43 0.82 -0.17 0.60 0.72 0.94 
TABAC -0.36 1.93 0.28 0.61 -0.22 0.03 1.54 1.79 -0.26 1.39 0.69 1.06 
TOTAL AGIND -0.35 1.78 0.34 0.67 -0.40 2.13 0.39 0.78 -0.19 0.73 0.59 0.80 
CIND -0.24 0.48 0.93 0.88 0.01 -1.00 1.33 1.25 -0.54 1.94 0.91 0.88 
CCONS -0.44 1.45 0.65 0.93                 
CENW -0.25 0.86 0.51 0.63   -0.11 0.38 0.41 -0.59 2.26 0.87 1.14 
CTTCOM -0.52 1.96 0.27 0.53 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05         
CSER -0.58 2.03 0.52 0.79 -0.14 0.46 0.17 0.24         
CTRADE -0.10 2.17 -2.15 -2.15 0.16 -0.43 -0.33 -0.42         
CADMIN -0.49 1.71 0.60 0.90                 
TOTAL -0.45 1.98 0.20 0.39 0.41 1.28 0.44 0.48 -0.41 1.48 0.90 0.83 
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
 Change in income and labor structure 
Table 4-11: Changes in factor income - trade and mixed scenarios 
  Factor income  
EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
CAP       -0.67 2.84 0.17 0.47 
FARM 3.99 0.99 6.70 11.06 
SELF -0.64 2.76 0.06 0.34 
HGHSK -0.70 2.57 0.61 0.97 
WHTcl -0.71 2.85 0.32 0.64 
BLUcl -0.11 2.26 0.69 1.33 
ARMED -0.60 2.13 0.67 1.03 
 
Table 4-12: Changes in labor demand -trade and mixed scenarios 
  Labor demand by activities 
EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
AGR 3.99 0.99 6.70 11.06 
AGIND -0.17 0.68 0.52 0.71 
IND -0.22 0.18 1.20 1.14 
CONS -0.63 2.18 0.77 1.14 
ENW -0.40 1.50 0.70 0.90 
TTCOM -0.87 3.38 0.45 0.89 
SER -0.90 3.26 0.79 1.21 
TRADE -0.19 3.14 -2.79 -2.77 
ADMIN -0.60 2.13 0.674 1.027 
TOTAL -0.06 2.37 0.75 1.48 
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Table 4-13: Changes in household income and consumption - trade and mixed 
scenarios 
 Real income 
EXP NTCexp TRM FUItrm 
Areas Marginal 0.25 0.98 0.77 1.33 
Central  -0.10 1.11 0.25 0.53 
Beirut  -0.25 1.33 0.07 0.25 
Case study 0.71 0.68 1.40 2.34 
Deciles (all Lebanon) HHD_1 0.25 1.22 0.76 1.38 
HHD_2 0.18 1.08 0.58 1.07 
HHD_3 0.25 1.03 0.71 1.23 
HHD_4 0.13 0.92 0.55 0.98 
HHD_5 0.08 1.04 0.50 0.95 
HHD_6 0.01 0.98 0.41 0.77 
HHD_7 -0.03 1.11 0.36 0.70 
HHD_8 -0.03 1.01 0.32 0.63 
HHD_9 -0.08 0.96 0.27 0.55 
HHD_10 -0.24 1.31 0.13 0.33 
Deciles Baalbak Al Hermel  HERBA_HHD_1 0.82 0.60 1.41 2.44 
HERBA_HHD_2 1.19 0.61 2.09 3.40 
HERBA_HHD_3 1.20 0.70 2.17 3.54 
HERBA_HHD_4 0.99 0.78 1.91 3.13 
HERBA_HHD_5 0.77 0.76 1.51 2.59 
HERBA_HHD_6 0.73 0.58 1.42 2.44 
HERBA_HHD_7 0.58 0.85 1.32 2.14 
HERBA_HHD_8 0.26 0.12 0.45 0.76 
HERBA_HHD_9 0.32 1.00 0.91 1.56 
HERBA_HHD_10 0.04 0.83 0.43 0.77 
 
  
 4.3.7 Analysis of the results of simulations EXP, NTCexp, TRM, and FUItrm 
 Farmers strategy and economic growth 
This farmer strategy is also linked to local rural development action that promotes a 
shorter supply chain and as a consequence reduces trade margins and redistributes value 
added toward producers. Such private initiatives have been done in parallel with development 
projects organized by the ministry. As previously discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1.3, 
government action in the agricultural sectors is comprised of a mixture of  funds from 
international projects with goals ranging from the promotion of small animal husbandry 
holdings to the improvement of quality products for export markets. In the following, the 
results of the trade and mixed scenarios are discussed 
An export-orientated development for Lebanese agriculture, at the current level of 
output, would have a neutral impact on the overall economy (slightly negative -0.09% 
decrease in real GDP, see Table 4-8). The effect is significantly improved if the export market 
development is done in parallel with an increase in output. The NTCexp simulation shows a 
raise of 1.44% in real GDP.  
 Changes in prices and factor income 
For The EXP scenario, the increase in exported quantities will raise the prices of most 
agricultural commodities and as a consequence the prices of food products in general, leading 
to a slight diminution of agro-industrial output by 0.35%. This increase in prices of food leads 
to lower demand, which nevertheless is met only through increasing imports. The increase in 
food prices lowers the demand for other commodities, reducing their relative prices and 
therefore payments to factors of production. The decrease in real income affects principally 
Beirut and central regions. In marginal areas, the decrease in income of HIGHsk and WHTcl 
labor is mitigated – but not completely set off – by the increase in farmers‟ income and the 
increased demand of agriculture for BLUct labor. Lower deciles in the case study areas 
witness an increase in real income. The results of the EXP simulation show that public 
policies aiming at the re-organization of the export channels of agricultural commodities 
should take into consideration the possible negative impacts resulting from the rise of 
domestic food prices. The results obtained for NTCexp demonstrate that on one hand, the 
increase in agricultural output decreases supply prices and largely compensates for the 
The Lebanese Agriculture in the Framework of a CGE 
 
97 
 
opening of export markets on domestic prices. On the other hand, the increase in the income 
of farmers obtained thanks to exports compensates the losses that might accompany an output 
growth. The NTCexp follows a structural dynamic similar to the NTC, with the difference 
that the negative effect on farmers‟ income is overcome by the – hypothetical – better price 
found in export markets. It shows that the main problems of agricultural output in Lebanon 
remain to be its marketing channels.  
 Resources transfer? 
For farmers to benefit from an increase in output or a change in the typology of 
production – toward more local channels, differentiation of production and resource transfers 
from rich urban to poor rural – efforts in finding market output should be found. The TRM 
and FUItrm results show that, at a fixed level of output, a re-organization of the domestic 
supply chain channel has a positive impact - although limited - on the economy (an increase 
of 0.51% and 0.92% in real GDP respectively for each scenario simulation). However, their 
effect on agriculture value added and on farmers‟ income is significant, +6.67% and +11.02% 
respectively. Both scenarios, within a framework similar to FUI, introduce very little change 
to the structure of relative prices – apart from CTRADE prices. Consumption increases by 
0.65% and 0.99% respectively, mainly due to the increase in real income in the marginal and 
Baalbak Al-Hermel areas. The economic dynamic of these scenarios – considering constant 
agricultural output – is of relatively moderate amplitude at the national level. In their cores 
they represent a redistribution of resources within the economy between traders and producers 
of food products in terms of value added, and between inputs and labor in term of production 
technology. The results show that trader losses are compensated for all deciles and in all 
regions. 
  
 4.4 Trade liberalization and protection policies  
4.4.1 Background on Lebanese trade policies 
The Lebanese economy is a free open economy benefiting from a particular advantage 
in trade due to its location, and its historical development. Before 1975, low tariffs were 
sufficient to create an almost constant state budget surplus and to buy gold in order to fix a 
strong currency. Political elites have not changed the conception of the economic role of the 
country, but at present, they are faced with a new international and national context. From one 
side, reconstruction efforts – together with ruling class interest – have created a large public 
debt and a consequential public deficit. Form the other side tariffs, which are already 
insufficient to balance state revenues, should be abolished if Lebanon is to respect its trade 
agreements, which within the discourse logic of the Lebanese ruling class is a crucial 
condition for the enhancement and development of the Lebanese economic role as a regional 
trade platform. 
Nowadays, the aggregate rate of taxes on import was of 16.8% in 2005 (PCM,2007) 
inclusive of tariffs, administrative tax and Value Added Tax (VAT). In order to restore the 
country‟s economic “role” as a trade center in the region, the Lebanese government has 
signed a series multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, the most important being, the 
EuroMEd partnership agreement with the EU (2002)
50, and the “Taysir” - Great Arab Free 
Trade Area (2005) agreement - with 17 other Arab countries
51
.  Although it has one of the 
most open economies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Lebanon is not a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
It has been granted observer status in 1999 and adhesion negotiations have been going 
on since 2001. It is in the perspective of this adhesion that Lebanon unilaterally reduced tariff 
rates in the period between 2000 and 2003,which were almost instantly replaced with a 10% 
VAT applied to both domestically produced and imported commodities alike. This policy – 
total abolition of tariffs and introduction of a VAT has been only partially implemented, and 
tariff reductions has been held back. As a matter of fact, the debt burden and budget deficit 
                                                             
50
 The agreement specified the progressive abolition (to be completed in 2015) of tariffs on imported 
European manufactured goods, and grants Lebanese industrial exports duty-free access to EU markets.  
51
 In addition to the “Taysir”, Lebanon has signed bilateral free trade agreements with Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. 
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have been the main problem of state finance, and the Ministry of Finance has proposed an 
increase of the VAT to 16% as a possible means of mitigation 
Agriculture and food product trade policies were treated due to the sensibility of these 
products in terms of food security, and because of the existence of a significant deficit for 
certain food commodities. Import taxes on food items vary from zero on cereals to 3.3% on 
fish up to 22.5% for fruits and 45.1% on vegetables. Lebanon does not apply any kind of trade 
quota, with the exception of potato seeds, which are fixed by the Ministry of Agriculture on a 
yearly base. Table 4-14, in sub-Section 4.4.2, below shows the import tax rates for food 
commodities in 2005. It results that relatively competitive subsectors are highly protected, e.g. 
(fruits, vegetables, foor products (conserves), while commodities like cereals, livestock that 
enter mainly as intermediate inputs and for which Lebanon witness a high deficit are freed of 
tariffs.  These commodities are also exempt from the 10% VAT .  
4.4.2 Presentation of the scenarios 
Against this background, and in order to assess the effects of different policies, the 
following four scenarios are simulated. Two liberalization scenarios: first, abolition of tariffs 
on agricultural commodities (AGRlib), and second, abolition of all tariffs (LIB). One 
protection scenario: a raise of 50% in existing tariffs on agricultural products (AGRpro). 
Finally, a scenario with the abolition of all trade barriers and the increase of VAT (VATinc) 
from 10 to 16% is simulated
52
. This last scenario have been envisaged as the main fiscal 
reform of the Lebanese government over the medium term; however, it has been delaying its 
implementation due to disagreements on its political and economic viability. The different 
scenarios parameters are presented in Table 4-14
53
, below.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
52
 Representing an estimate 18% rise on activity tax, (see note on taxes table 3-5) 
53
 Note that taxes on CENW, ALBVRG, and TABAC have been kept constant during the simulations, as 
they do not represent tariffs but specific taxes on these commodities. 
 Table 4-14: Imports tariffs for base and simulation scenarios 
  BASE AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
CRL           
FRT 22.5% 10.0% 33.8% 10.0% 16.0% 
INDCRP 9.0% 10.0% 13.5% 10.0% 16.0% 
VEGT 45.1% 10.0% 67.7% 10.0% 16.0% 
LIVES           
LIVESPR 20.0% 10.0% 30.0% 10.0% 16.0% 
FISH 3.3%   5.0%     
FRMT 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%     
FPR 40.4% 40.4% 40.4% 10.0% 16.0% 
DAIRY 12.2% 12.2% 12.2% 10.0% 16.0% 
FATOL 7.4% 7.4% 7.4%     
PASTA 17.1% 17.1% 17.1% 10.0% 16.0% 
SGCHS 17.2% 17.2% 17.2% 10.0% 16.0% 
ALBVRG 41.8% 41.8% 41.8% 41.8% 41.8% 
NALBVRG 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 10.0% 16.0% 
OTHER 15.1% 15.1% 15.1% 10.0% 16.0% 
TABAC 129.5% 129.5% 129.5% 129.5% 129.5% 
CIND 16.8% 16.8% 16.8% 10.0% 16.0% 
CENW 22.7% 22.7% 22.7% 22.7% 26.8% 
 
4.4.3 Results of simulations AGRLib, AGRpro, LIB and VATinc 
The following tables present the results of the AGRLib, AGRpro, LIB and VATinc 
simulations. All figures represent percentage change from base equilibrium (e.g. from 
SAMLEB05).   
Table 4-15 presents changes in macro-economic variables and Table 4-16 present changes in 
production 
Table 4-17 presents changes in the prices structure and Table 4-18 changes in demand 
Table 4-19 presents changes in factor income and Table 4-20 changes in labor demand  
Table 4-21 presents changes in household real income for regions, national deciles and case 
study deciles, and Table 4-22 presents changes in households welfare (Equivalent Variation 
EV) for regions, national deciles and case study deciles. 
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 Changes in macro variables and in production 
 
Table 4-15: Changes in macro variables – liberalization and protection scenarios 
  Macro variables 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
Real GDP 0.26 -0.12 2.87 -0.50 
Total  Output 0.34 -0.17 3.53 -0.70 
Total Real Investment  0.65 -0.33 6.01 -0.16 
Government Savings -5.31 1.77 -49.52 8.36 
Total Real Private Consumption 0.91 -0.46 4.94 0.15 
Total Import 1.47 -0.69 7.62 0.44 
Total Export -0.35 0.18 1.62 -2.12 
 
Table 4-16: Changes in commodities output– 
liberalization and protection scenarios 
  
Commodities output 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
CAGR -4.4 2.2 -2.4 -3.2 
CAGIND 0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.9 
CIND 0.1 -0.1 2.1 -1.6 
CCONS 0.6 -0.3 6 -0.1 
CENW 0.4 -0.2 2.6 -0.3 
CTTCOM 0.8 -0.4 4.4 -0.4 
CSER 0.9 -0.4 4.6 -0.4 
CTRADE 0.3 -0.1 3.5 -1 
CADMIN 0.7 -0.4 4.2 -0.1 
  
  
  
  
  
   
 Changes in the structure of prices and demand 
Table 4-17: Changes in demand prices –
liberalization and protection scenarios 
  Commodities demand prices 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
CRL 3.06 -1.48 2.47 1.27 
FRT 2.05 -0.96 2.35 3.01 
INDCRP -2.39 1.36 1.96 4.36 
VEGT -10.90 5.02 -9.16 -7.70 
LIVES 5.75 -2.80 3.95 2.22 
LIVESPR 10.98 -4.87 11.10 8.00 
FISH 3.16 -1.54 4.17 2.22 
FRMT 0.23 -0.10 2.43 0.45 
FPR 0.07 -0.03 -11.18 -9.31 
DAIRY 0.18 -0.08 1.14 2.87 
FATOL 0.13 -0.06 -2.37 -3.32 
PASTA -0.09 0.05 -1.07 1.14 
SGCHS 0.15 -0.07 -2.47 -0.31 
ALBVRG 0.19 -0.10 1.53 0.68 
NALBVRG 0.45 -0.21 2.74 0.37 
OTHER 0.17 -0.08 0.14 1.40 
TABAC 0.16 -0.07 1.72 0.64 
CIND 0.31 -0.15 -1.27 0.43 
CCONS 0.31 -0.15 0.15 0.44 
CENW 0.30 -0.15 1.64 0.02 
CTTCOM 0.70 -0.35 3.78 0.45 
CSER 0.61 -0.30 2.88 0.54 
CTRADE 0.39 -0.18 3.07 1.45 
CADMIN 0.19 -0.10 0.73 0.16 
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Table 4-18: Changes in commodity markets – liberalization and protection scenarios 
 
Commodities Aggregated domestic demand Exports Imports 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
CRL -0.13 9.76 0.07 0.06 10.57 29.01 -4.92 -2.08 0.39 0.10 2.62 -2.39 
FRT -1.54 4.61 1.08 0.81 8.63 37.78 -6.44 -4.61 6.79 -12.14 -0.85 -4.40 
INDCRP -6.01 1.31 1.52 0.81 2.71 13.87 -0.69 -0.32 1.29 2.90 1.35 -1.25 
VEGT -0.83 7.61 0.42 0.39 11.28 40.20 -5.83 -5.05 1.70 -12.22 0.88 -0.56 
LIVES 0.01 10.01 0.02 0.04         -1.01 -5.82 1.86 1.11 
LIVESPR -0.83 6.76 0.54 0.56 14.27 58.98 -10.04 -9.90 2.98 -21.14 0.70 0.45 
FISH -0.95 8.86 0.04 0.07         0.26 -4.18 1.08 1.12 
TOTAL AGR -1.00 6.87 0.59 0.48 7.75 32.32 -4.83 -3.68 0.26 -4.18 1.08 1.12 
FRMT -0.35 1.81 0.35 0.68 -0.62 3.41 0.51 1.11 0.14 -1.36 0.76 0.67 
FPR -0.34 1.76 0.34 0.66 -0.36 1.86 0.36 0.70 -0.27 1.29 0.50 0.79 
DAIRY -0.35 1.82 0.34 0.67 -0.34 1.38 1.03 1.42 -0.21 0.75 0.60 0.82 
FATOL -0.35 1.78 0.33 0.66 -0.38 2.09 0.47 0.88 -0.24 0.74 0.52 0.69 
PASTA -0.33 1.72 0.34 0.65 -0.76 3.75 0.62 1.25 0.40 -1.88 0.23 0.03 
SGCHS -0.37 1.88 0.37 0.71 -0.32 1.69 0.31 0.63 -0.44 2.00 0.59 0.97 
ALBVRG -0.40 1.88 0.24 0.54 -0.27 1.69 0.55 0.94 -0.48 1.13 0.51 0.65 
NALBVRG -0.35 1.76 0.37 0.70 -0.40 2.42 0.10 0.49 -0.23 0.34 1.09 1.30 
OTHER -0.35 1.79 0.34 0.67 -0.41 2.09 0.43 0.82 -0.17 0.60 0.72 0.94 
TABAC -0.36 1.93 0.28 0.61 -0.22 0.03 1.54 1.79 -0.26 1.39 0.69 1.06 
TOTAL AGIND -0.35 1.78 0.34 0.67 -0.40 2.13 0.39 0.78 -0.19 0.73 0.59 0.80 
CIND -0.24 0.48 0.93 0.88 0.01 -1.00 1.33 1.25 -0.54 1.94 0.91 0.88 
CCONS -0.44 1.45 0.65 0.93                 
CENW -0.25 0.86 0.51 0.63   -0.11 0.38 0.41 -0.59 2.26 0.87 1.14 
CTTCOM -0.52 1.96 0.27 0.53 -0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05         
CSER -0.58 2.03 0.52 0.79 -0.14 0.46 0.17 0.24         
CTRADE -0.10 2.17 -
2.15 
-2.15 0.16 -0.43 -0.33 -0.42         
CADMIN -0.49 1.71 0.60 0.90                 
TOTAL -0.45 1.98 0.20 0.39 0.41 1.28 0.44 0.48 -0.41 1.48 0.90 0.83 
 
  
  
  
  
  Changes in income and labor structure 
Table 4-19: Changes in Factor income - 
liberalization and protection scenarios 
 
  Factor income 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
CAP       1.10 -0.54 6.27 -0.86 
FARM -4.53 2.31 -2.69 -3.22 
SELF 1.04 -0.51 6.07 -0.80 
HGHSK 1.07 -0.54 5.77 -0.28 
WHTcl 1.14 -0.56 6.26 -0.67 
BLUcl 0.37 -0.17 4.57 -1.05 
ARMED 0.90 -0.45 4.87 0.04 
Total  0.71 -0.34 5.47 -0.91 
 
Table 4-20: Change in labor demand - liberalization 
and protection scenarios 
 
  Labor Demand by activities 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
AGR     -4.53 2.31 -2.69 -3.22 
AGIND  0.44 -0.22 0.34 -1.09 
IND     0.26 -0.14 0.62 -1.91 
CONS   0.93 -0.47 6.15 -0.18 
ENW      0.65 -0.33 4.02 -0.44 
TTCOM  1.37 -0.68 7.76 -0.43 
SER    1.40 -0.70 7.24 -0.50 
TRADE  0.58 -0.25 5.95 -1.41 
ADMIN  0.90 -0.45 4.87 0.04 
Total  0.53 -0.26 4.83 -0.85 
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Table 4-21: Changes in households real income - liberalization and protection 
scenarios 
 Real Income 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
Areas Marginal -0.12 0.09 2.42 -0.70 
Central  0.21 -0.10 3.18 -0.78 
Beirut  0.44 -0.16 3.90 -0.85 
Case study -0.74 0.41 1.18 -0.96 
Deciles (all Lebanon) HHD_1 0.05 0.04 2.28 -0.64 
HHD_2 0.02 0.02 2.15 -0.61 
HHD_3 -0.07 0.10 1.98 -0.70 
HHD_4 -0.05 0.02 2.05 -0.70 
HHD_5 0.04   2.40 -0.71 
HHD_6 0.07 -0.04 2.37 -0.70 
HHD_7 0.12 -0.03 2.79 -0.76 
HHD_8 0.12 -0.04 3.12 -0.85 
HHD_9 0.11 -0.06 3.00 -0.83 
HHD_10 0.41 -0.17 4.23 -0.86 
Deciles Baalbak Al Hermel  HERBA_HHD_1 -0.84 0.39 0.58 -0.88 
HERBA_HHD_2 -1.28 0.70 0.07 -1.15 
HERBA_HHD_3 -1.28 0.70 0.24 -1.16 
HERBA_HHD_4 -1.01 0.57 1.00 -1.18 
HERBA_HHD_5 -0.77 0.44 0.93 -1.00 
HERBA_HHD_6 -0.81 0.42 0.81 -0.90 
HERBA_HHD_7 -0.49 0.35 1.79 -0.87 
HERBA_HHD_8 -0.35 0.18 1.11 -0.62 
HERBA_HHD_9 -0.34 0.18 2.64 -0.99 
HERBA_HHD_10 -0.02 0.02 3.20 -0.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4-22: Changes in households Welfare (EV) - liberalization and protection 
scenarios 
 
EV 
AGRlib AGRpro LIB VATinc 
Areas Marginal 0.58 -0.26 3.98 0.17 
Central  0.81 -0.40 4.59 -0.03 
Beirut  1.73 -0.92 7.10 1.08 
Case study -0.06 0.04 2.77 -0.06 
Deciles (all Lebanon) HHD_1 0.68 -0.28 3.69 -0.02 
HHD_2 0.59 -0.26 3.52 -0.01 
HHD_3 0.47 -0.20 3.29 -0.10 
HHD_4 0.49 -0.20 3.27 -0.11 
HHD_5 0.55 -0.25 3.61 -0.14 
HHD_6 0.55 -0.25 3.54 -0.10 
HHD_7 0.67 -0.34 4.09 -0.14 
HHD_8 0.72 -0.36 4.44 -0.14 
HHD_9 0.62 -0.32 4.14 -0.28 
HHD_10 1.66 -0.87 7.47 1.04 
Deciles Baalbak Al Hermel  HERBA_HHD_1 -0.20 0.10 2.00 -0.20 
HERBA_HHD_2 -0.70 0.40 1.40 -0.50 
HERBA_HHD_3 -0.70 0.40 1.50 -0.60 
HERBA_HHD_4 -0.60 0.30 2.00 -0.60 
HERBA_HHD_5 -0.20 0.10 2.30 -0.30 
HERBA_HHD_6 -0.30 0.20 2.00 -0.30 
HERBA_HHD_7 0.20 -0.10 3.30 -0.10 
HERBA_HHD_8 0.50 -0.30 3.10 0.50 
HERBA_HHD_9 1.10 -0.60 6.20 1.10 
HERBA_HHD_10 2.20 -1.20 9.00 2.80 
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4.4.4 Analysis of the results of simulations AGRLib, AGRpro, LIB and VATinc 
Scenarios limited to agricultural commodities show slight changes in aggregate 
variables. Raising import taxes on agricultural products would lower real GDP by -0.12% and 
raise agricultural output by 2.2%, while having a negative impact on the other sectors of the 
economy. The Liberalization scenario works in the opposite direction, and the amplitude of 
change is higher as agricultural output would decrease by 4.4%. This fall is a direct 
consequence of the significant increase in agricultural imports, 12.26%. The agricultural 
liberalization process has a significant impact on all households deciles of the case study (see 
Table 4-17). With a fall in real income reaching -1.28% for  translating the fall of farmers‟ 
income by -4.53% induced by the opening of the national market. As a matter of fact, many 
farmers stopped their vegetable production in response to the unilateral reduction of tariffs of 
2003 and the opening of the Lebanese market to Syrian and Jordanian production following 
the “Tayssir” agreements. 
Results of the LIB scenario show that the opening of the market would induce a 2.87% 
growth in real GDP, and increase real consumption and savings. It increases welfare of all 
households, although deepening inequality as richer household deciles‟ consumption and 
therefore income increase significantly more that poorer ones. the results show the tendency 
of a neo-liberal free market policy to create inequality in growth and accumulation of 
resources within the richer deciles. As shown in Table 4-22, at both the national and HERBA 
level, HHD_10-households‟ welfare has a significantly greater increase than other deciles. 
These results are in line with other observations made in the literature (Annabi (2005) in 
Senegal, Vos and de Jong (2003) in Ecuador (macro simulation), Cockburn (2003) in Nepal 
(micro simulation) and others). Furthermore, the political economy of Lebanon suggests that 
free-market policies would benefit mostly the richest as Lebanese importers and traders 
historically supported and formed a political elite biased against productive sectors. Against 
that background, a protection of agricultural production, which would keep the current 
structure of import taxes, could be considered as a pro-poor / pro-marginal areas policies 
Nevertheless, government savings would be reduced by 49.65%, i.e. in the actual 
financial context, this translated to an increase of public deficit by almost 50%. These figures 
are in line with the results of other studies, Dessus and Ghaleb (2004) and Lucke et al. (2007), 
 where the latter (based on a 1997 SAM) reported a 2.7% increase in GDP in case of trade 
liberalization, and diminution of public revenues by 9.3%. In LIB simulation, the increase in 
government deficit is caused by a 10.27% fall in public revenues.  
The LIB scenario is not a sustainable policy option  for the country. Actual trust in the 
Lebanese economy stems from the ability of the central bank to maintain  parity between the 
LBP and the USD and to repay internal and foreign public debt. Modeling of this trust aspect, 
and debt constraint is beyond the limits of the model used for this analysis. Still, in a changing 
unstable political and social environment, at both national and regional level, the risk of 
deepening budget deficit with the hope that growth could be sustained by the continuous 
ability of the government to borrow is definitely too high to make of the LIB scenario a real 
political option. In fact, successive governments have kept delaying total abolition of tariffs, a 
step that seems conceivable to policy makers only if it is accompanied by an increase in  
VAT. The results of simulating such a policy scenario are analyzed in what follows.  
The simulations results for the VATinc scenario show a slight decrease of 0.56% of 
real GDP, together with a very small increase in real consumption, and a significant increase 
in government savings. The macro data suggests that an increase in VAT rate, together with 
the abolition of tariffs might represent an acceptable policy for reducing government deficit, 
while not interfering with economical growth, for reduction in growth obtained through the 
simulation could be corrected by other economic measures or simply by a minor increase in 
VAT. However, household data show (Table 4-21) that the increase in aggregate total real 
consumption is in fact due to increase in the consumption of the richest. This result reflects 
the tendency of trade liberation policy to further deepen income inequality between rich and 
poor households. The change in welfare is Pareto efficient when the policy is limited to 
reduction of tariffs. In the Lebanese context, an additional tax such as. VAT applied to both 
domestic and imported goods would lead to a Pareto inefficient change as consumption 
increases for the richest deciles by 1.04% while real consumption of the poorest deciles 
decrease by 0.38%
54
.  
                                                             
54
 This result are in line with Salti and Chaaban (2010), whom regardless of tariffs reduction using a micro-
simulation showed that the VAT system is regressive, impacting more the poor than rich households.  
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4.5 Food Security 
4.5.1 MENA’s economy vulnerability to international price of food 
In early 2011, popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt led to the fall of those 
governments and instilled a prominent change in the political institutions of both countries. 
These protests have created a wave across the Arab world, in particular in Algeria, Bahrain, 
Jordan and Yemen, where people have taken to the streets in protest against their 
governments and regimes. Unlike the sporadic and often violent demonstrations that were 
common in the Arab world, the recent protests are mainly driven by the rising prices of food 
and basic commodities (like oil and sugar in Tunisia), and a middle class “malaise”. Popular 
slogans were: “Freedom, food and socio-economic justice”.  
The issue of food security in the MENA region is not grave in comparison to the 
situation of poor areas of Asia and Africa. Most Arab countries are classified as low and 
upper middle-income countries (which is the case for Lebanon), and the oil economies of the 
Gulf witness very high levels of income. The main issue is not that of extreme poverty, then, 
but rather of vulnerability, especially of the urban poor and lower middle classes. It is this 
vulnerability which is further exacerbated during this period of international food price crises. 
A working paper by the Socio-Economic Council of the Arab League highlighted the risk that 
the poor in the Arab world may not be able to guarantee their minimum food requirements in 
the case of a sharp increase in international prices (Arab League, 2009).  
4.5.2 Presentation of the food security scenario 
In order to study the vulnerability of the Lebanese economy, the following simulation 
looks at the economic changes induced by a 20% increase in agricultural imports‟ prices, 
while agricultural output is kept constant at base level. In this scenario, all factors of 
production (labor and capital) are considered sector specific and fully employed, with the 
exception of BLUct labor . Investment and government consumption are fixed. These closures 
intend to model the rise of very volatile international food prices, as with a short-term shock. 
The aim is to gage the Lebanese economy‟s reaction to a food price crisis in a condensed 
period of time, where the ability of the economy to respond is limited and the elasticity of the 
agricultural supply is zero. 
 4.5.3 Results of the Fdsec scenario 
The following presents the results of Fdsec simulations. All figures represent the 
percentage change from base equilibrium (e.g., from SAMLEB05). Table 4-23 depicts the 
changes in household groups‟ welfare. Table 4-24 investigates more specific details and 
shows those household groups witnessing an increase in welfare and those witnessing the 
highest negative changes. Other results are presented in the text. 
Table 4-23: Changes in Welfare EV - food security scenario 
Changes in EV Fdsec  
Regions Marginal -0.90 
Central  -1.29 
Beirut -1.75 
Baalbak / Al-Hermel 0.50 
Lebanon -1.20 
Deciles  
(all Lebanon) 
HHD_1 -1.37 Deciles 
Baalbak 
Al Hermel  
HERBA_HHD_1 0.55 
HHD_2 -1.28 HERBA_HHD_2 1.47 
HHD_3 -0.90 HERBA_HHD_3 1.42 
HHD_4 -1.00 HERBA_HHD_4 1.04 
HHD_5 -1.08 HERBA_HHD_5 0.49 
HHD_6 -1.11 HERBA_HHD_6 0.66 
HHD_7 -1.17 HERBA_HHD_7 -0.05 
HHD_8 -1.16 HERBA_HHD_8 -0.32 
HHD_9 -1.02 HERBA_HHD_9 -0.59 
HHD_10 -1.24 HERBA_HHD_10 -0.95 
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Table 4-24: Changes in welfare EV for selected 
households – Food security scenario 
EV changes – Fdsec scenario 
Largest  negative changes Positive changes 
BRT_7 -2.34 SOUR_10 0.02 
KSJB_2   -2.32 BJMR_5 0.06 
NABA_2 -2.28 ZHLE_2 0.20 
SDJZ_1 -2.25 KSJB_3 0.21 
KZGB_1    -2.08 WBRA_2 0.22 
TRIP_6 -2.06 KZGB_8 0.40 
AKMD_8 -1.98 HERBA_5 0.49 
AKMD_6 -1.96 HERBA_1 0.55 
BRT_3 -1.95 HERBA_6 0.66 
BBDA_1 -1.94 WBRA_3 0.72 
TRIP_1 -1.92 KZGB_6 0.87 
SDJZ_3 -1.82 HERBA_4 1.04 
SDJZ_2 -1.80 WBRA_9 1.32 
SOUR_1 -1.80 HERBA_3 1.42 
SDJZ_7 -1.78 HERBA_2 1.47 
SOUR_9 -1.77 KZGB_3 1.89 
          See Table 1-1 for acronyms spelling., the number refer to the deciles 
4.5.4 Analysis of the results of the Fdsec scenario 
The 20% rise in the price of agricultural imports induces a 9.5% increase in output 
prices in the agriculture sector and a 6.6% increase in that of agro-industry; however, other 
activities witness a decrease in output prices, reaching a 3.1% decrease for services. These 
changes in prices lead to a reduction in real total absorption by 0.89% and a reduction of real 
consumption by 1.22%. Real GDP decreases by 0.22%, and overall welfare (EV) is reduced 
by 1.20%.  
Each household aggregate (deciles at national and regional levels) reacts to the 
increase in prices according to the share of FARM income within the total income of the 
household. Analysis of the household aggregate response sheds light on the role played by 
agriculture in the different Lebanese regions and household consumption deciles. It should be 
kept in mind that an increase in welfare of a household aggregate is due to the increase in 
FARM income. A positive change is thus explained by the higher value of the welfare gain 
 for agricultural households compared to the welfare lost for the non-agricultural ones, within 
a single consumption decile.  
In addition to the households deciles of the case study (HERBA_1 to 6), several other 
groups witness an increase in welfare. Although this data does not permit generalized 
conclusions – because groups are aggregates of farmers and non-farmer households – it gives 
insights into the importance of agriculture for specific social groups. Furthermore, it reflects 
the heterogeneity of the sector (see Chapter 3, Section 3.6.2), as the welfare of rich deciles 
shows positive changes with the increase in international prices of food (Sour (SOUR) 
HHD_10, West Bekaa / Rashayya (WBRA) HHD_9, Koura/ Zgharta / Batroun/ Bsharre 
(KZGB) HHD_8). It is important to note that those regions witness intensive agricultural 
production (see Chapter 3, Section 3.7.2 and 3.7.5). 
Aggregate results show that a decrease in welfare affects all deciles and regions, with 
the exception of the case study region, where welfare increases by 0.50%. The most 
concerned groups are HHD_1 and HHD_2 with respectively -1.37% and -1.28%. These 
household groups represent 20% of the population, e.g. the population already living under 
the poverty line (UNDP and MOSA, 2008). A decrease in welfare (e.g. real consumption) of 
higher that 1% (at base level agricultural output) represents a significant decrease in 
consumption that was already limited to basic needs.  
The data in Table 4-24, on the largest negative changes, identify the more vulnerable 
groups in the adevent of a food security crisis. Large negative welfare changes concern upper-
middle class and poor households. Indeed, policy makers should be primarily concerned with 
poor households, as decreases in welfare, e.g. real consumption, are highly correlated with 
food consumption (see Table 3-13). The most important priority appears to be the Beirut 
southern suburbs  (BBDA_1) and the poor neighborhoods of the cities of Saida and Tripoli 
(SDJZ_1 and TRI_1). They show a decrease in welfare of -1.94%, -2.25% and -1.92%, and 
represent 14.36%, 13.5% and 8.2% of the poorest deciles respectively (see Table 3-8).  
If the most vulnerable groups – in terms of the absolute value of welfare decrease and 
in terms of the number of individuals – appear to be the poor urban and rural poor households 
(already highly vulnerable groups), then Lebanon, like other MENA countries, is susceptible 
to political and social problems should the international prices of food increase.   
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4.6 Synthesis 
This Chapter studied economic scenarios resulting from changes in policy, trade and 
production technology, in direct relation with farmers‟ livelihoods strategies. It looked at the 
structural dynamics, welfare and income distribution induced by the different scenarios. As 
pointed out by Derejan and Robinson (2002), CGE models have both academic and policy 
purposes. In particular, the models can be used by policymakers to evaluate the impact of 
political and economic decisions, allowing them to distinguish between “loser and winner” 
options.  
The results of the CGE models tested in this Chapter show that several simulations 
induce non Pareto efficient
55
 changes in regards to Equivalent Variation (EV) and/or to real 
income, either at the level of households deciles, at the regional level or both, thereby 
highlighting the conflicting economic interests between the richer and poorer deciles and 
between regions. 
In regards to the trade liberalization scenarios, the abolition of agricultural tariffs was 
shown to have negative effects on the Baalbak Al Hermel strata HHD_1 to HHD_5 deciles. 
However, abolition of all tariffs, but keeping the VAT tax of 10%, is Pareto efficient, 
although it increases inequality. Conversely the envisaged policy of increasing the VAT (to 
16%), together with the abolition of tariffs is non Pareto efficient, and only the richest deciles 
will witness an increase in welfare. The Lebanese government suffers from an important 
budget deficit and is in need of creating new revenue, however, the neo-liberal policies of 
abolishing tariffs and raising VAT taxes benefits only the richest part of the population, 
without creating sufficient additional revenue. 
                                                             
55
 “An allocation that is Pareto optimal uses society's initial resources and technological possibility 
efficiently in the sense that there is no alternative way to organize the production and distribution of goods that 
makes some consumer better off without making some other consumer worse off." (Mascollel et al. 1995:313). 
 Therefore, when the economy given its set of technological and resource constraints, is moving from a 
situation where it is wasting some of these resources to a situation where there is no waste in the allocation of its 
resources is in fact making a Pareto efficient change. In microeconomic terms, if the equilibrium reached can be 
moved to another allocation where one of the consumers can be strictly better off, i.e. have a higher utility level, 
while the others have at least the same utility level (or higher), then this is a Pareto improvement of the 
equilibrium reached. Note that a Pareto optimal change need not be in the direction of a more equitable change 
for society. For example, "using all of society's resources and technological capabilities to make a single 
consumer as well off as possible, subject to all other consumers receiving a subsistence level utility, results in an 
allocation that is Pareto optimal but not in one that is very desirable on distributional grounds" (p:313).  
 
 In regards to the agricultural production scenarios, Neutral Technical Changes (NTC) 
induce losses in real income for the poorer deciles households in Baalbak Al Hermel 
(HERBA), and theses losses are greater with Input Use Intensification (IUI) and concern 
HERBA, marginal areas and poorer deciles at the national level. Moreover, the growth and 
wealth produced by an increase in agricultural output is redirected toward the trade and the 
tertiary sectors – concentrated in Beirut and Mount Lebanon – benefiting self-employed, 
highly skilled labor, and most particularly the capital holders concentrated in the richest 
deciles. The Factor Use Intensification Scenario (FUI) creates a Pareto efficient change in 
term of real income, which remains consistent even when FUI is linked to reductions in 
domestic trade margins. The domestic trade margins reduction (Trm), FUI and FUItrm 
scenarios induce a mechanism of “resources transfer” between traders and farmers in terms of 
value added, and between inputs and labor in terms of production technology. 
  
 
 
5 Rural development and Agricultural Livelihood 
Strategies in Hermel  
 
 Chapter’s outline 
 
The qualitative case study presented in this Chapter investigates the strategies of Hermel‟s 
farmers and rural development activists, either as individuals or as an association. It uses a 
phenomenology approach imbedded in the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) livelihood 
strategy analytical framework (Scoones, 1998), to answer the following research question: 
 What are the main dynamics of change in farming praxis in Hermel? 
 What are the main factors influencing farmers and rural activists choices 
on their agricultural and rural development praxis, i.e. their livelihood 
strategies? 
The Chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 presents a review of the literature 
focusing on the change in the rural development paradigm and different frameworks used to  
study and analyze regional economies, both in Europe and in Lebanon. Section 5.2 presents 
the research questions, approach and methodology. This Section is intentionally written in a 
narrative / personal manner to better reflect the role of researcher-research interplay. Sections 
5.3 and 5.4 present the findings of the research. The former analyses the region‟s capital 
assets, and the latter investigates and reports farmers‟ strategies using their own narratives. 
Section 5.6 concludes and returns to the research questions. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Identifying what livelihood resources (or combinations of capital) are 
required for different strategy combinations is a key step in the process of 
analysis. (…)Understanding, in a dynamic and historical context, how 
different livelihood resources are sequenced and combined in the pursuit 
of different livelihood strategies is therefore critical”.  
(Scoones 1998:9)  
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5.1 Review of rural development paradigms 
5.1.1 Alternative food networks reshaping Rural Europe  
Europe‟s rural areas and food markets are witnessing a revival of typical and local 
food networks. These “alternative food networks” (Marsden et al. 2000) are described as 
endogenous rural development practices, which are creating a new rural development 
paradigm (van der Ploeg et al. 2000) and locally based cultural economies (Ray 1998). A key 
characteristic of these “new supply chains” is their capacity to re-socialize and re-spatialize 
food - a “counter tendency” to the predominant forces of globalization (Murdoch et al. 2000) 
- thus creating new linkages between agriculture and society (Renting et al. 2003). Typical 
and local products have set in motion alternative producer-consumer interactions, an answer 
to both: (i) consumers‟ “quality turn” (Murdoch et al. 2000) and the resulting rise in demand 
for quality products that followed the 1980‟s European food scandals; and (ii) the need of 
agricultural households to develop their livelihood strategies and increase their income (van 
der Ploeg et al. 2000).  
Watcher (1987) defines local development as a process aiming “at bringing together 
all local actors in a geographically limited area to merge their individual determination and 
strategic skills in order to serve a new dynamic economy characterized by a general interest in 
quality”. Furthermore, he considers that the presence of a local identity is  an essential pre-
requisite for the success of this process.  
Rural areas, in response to neo-liberal globalization, are increasingly resorting to 
“culture” as a key element in their local economic development. This “culture economy” is 
primarily concerned with the territory, its resources and its various networks of actors. It aims 
at reorganizing certain economic activities into the geographical scale of local territories in 
order to maximize the economic benefit from locally based industries. Since typical food 
products carry the identity of the territory, they illustrate how “culture economy” is 
operationalized through the commoditization of local and regional culture (Ray 1998). Ray 
also emphasizes the fact that both locals and extra-locals (rural and urban citizens) have 
agency with regards to the development of a “culture economy”.  
 According to van der Ploeg et al. (2000), rural development, is an array of practices, a 
“multi-leveled” bottom-up mechanism born from “global interrelation between agriculture 
and society” (p.352), and accumulating to define “a new agricultural development model 
operationalized at the level of the individual farm" (p.392). The paper explores “rural 
development understood as everyday practices, rather than as a policy or a social scientific 
paradigm”. However, this raises concerns about how the notion of resisting the 
modernisationist development of paradigms and creating new livelihood practices can be 
introduced as a realistic alternative among rural localities, especially among those that have 
been marginalised and demoralized by the collapse of farming under agricultural development 
policies over the past thirty years. It is when the strength, scope and impact of its practices 
(e.g. organic, agro-tourism, high-quality region-specific foods) become clear that the core and 
essence of rural development will emerge .  
This perception of rural development presents itself as a consequence of economic 
pressures on farm households that have led them to elaborate and implement new innovative 
methods of cost reductions. These farm-native innovations are creating a “new rural 
development paradigm”, which is emerging in both policy and practice through a two–way 
mechanism where practices tend to influence the EU and national policy making decisions in 
as much as they are being influenced by it. The creation, operation, and evolution of “new” or 
“alternative” food supply chains are taking place within this context. Alternative food supply 
chains “by their nature, employ different social constructions and equations with ecology, 
locality, region, and quality convention and consumer cultures”, as such they are  one of the 
pillars of emerging rural development patterns. They are a translation of the “public consumer 
pressure for a larger variety of distinctive quality food” (Renting et al. 2003).  
Goodman (2004) points out that the sited above scholars fail to critically analyze 
farm-level innovation and alternative food networks centered strategies in sociological terms. 
He argues that rural problems, such as income inequality, social exclusion, low wages and the 
“more general question of uneven development receive negligible attention”. Goodman 
echoes previous similar critics who warned that cultural political economy occludes 
exploitive capitalist processes and relations of domination (Sayer 2001). 
In turn, Shucksmith (2000 and 2004) raises an important issue related to social 
inclusion and exclusion within endogenous development processes in rural areas. His major 
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concern was “whether collective capacity-building through territorially based endogenous 
development is compatible with building the capacities of excluded individuals and 
redistributing power towards the less powerful” (Shuckmith, 2000:208). He argues that 
opposing globalization by means of local agency based on “cultural-territorial identity carries 
with it several dangers”(p.210) including social exclusion. Using Bourdieu‟s notion of 
capitals (social, symbolic and cultural), he explains that the social “construction of 
endogenous rural development may be a means of not only furthering the interest of locally 
dominant class, but also of masking the power relation implicit in this process and making it 
appear legitimate” (p.214).  
5.1.2 Theorical and Analytical frameworks  
 Amin Ash’s “the wealth of regions” 
The previous Section presented the literature analysis of social and economic 
phenomena in rural Europe. In what follows I discuss three theoretical and analytical 
frameworks, which allow for the understanding of the dynamics of rural economics and 
highlight possible plans for intervention. The first two, “the wealth of regions” (Ash, 
1999:370) and/or the “territorial accumulation of capital” (Ray, 2002:225),  have a European 
focus, while the third, Sustainable Livelihood (Scoones 1998), focuses on developing 
countries.  
Ash suggests four areas of action for building regional wealth: clustering, knowledge, 
the broadening of local institutional base and the mobilization of the social economy. 
According to him, economic clustering programs – because of the advantage they bring in 
terms of regional competitiveness (see Becatini 2004) – have been standardized, where “ most 
regions seem to have a cluster program of some sort” (Ash, 1999:371). The possible failure of 
these programs mainly emerges from overlooking the influence of the other three areas of 
action. Ash cites Hudson‟s (1999) argument that knowledge and strength stems from the 
ability of  “learning to learn”, which itself depends on the density of “ „intelligent‟ people and 
institutions” (p.371) mirrored in the labor market level of skills. Knowledge and learning not 
only depend on the links between different education and research institutions, but also their 
interaction with industries and other sectors of economic activity Institutions should be able to 
adapt and change, but above all they should be open and democratic. Present experience 
 shows that the governance of institutions “has always been in the hands of elite coalitions, and 
the resulting institutional sclerosis has been a source of economic failure by acting as a block 
on innovation and the wider distribution of resources and opportunity” (p.373). The 
broadening of the institutional base will enhance “social inclusion and empowerment [which 
are] likely to encourage economic creativity by allowing diverse social groups and individuals 
to realize their potential” (p.374). Finally, Ash highlights the importance of macroeconomic 
policy aspects for the success of policies based on these four areas of action. “In the absence 
of a conducive macro-economic framework, it seems irresponsible to ask the regions to 
embark upon a long-term and comprehensive overhaul in pursuit of an endogenous pathway 
to prosperity” (p.376). 
 Ray’s territorial accumulation of capital  
Ray starts by a discussion of the Marxist modes of production theory, especially 
because the existence of non-capitalism form of production together with capitalism 
demonstrates that modes of production – including capitalism - are social constructions56. He 
suggests “a neo-endogenous mode of production” (Ray, 2002:228), for rural Europe, a model 
based on territorial capital accumulation, producer-consumer relations and regulations. It is 
the specific form of producer-consumer relationship that delimited this mode of production to 
Europe or in more general terms to advanced societies, in which the individual is a consumer-
citizen with an enhanced capacity for agency (Lash and Urry, 1994). These consumer-
producer relations, conducted with the framework of alternative food networks previously 
discussed, produce sign
57
 commodities, thus “de-fetishising” 58 (Ray, 2002:230) territorial 
products and services. The concept of sign commodities has been developed by Baudrillard 
(1972) in one of the major post-modernist works on consumer theory, where he identifies a 
value in symbolic exchange and the exchange value “sign” in addition to the classical political 
                                                             
56
 In Chapter 1 and 2 discussed the Lebanese mode of production and what academics have called the 
“Lebanese capitalism”, i.e. the Lebanese specific social construction of capitalism.  
57
 Baudrillard (2007) [1972] in one of the major post-modernist works on consumer theory, identifies, in 
addition to classical political economy value in use and value in exchange of a commodity, a value in symbolic 
exchange and the exchange value “sign” (la valeur d‟échange signe). According to Baudrillard “la marchandise 
est immediatement produite comme signe, comme valeur/signe, et les signes (la culture) comme marchandise” 
(Baudrillard 2007) This concept was as well discussed by Lash and Ury (1994)  who argue that global capitalism 
has replace material and labor with „design value‟.  
58
 According to Marx, in a capitalist market based society there is in eternal need to secure competitive 
advantage by way of labor reduction innovation - reducing production costs - or by way of working on the social 
relationship between people and things through commodity fetishism. Where a commodity is believed to contain 
value per se; a value  not added by labor but given to it by the dominant ideology. Commodity fetishism  hides 
the real social relation that exist in the production sphere 
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economy value in use and value in exchange of a commodity. As for de-fetishisim, it derives 
from the concept of commodity fetishism, which was defined by Marx as an alternative 
means of securing comparative advantage for goods through working on the social 
relationship between people and things. According to Marx, commodity fetishism hides the 
real social relations that exist in the production sphere.  
In alternative food network commodities “consumption and production become 
imbued with the culture of the producing territory. Thus culture becomes a commodity but in 
the form of territorial (common), intellectual property” (Ray, 2002:230). Regulations such as 
protected Designation of Origin (PDO), Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) standards 
protect this common territorial resource. The sphere of production is not hidden to the 
consumer, and economic relations between consumers and producers are relatively 
transparent. They are regulated by standards and labels, and hence commodities are  “de-
fetishised”. The two axes, the producer-consumer axis and the regulations axis, on which Ray 
built his analysis of “culture economy” (Ray, 1998) need to be complemented by “both 
individual and collective reflexive action to build a pool of territorial common resources)” 
(Ray, 2002:228). These common resources are forms of capital manifested in interconnected 
cultural, educational, financial and social capitals.   
 Sustainable Livelihood Assets framework of analysis 
Some scholars, like Korf and Oughton, suggested a “transfer of methodology from the 
South” (Korf and Oughton, 2006:278), i.e. rural analytical framework used in developing 
countries – to look at issues of rural development, poverty and social exclusion. They argue 
that livelihood approaches are adaptable –with some limitation - to the European and North 
American context. They could help in “understanding households and the individuals within it 
as being embedded in a broader social and economical context” (Korf and Oughton, 
2006:279).  
The sustainable livelihood approach was first promoted by Chambers and Conway 
(1992). The rationale behind it was to define a framework of analysis that is compatible with 
the rural realities in developing countries. The authors define a livelihood as comprised of “ 
the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and activities required for a 
means of living (Chambers and Conway 1992:6). This livelihood is sustainable if it can cope 
and recover from shocks, maintaining and enhancing itself “ both now and in the future” 
 (Carney, 1998:4), “while not undermining the natural bases” (Scoones, 1998:5). It is only 
with Scoones (1998) - and later on Carney (1999) - that the livelihood approach became an 
analysis framework. The present research analysis is closer to the framework proposed by 
Scoones, as it focuses on the case study‟s political historical and social background rather 
than its vulnerability context – which is a central element in Carney (1999). Scoones 
describes the elements of the Institute of Development Study (IDS) framework as the answer 
to the following key issues: 
“Given a particular context (of policy setting, politics, history, agroecology and socio-
economic conditions), what combination of livelihood resources (different types of „capital‟) 
result in the ability to follow what combination of livelihood strategies (agricultural 
intensification/extensification, livelihood diversification and migration) with what outcomes?  
Of particular interest in this framework are the institutional processes (…) which mediate the 
ability to carry out such strategies and achieve (or not) such outcomes” (Scoones, 1998:3, 
author emphasis). 
Although the approaches – institutional geographic economy, social sciences and 
development economics – and the focus – Europe and developing countries – are different, 
the three frameworks have a common analytical ground. They give importance to the specific 
context – culture, social relations and politics –, to the resources – forms of capitals - and to 
the institutional environment in which the local economy is embedded. As pointed out by 
Korf and Oughton , methodology born from development economics in the South could be 
transferred and used with analytical purposes in the North, while the contrary may not be 
feasible. The density of public institutions and policies present in the EU cannot be compared 
to the situation in developing countries; therefore, the IDS framework remains more 
appropriate to study rural Lebanon. Nevertheless, the issues of social empowerment and the 
importance of macro-economic policies raised by Ash, as well as the notion of cultural 
economy and change in consumer-producer present in Ray‟s neo-endogenous model of 
growth, should be kept in mind as well during the analysis of rural Lebanon, as the country 
witnesses the development of alternative food supply chain.  
Next, I present some experiences from rural Lebanon studied by the literature.     
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5.1.3 Research in Rural Lebanon 
In addition to the political economy studies carried out by the new wave of Lebanese 
historians, that “wrote” the history of rural Lebanon, especially the Cazas that were joined in 
1920 (see Chapter 2 Section 2.2 and Sub-section 2.6.1)  Research on rural Lebanon – in 
relation to agriculture and development – can be divided into three types based on whether it: 
(i) looks at the actors of development in terms of their role views and dynamics, (ii) adopts a 
participatory approach, (iii) investigates alternative food networks.  
 The actors of development: people’s views and civil society structures  
The main actors of rural development are: (i) local people either excluded or 
empowered; (ii) local associations with varying degrees of impact; (iii) large private profit 
and non-profit organizations, that are often playing the role of the state in providing needs and 
services in most marginal rural areas where the state is mostly absent, e.g. Jihad Al-Bina 
association.   
Makhoul and Harrisson (2002) used participant observation and interviews in an 
ethnographic research to look at local perception of rural development in two case studies in 
North Lebanon. Specific focus was given to the role of local NGOs in a patriarchal context, 
and where patron-client relationships are strong. The study showed that the success of local 
initiatives is highly dependent on the involvement of socially marginalized people- women 
and men outside the clientelism circle - in the decision making process. These social groups 
have been disregarded by NGOs who still rely on village leaders, assuming they represent the 
overall community views and interests. According to the authors this assumption does not 
stand. The research demonstrates that development initiatives in Lebanon are constrained by 
social structures. 
It is common in Lebanon to differentiate between civil society institutions al mujtama‘ 
al-madanī and community institutions al mujtama‘ al-āhlī These two categories of institutions 
resemble each other in their associative forms and fields of activity, but vary with regards to 
their target members and thus have different membership criteria. In principle, any citizen can 
become part of a civil society institution, but only members of a specific community can be 
part of the community institutions it has established. Civil society institutions promoting 
different types of social linkages and relations face difficulties in penetrating rural 
 environments, for with often limited resources and influence, they have to rely on local 
leadership opinions, and benediction, in order to be able to work with the members of these 
communities. On the other hand, community institutions do not face such obstacles since their 
presence and activity is already endorsed by the leading figures of the communities from 
which they emerge.  
A comparative case study of two NGOs and their role in rural development was 
carried out by Bissat (2002). The associations under study were Jihad Al-Bina and Arsal rural 
development association (ARDA). 
Jihad al Bina is the Lebanese twin of the Iranian association carrying the same name. 
It is managed by Hezbollah party and receives large funds from The Islamic Republic of Iran. 
This organization is of particular interest to this research as it is the main provider of 
agricultural extension services in the Hermel-Baalbak region; an association that stands at the 
limit between al mujtama‘ al-madanī and al mujtama‘ al-āhlī, as its membership is not open to 
outsiders and staffing is restricted to people with specific religious and political affiliations, 
i.e. Hezbollah. The association does not provide services to its members, but rather to  
specific target groups distributed in specific regions in South Lebanon, the Bekaa and the 
southern Suburbs of Beirut. It enjoys a remarkable model of organization and structure - 
mixing leadership and participatory management- and operational efficiency.  
ARDA is a volunteer-based association. Its activities are limited to the village of 
Arsal
59
, and are structured around four main axes: environment, agriculture, human resources 
development, and youth. According to Bissat (2002) ARDA has been a model of best 
practices in rural community development in Lebanon. Its success stems from its ability to 
guarantee participation of all the community and in the active participation of women in 
decision-making. 
 Participatory approaches in rural Lebanon 
The specific situation of Arsal village has transformed it into a laboratory for research 
on local development. In addition to Obeid (2010) who looked at the local understanding of 
the state, two studies using participatory approaches were carried out by Hamadeh et 
al.(2001) and Zurayk et al. (2001).  
                                                             
59 Distant 143Km from Beirut and 30Km from Hermel. 
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Relying on the participation of the farmers for his study, Hamadeh et al. explored  the 
feasibility of different types of ruminant productions (ranging from semi-nomadic to settled). 
The results showed that only a settled system was profitable. Rent of pasture was a significant 
contributor to overall cost of the other systems. In turn, Zurayk et al. studied the conflicts 
emerging between growers and pastoralists on land use. The authors used both advanced 
technology (Geographic Information System) and indigenous knowledge to determine land 
characteristics. The research opened the opportunity for local stakeholders to debate on issues 
related to land use, and  it identified sustainable land management options.  
Several research studies followed an objective-oriented approach, where their main 
purpose was to plan and promote development in rural areas. Two have been conducted for 
the Hermel region. The first has been implemented within the framework of a cooperation 
project (OMSAR) between the EU and Lebanon (Moussawi and Yazji, 2005). It was directed 
specifically to Hermel, and used a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methodology. The 
second study has been published in the proceedings of the Consultative Center For Studies 
and Documentation
60
 (2001) conference on the development of North Bekaa.  
 AUB and MAI-Bari research line on Lebanon alternative food Network 
In Sub-section 5.1.1, I have described alternative food networks as being born from 
important social changes in societies. Organic agriculture, as an alternative way of producing 
food, and as a social movement is characterized by being wider than just being a farmers‟ 
movement (Tovey, 1997). It includes professors, students, environmental activists, etc. given 
the broad social basis of organic farming, its development is strongly influenced by 
developments in society at large (Michelsen, 2001). Professors at the American University of 
Beirut (AUB) have been promoting the development of organic and alternative food networks 
in Lebanon, through direct action and research. Zurayk and Touma (2006) assessed the 
experience of community supported agriculture initiatives and their positive impact on poor 
farmers. In recent years, moving beyond organic agriculture, a return to the land movement 
has emerged. Shops selling traditional products are becoming more widespread and 
producers‟ markets are emerging in the major cities. The local food phenomenon in Lebanon, 
the parallel political effort to introduce geographical denomination and traditional food 
regulations, as well as the economic opportunities arising from such  a development are well 
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 Beirut based think-tank close to Hezbollah.  
 reported and documented in  (Zurayk and Abdul Rahman (2008), Zurayk and Abu Ghyda 
(2009) and Atallah (2010))  
In that respect, the Mediterranean agricultural institute of Bari (MAIB), has developed 
a line of research on alternative food networks in the Mediterranean region. Three studies 
were carried out on Lebanon, where first Bteich (2000) looks at the possible strategies and 
prospects for organic production at its early stages of development. With the development of 
the sector, issues became more specific; Fawaz (2008) studied the role of social capital in 
empowering local women organic cooperatives, while Atallah (2010) investigated both 
production and consumption spheres, looking at consumers‟ perception of organic and local 
traditional food, as well as  the interaction between the two alternative food networks at the 
level of the producers.  
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5.2 Methodology 
“Qualitative designs follow a completely different logic than quantitative research. 
Completely different.”(Patton, 2002)  
5.2.1 Creswell’s (2007) interacting circles 
According to Creswell (2007), good qualitative research includes three interacting 
theoretical circles: the research philosophical assumptions, the approach to the research and 
the research design procedures. It is the interplay of these three factors that contributes to a 
complex rigorous study. Philosophical assumptions consist of the answers to ontological 
(what is the nature of reality?), epistemological (what is the relationship between the 
researcher and the research subject?) and, axiological (what is the role of values?) questions. 
After determining the subject of interest, qualitative research opts for an approach to the 
research (narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography, and case studies are the 
most commonly used). The approach to the study follows a logical sequence, connecting the 
empirical data to the research question(s), and ultimately to the study‟s findings and 
conclusions Yin (2003). Finally, the researcher designs an investigation strategy. As pointed 
out by Creswell (2007), the theoretical circles‟ elements are interacting and interconnected. 
Qualitative research transforms data into findings, and it does this while following a logical 
sequence; however, “there is no formula for this transformation” (Patton, 2002). In the 
following, I describe the sequence that I have followed in my research.   
5.2.2 The philosophical assumptions  
 What is the nature of reality? 
The choice for a qualitative inquiry emerged from both the nature of the research and 
my personal academic conviction. I strongly believe in the necessity for agricultural economic 
research to incorporate modeling methods with social sciences approaches and findings, and 
as such be able to compare and contrast the results and observations emerging from this fan of 
varying methodologies and research perspectives. In a context of globalization and change in 
agricultural paradigms, understanding farmers, and rural grass roots‟ leadership discourses 
and perceptions is essential for the study of the dynamics of development in rural areas. As 
discussed above, in the European context a large amount of literature describes the role of 
 social movement and culture in shaping realities in rural areas. However, in developing 
countries, innovation, creativity and empowerment through local social capital are acting as 
the major tools for the improvement of livelihoods in rural communities.  
In that matter qualitative research is an adequate tool of analysis as it allows for the 
understanding and description of social phenomena as experienced by people in their own 
terms. Critical issues are explored in detail, in the way they are perceived by those whose 
livelihoods‟ are most affected by and dependent on the questions and problematic at hand 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2007). Qualitative research puts aside the rationale of utility and profit 
maximization and optimization of agricultural output, and tries to understand the reality of 
rural areas.  
 What is the relationship between the researcher and the case study? And 
what is the role of values? 
Being from the region myself, I had facilitated access to interviewees and much of the 
“ice breaking” part of the interview process was not a difficult task. At the same time, not 
living there and not sharing the same daily pre-occupations as the research participant,  helped 
me maintain the distance and objectivity necessary for the accomplishment of the research. 
Furthermore, this personal connection with the case study allowed me to have a better 
perception and understanding of narratives, explanations, descriptions of social processes and 
norms as well as personal and societal contexts. Although I do stand by the side of farmers in 
their struggles and on the side of the regions residents in their latent conflicted relations with 
the central state, I did not intervene nor express my personal opinions and positions during the 
interviews. When asked about my family‟s farm I would delay my answers till the end of the 
interview. Then after turning the recorder off, I would answer the questions of the 
interviewees.  
5.2.3 The research approach  
The Hermel area has been the subject of research conducted by academic and public 
institutions. These studies have mainly focused on assessing the needs of the region, 
exploring its socio-economic situation, and presenting possible choices for development paths 
that the region can follow. The main aim of my study was to gain a deeper insight into the 
lives and motivations of farmers and local grassroots leaders in Hermel. I set out to describe 
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their experiences, and understand their decision-making strategies. I wanted to highlight the 
underlying processes of change in the region. I deliberately excluded  the point of view of 
local and national elites in order to focus on and try to understand some of the reasons behind 
the pronounced lack of agency within the community. The research is grounded in a 
phenomenological case study approach that tries to identify people‟s experiences and the 
social interactions that give rise to their reality.   
 The research questions 
My research questions -  
 What are the main dynamics of change in farming praxis in Hermel? 
 What are the main factors influencing farmers and rural activists 
choices on their agricultural and rural development praxis, i.e. their 
livelihood strategies? 
- are best answered using this approach. More specifically, I conducted in-depth 
 interviews, participant observations and desk study to explore:  
How do farmers respond to innovation introduction and to policy change? 
What type of relation do they have with local extension services, cooperatives and 
 other institutions whose actions revolve around the farmers. 
How do they perceive their relationships with local and national political institutions?  
How do they perceive the role of the local political elite and their own agency? 
As in any qualitative research, there are some inherent limitations to this study. In 
particular, it cannot address the incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon or social action, 
and, as it does not use sampling techniques grounded in probability, it cannot claim that its 
findings are representative of the whole population under study (Bryman, 2004). 
Unfortunately, at the time I conducted the fieldwork, a new agricultural survey was being 
conducted, the results of which were not yet available. A new data system was also being 
instituted at the Ministry of Agriculture, which when available  in the future, would allow for 
a year to year monitoring and updating of all (registered) Lebanese farmers‟ production. This 
 data would allow future researches – qualitative and/or quantitative – to study in more detail 
phenomena of change in agricultural praxis.  
5.2.4 The research design 
 Data collection  
I carried out my fieldwork between April and August 2010. The first period in the 
field was dedicated to the collection and review of available documents (reports, books, and 
articles) and to the design of the research tools. I used semi-structured open-ended interview 
questions as a tool for data collection in addition to observations and desk study. Interviews 
best reflect the actors‟ perceptions and visions, their actions and interactions, as well as their 
influences (Patton, 2002). I carried out the interviews in June and July, at the end of the 
watermelon and vegetable harvesting period. Most of the interviews were recorded and 
transcribed (in Arabic
61
). In cases where  I was not given permission to record, I  took notes in 
both Arabic and English. Interviewees were selected to represent most of the agricultural 
livelihoods in the Hermel region; however, the sample (33 interviews) did not aim to be 
statistically representative (see Table 5-1). Interview length varied between 27 minutes and 1 
hour and 22 minutes. Two interviews that were less than 25 minutes long were excluded from 
the database. I decided to stop data collection and end the interview when saturation was 
reached, i.e. when the information provided by the interviewee started to become redundant. 
I have classified farmers according to the predominant crop and/or characteristics; 
however, many farmers in fact belong to several categories. 
The interview transcripts, my personal notes and the documents collected during the first 
phase of the research constituted the data-base that was then analyzed.   
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 Quotes from the interviews appearing in the text, have been translated from Arabic to English in a way 
they preserve as much as possible their meaning, slightly overlooking grammatical English structure.  
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Table 5-1. List of interviewees 
  Interviewee Nb Notes 
Farmers Watermelon growers 4 One was not recorded. 
Olive growers 3 One was not recorded 
Ex-cannabis growers 2   
Current cannabis growers 1 Not recorded 
Dairy farmers 3   
Aquaculture 1 Discarded because too short 
Others 2  
Cooperatives and local 
initiatives leaders 
Cooperatives leaders 3 Olive and dairy cooperatives 
Local initiatives Jerd 2   
Local initiatives Hermel plain 1   
Extension services Private non profit 2 Not recorded 
Private profit oriented 1   
Public 1   
Decision makers Municipality 1   
Ministry official 2 One was not recorded 
Others Agricultural workers 1   
Non agricultural Local NGOs 3 One was discarded because too 
short 
Local opinion leader  1 Not recorded 
 
 Data analysis 
Qualitative data is analyzed by first developing a manageable classification or coding 
scheme (Patton, 2002) and then grouping it into homogeneous categories. It is a process of 
breaking down data and putting it together in a meaning full way (Creswell, 2007). I created 
three databases based on the three forms of data collection – i.e. interviews, observation notes, 
and documents.   
I coded data following Scoones‟ (1998) analytic framework. The codes were the 
following: context, livelihood resources, livelihood strategies, outcomes – and possible 
changes in strategies resulting from unexpected outcomes – and finally the institutional 
process. In addition, a second stage coding separated descriptive and interpretative data. The 
coding was completed separately for each database in order to allow for triangulation between 
each source of data.  
 According to Patton (2002), triangulation strengthens qualitative research by diversifying 
sources and/or data collection methods. There are several basic types of data triangulation: (i) 
data triangulation using a variety of data sources in a study; (ii) investigators‟ triangulation, 
(iii) theory triangulation; and (iv) methodological triangulation. In the present study I used the 
first type of triangulation; however, in the overall research I used a triangulation of theories 
and methods. Results emerging from the qualitative study are contrasted with the results of 
the theoretical analysis and the CGE modeling throughout the reporting and in the 
conclusions.  
In what follows, I report the findings of the data analysis in two Sections. The first focuses 
on Hermel‟s rural livelihood assets (different forms of capital) and the second on farmers‟ and 
rural leaders‟ experiences and narratives, their livelihood strategies and outcomes as well as 
their perceptions of the institutions – their roles and impacts on local development.  
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5.3 Hermel’s Rural livelihood Assets  
5.3.1 Natural capital and agriculture in Hermel  
 Land use 
The total area of the region is 56,535 ha. According to the 1996 agricultural census, 
11,194 ha were characterized as cultivated agricultural land, while by the 2004 census this 
figure had dropped to 8,123 ha, representing a significant diminution of 27.43%. In part this 
reflects better survey and data collection methods, but more importantly implies a socio-
economic dynamic in which people in the Jerd and Hermel plain are suspending their farming 
activity and relying on other sources of income. These figures mirror the low economic 
viability of certain forms of agricultural production.   
The Average size of holdings is 2.7 ha (Bekaa 2.9 ha and Lebanon 1.3 ha MOA (2006)) . 
The main cultivations are perennial crops such as apricot and newly re-introduced olive and 
dwarf apple trees in the plain, and almonds, pears and cherries in the Jerd. As for annual 
crops, winter cultivations remain traditional: barley, wheat, fava beans and peas. The main 
summer vegetable is watermelon and, to a lesser extent, melon, cucumber and tomato. 
Cultivation of corn is in increase because of the rise in demand for animal feed. In the Jerd 
fava beans, peas, chickpeas and potatoes are produced out of season, while cannabis, which 
was the main crop during the civil-war period, is now cultivated in very marginal areas only.   
 Forest 
The region has important forest resources totaling 11,730 ha, or 27% of its entire area. 
This represents a share much higher than the national average of approximately 7% (Mousawi 
and Yazji 2005). Most of these forests are located in the Jerd area and used to constitute a 
source of income and heating for people there (wood charcoal making). Today, with the 
growth of environmental awareness, these resources have become protected. Eco-tourism 
projects in the Jerd have benefited from the protection and revalorization of local forests, 
using them as their main attractive feature, and as the symbol around which they have built 
their image. In addition, the revalorization of local wild edible herbs present in the plain and 
on the region‟s hills has facilitated the emergence of local rural development initiatives.   
  Water and aquaculture  
Hermel is considered to be a region relatively rich in water resources. In addition to the 
Orontes River, water flowing from the mountains has formed a number of springs in Hermel 
city and the Jerd. Although located in a semi arid-area – yearly precipitation ranges from 
250mm in the plain (the lowest rate in Lebanon), to between 400 and 600 mm on the hills, to 
above 1,000 mm in the mountainous region. Near its spring, the Orontes river has cold and 
oxygenated water, which allows for trout rearing, and thus significant aquaculture production 
can be witnessed. Trout production is a main source of income for more than 120 families. 
Approximately 300 tons of annual production is sold either to restaurants or through direct 
sale. In addition, some of the production is exported to the Syrian city of Homs.  
Many lower-middle class households in the region rely on consumption of trout, the price 
of which has remained at stable low levels, even during periods when chicken and/or meat 
prices have increased. It is worth noting that Hermel‟s production of trout constitutes 5% of 
the total demand for fish in Lebanon (Moussawi and Yazgi, 2005). Lebanese demand for lake 
and river water fish is low, especially in the coastal areas where sea fish is preferred and 
readily available. Trout production faces marketing difficulties outside the inlands, although a 
supply push marketing strategy could help in promoting it. As such, it could help in the 
growth of the production, which suffers from low national demand and still relies on imported 
eggs (due to lack of local know-how on trout egg production). 
 Animal husbandry 
Animal husbandry was limited to goats (local protected breed and mixed breed) in the 
Jerd and sheep in the Hermel plain, both of which are used for meat and dairy production. 
Shepherds do not face significant obstacles with regard to marketing. Nevertheless, 
production and grazing still relies on traditional techniques and no important increases in 
output have been observed. 
The major problem is related to grazing areas, which are neglected by local authorities 
and by the MOA There is a high potential for opportunities of cooperation between Lebanon 
and Syria with regards to this issue since important savoir faire in sheep husbandry and 
grazing area management is present in Syria (including the near region of Homs); however, 
such possibilities are not being exploited Dairy cow husbandry, which was supported and 
promoted by national authorities is discussed in detail in Section 5.4.3. The region also allows 
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for beekeeping due to the different microclimates existing in the region and the possibility to 
move the bees to the Jerd. There is an active cooperative of honey producers; however, 
apiculture remains a hobby and a source of additional income, and  does not constitute an 
economic activity in and of itself. 
5.3.2 Poverty 
Poverty in the Hermel region is very high therefore entitling this Section “financial 
capital” would be simply inadequate. The UNDP MOSA (2008) poverty report estimates that 
in Baalbek Hermel region 32.54% of the population lives below the national the poverty line, 
while 13.40% lives under conditions of extreme poverty. This would approximately 
correspond to the consumption deciles HHD_1 for extreme poverty (14%), and HHD_1 to 
HHD_3 for poverty (total of 39%), of the household desegregation I proposed for the SAM 
and the CGE model (refer to Chapter 3 and 4) and considering that HHD_3 represents the 
vulnerable households that are likely to fall below the poverty line if subject to even minor 
shocks. 
 Table 5-2: Distribution of Baalbak Al-Hermel Population across national 
consumption deciles 
Households 
deciles 
HHD_1 HHD_2 HHD_3 HH_D4 HHD_5 HHD_6 HHD_7 HHD_8 HHD_9 HHD_10 
Population 14% 11% 14% 15% 12% 13% 9% 6% 4% 2% 
 
The household survey classified 50.02% of Hermel‟s households as poor and 5.80% as 
extremely poor, where 24.76% of households had an income lower than 500 USD in the 
month that preceded the survey (see Table 5-4 and 5-5 below).  
In the absence of financial credit – today there is only two branches of medium size 
Lebanese bank operating in Hermel, the first one opened in 2001 – households‟ capacity to 
invest in agricultural or other types of businesses is limited. Local moneylenders offer 
informal forms of credits with very high interest rates and land hypothetical as collateral. 
Often moneylenders use intimidations and pressure to assure repayment. This scarcity in 
 credit and the incapacity to invest in long-term business plans and/or to enlarge existing 
investments is holding back economic activities.  
Table 5-3: Classification of Hermel households (source raw data HLCS)  
Households classification Rich 
Financially 
comfortable 
Middle 
class 
Middle 
class to 
poor 
Poor 
Extremely 
poor 
Percentage population  
Hermel area 
0.42% 2.59% 15.23% 25.95% 50.02% 5.80% 
 
Table 5-4: Last month income of hermel households (source HLCS) 
Income in  
USD Last 
month 
less 
than 
150 
150-
299 
300-
499 
500-
649 
650-
799 
800-
999 
1000-
1199 
1200-
1599 
1600-
2399 
2400-
3199 
more 
than 
3200 
Percentage 
households  
2.65% 7.19% 14.92% 20.01% 11.14% 15.83% 9.26% 10.59% 5.83% 1.85% 0.74% 
 
Data from the households (1995 and 2004) were elaborated using the unsatisfied basic 
needs approach. Results show that 66% of the population of Hermel had low levels of 
satisfied basic needs – 26% had very low levels62. This report used a methodology that 
estimates the satisfaction of needs of households not only in terms of expenditure but also in 
terms of access to basic such as roads, waters, electricity and others. The following Section 
discusses the situation of the case study area with respect to these issues.   
5.3.3 Physical capital  
 Roads 
Hermel city is at a distance of 145 km (road) from Beirut. The road linking both cities, 
and passing through baalback and Zahle, is the main road used by farmers for trade purposes . 
The state of the road is good, apart from the Baalbak-hermel junction, where enlargement 
works had been initiated after the Lebanese Israeli war of July 2006, but were held back due 
to  conflicts pertaining to land expropriation issues. The road linking Hermel to Tripoli has 
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1997 figures, figures for 2004 where published for aggregating Baalbak and Hermel regions and showed 
limited changes from 1997 (UNDP, MOSA and CAS, 2006b) 
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been modernized; however, because of its mountainous topography and the existence of 
stronger social relations and linkages to the city of Baalbek, farmers do not rely on this road 
as a trade route since they do not trade as much at the  Tripoli market. Internal roads suffer 
from lack of maintenance, especially outside Hermel city, and many newly established 
agricultural holdings are not connected to the road network.  
 Electricity 
“Down there, the holdings are not connected to the electricity network, they steal it. I 
am connected, but I still steal. During the day I put it on the bill, when I irrigate at night I 
steal it. You can‟t steal it during the day, you do it at night” 
The vast majority of houses and establishments (99.7% of households 
63
) in the 
Hermel Caza have access to electricity, including those in the Jerd. Agricultural 
exploitations
64
 however are often not connected to electrical power. Requests can be made to 
obtain an agricultural electrical transformer, which benefits from price reductions. The 
connection to the network is free for holdings distant at most one km from the network, and 
additional distance is at the expense of the farmer. Larger holdings can ask for a private 
transformer, which allows for the generation of additional power. However, the fixed monthly 
cost of such an installation is high, which make it financially unsustainable.  
Availability of electricity  is a major problem in Lebanon, where it is continuously  
available only in Beirut. Other regions are subject to a rationing that ranges between 3 and 12 
hours a day. A system of private generators distributing electricity to the various 
neighborhoods is a common practice all over the country (49.17% of household in Hermel, 
79.58% in Zahle (highest), 14.54% in Beirut (lowest), 61.6% for Lebanon
65
). In Hermel, 
electricity is rationed 12 hours a day in summer and between 6 and 12 hours a day in winter. 
Some households – and agricultural holdings – illegally connect to the network and do not 
pay electricity bills. The national electricity company has been suffering from high losses, and 
its debts constitute a large part of the state deficit. These internal financial and management 
problems, in addition to the company‟s inability to provide regular electrical supply reflect 
                                                             
63 Hermel sample data, elaborated from the HLCS survey.  
64
 Electricity in mainly used to generate water pumps (see Section 5.4.1). 
65
 Sample data, elaborated from the HLCS survey, the percentage include both subscription to a private 
generate providing electricity for the neighborhood and the owning of a small electrical generator  
(providing electricity for the house). 
 grave problems of governance in the country. The shorfall of electric supply is also due to the 
numerous Israeli bombardments that have led to partial, and at times complete, destruction of 
electric plants
66
.  
The privileges that Beirut enjoys are a reflection of the unbalanced development and 
inequality between the capital and the rest of the county.  
The illegal connections to the network show the weakness of the state in certain areas. 
Finally this problem is the main source of daily life frustration of the Lebanese citizens and a 
reason of regular anti-government protests.  
 Water 
“The land is generous, it gives. But water, we do not have water, and water is here 
near us. We are like the Al-Imam Hussein
67
 and his followers; they died thirsty near the 
Euphrates . We are on the Orontes and we are dying thirsty”.  
The most striking fact about the management of resources in Hermel is the great 
contrast between the presence of important water resources and the lack of adequate water 
networks, for both agriculture and domestic uses. The problem of water management remains 
the main obstacle for development in Hermel. Public network is the primary source of water 
for 67.47% of the households (in 89.3% of the cases with daily interruptions and 9.5% with 
weekly), 26.17% use private artesian well
68
, and 7.26% water tanks
69
. Agricultural holdings 
use underground water (through artesian wells) for irrigation (50.7% of the holdings). Old 
open air irrigation canals (used by 49.3% of the holdings) originating from springs in Hermel 
city and in the Jerd are still used to irrigate orchards and low water demanding crops. Drip 
irrigation is used by 36.2%
70
 of the agricultural holdings. 
 
                                                             
66 The Israeli army bombed Lebanese Electrical plant in 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2006. 
67 Al Imam Hussein (grandson of the Prophet Mohammad) is the third Imam in Muslim Shiite theology. He 
was killed in a battle for the Islamic Khalifa in 680 In Karbala (Iraq). Him and his followers where outnumber 
and encircled near the Euphrates River. They were not allowed access to water. The commemoration of Hussein 
Martyrdom is deeply rooted in common consciences of the Shiite people.     
68
 83.46% of the household use sanitary pits for domestic water drainage. On the long term they could 
become a source  of pollution of the artesian waters. 
69
Hermel sample data, elaborated from the HLCS  
70
 MAO, FAO Atlas of Lebanon agriculture 2006 
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A plan to build a dam on the Orontes River has existed in the agenda since the 
Chehabist period in the 1960‟s, one of the “effets d‟annonces” (debiè and Pieter 2003) that 
characterized this period (see Chapter 2 section 2.4.2). The dam would gather the Lebanese 
part of the Orontes water, which would be enough to provide water for the Hermel region and 
the neighboring villages of Qaa and Rass Baalbak, and for irrigation and electricity. “As 
people from Hermel, our dream is to see the large dam on the Orontes . The large dam means 
than all the area you see here will be covered by water. It would be a great resource for 
aquaculture, and a great resource for agriculture. It has been 15 years we ask for it. And 
money is spent, and money is stolen, and politicians get divided and the project is lost”. The 
expropriation of the land that would be covered by the artificial lake has been done and work 
has started, but was halted by the Lebanese Israeli July war in 2006, and the contracted 
Chinese company left. The projected capacity of the dam was reduced for: ecological reasons, 
opposition from the Syrian side to a large dam that could gather a quantity higher than the 
Lebanese share, and finally for lack of funding. These arguments were rejected by local civil 
society and a series of campaigning for a “large dam” have been launched and revitalized 
after the works had stopped in 2006, and a return to the old project became possible. “The 
small dam, is useless. All specialists say that it cannot produce electricity. The restaurants on 
the river make more money in one year than the possible return of the small dam in 50 years. 
It is useless”. However, local civil society campaigns are weak and  have not been able to 
force changes at the political level yet.   
The inability of local actors, and regional political leaders to advocate the execution of 
the dam is striking. It raises questions on the political and power relations between the people, 
their local representatives and the central state. Why are people unable to pressure for what 
they perceive as a right and a necessity? Why are powerful political parties – like Hezbollah 
and Amal – incapable to obtain from the government – to which they participate – the 
execution of the project?  
 
 
 
 5.3.4 Social Capital  
The literature differentiates between three types of social capital: the bonding social 
capital (within social groups), the bridging social capital (with similar groups), and the linking 
social capital (with public institutions).  
 Bonding social capital  
Families and clans remain to be the main bonding social links in Hermel, especially in 
the Jerd. These social links constitute the dominant form of solidarity, and bonds between 
individuals from the same extended family are strong. Clans are also political institutions , 
although much of the families‟ political power has been weakened with the rise of Hezbollah. 
The other form of bonding capital revolves around people‟s belonging to the Shiite 
community, and falls within the larger context of Lebanon, where sectarian solidarity forms 
the basis of an entire system of social and political norms that regulate, formally and 
informally, the relations between the community and the state. In that system, such links are 
mediated through the leaderships of the community, both traditional authority figures and 
representatives of the predominant Shiite political parties, namely Hezbollah. At many 
instances, this type of mediation also forms the means through which members of the 
community gain access to services such as health and education, to work opportunities, and 
other similar social and economic services.  
Thus, people raise their demands to the local representatives of the community/region, 
and  in turn, they present these demands to the state. Then, based on the practice of “sharing” 
and division of resources between the different communities and regions, political decisions 
are made accordingly. Today, Hezbollah plays the role that used to be played in the past by 
local politicians and landlords. The fighting between Israel and the resistance in the south 
between 1990- 2000, and the following issue of Hezbollah‟s weapons pushed economic and 
social issues to the background. The Shiite priorities were directed towards the consolidation 
of the community power share and to the safeguarding of the resistance arms (see Chapter 2 
Section 2.6.2).  
Both forms of strong bonding capital did not contribute to the enhancement of 
people‟s agency in terms of rural development. They rather hampered the improvement of 
bridging and linking forms of social relations.   
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 Bridging social capital  
Clan bonds and to a certain extent bonds between different political groups stand as an 
obstacle for the creation of associations or other forms of social actions that link the citizens 
of the region. As a matter of fact, local initiatives where participation and cooperation 
between members of the community is a key factor for success, are not being able to penetrate 
through the strong familial bonds on one side and the political power of the dominant 
party(ies) on the other side. For example,  public and private rural development initiatives are 
still divided according to clans in the Jerd region, and membership to cooperatives in these 
areas is often restricted to clan members. Armed clashes between clans, as well as acts of 
vendetta, in the Jerd are still common today. Issues of trust between different social groups 
are highly affected by these social norms and resulting conducts, creating an overall climate 
of latent mistrust among people in Hermel. And so, while strong bonds of trust and solidarity 
exist between members of the same clans and families, they tend to be missing at other levels 
of social relations such as those between different clans, between Hezbollah and other 
political parties, and between the municipality and local associations. The relation with the 
Hezbollah association Jihad Al-bina is however an exception to this general phenomenon, 
where it is generally trusted by farmers.   
 Linking social capital 
Before 2005, several factors hindered the liberty of association in the region. On one 
hand, the Syrian army
71
 and intelligence services, up to their withdrawal in 2005, used to 
intervene in internal elections and actions of cooperatives and rural development associations. 
On the other hand, the Lebanese Ministry of interior applied its own interpretation of the 
association law, where it required permits for the formation of associations, which is not in 
line with the existing laws 
72
. Today associative life is freer, but social forms of actions still 
need to be “legitimized” by local political powers, that will in turn determine The relations of 
the associations with local institutions, e.g. the municipality. Conflicts between dominant 
political forces, i.e. Hezbollah, and local associations tend to emerge when the political 
agenda of the association, if any, or the connections of the association with other political 
                                                             
71 The Syrian army was present in Lebanon from 1996 to 2005. 
72
 The association law in Lebanon date form Ottoman period (1909). In order to be legal an association does 
not ask for a permit but simply inform the ministry of interior of its existence. In no case the ministry has the 
right to refuse the formation of the association. Between 1990-and 2005, a de-facto process of permit obtaining 
has been implemented. Civil society considered it as illegal, and always refused any amendment to the law.   
 parties or foreign cooperation agencies. The most problematic issues are connections with 
American public cooperation agencies, whether directly or through Beirut-based NGOs that 
are funded by these agencies. “They first asked us from where are you getting your funds 
from? the Americans? But we take it from the OTI
73
. And the OTI worked with everybody 
including their [Hezbollah] association and their schools and with the municipality”. Local 
political leadership monopolizes linkages with the government and state institutions. It also 
desires to monopolize potential funds from international development agencies.  
 Relation with the state 
The historical political economy of the region has led to conflicting relations between 
Hermel and the state. Basic public administration institutions  such as, a social security office, 
and cadastral offices, are absent in Hermel. This relation has regularly culminated to violent 
clashes. Hezbollah has, in many occasions, played a mediating role in negotiating conflict 
resolution initiatives between the people and the army and state police. Institutionalized 
political and social norms have given this role to local political leaders and dominant parties 
since 1943.  
People in the region suffer from a lack of state socio-economical and development 
interventions, while unable to surpass strong local political power. This aspect is highly 
influential in determining livelihood strategies and will be further discussed in the following 
Sections. 
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 The United states Agency For International Development‟s (USAID) office for transitional initiatives 
(OTI)  
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5.4  The changes in agricultural paradigms Farmers 
experiences 
5.4.1 The watermelon lottery 
“It‟s just like a lottery ticket, an agricultural gambling. I would be lucky if my 
neighbor planted tomatoes instead.” 
Large-scale production of watermelon, as well as tomatoes and other vegetables was 
introduced to Hermel areas in the beginning of the 90‟s with the introduction of drip irrigation 
that led to reductions in the previously existing water constraints. Agricultural households 
looked at this as an opportunity to gain good profit from this quick cash crop, and many 
employees working outside the agricultural sector considered it as a source of extra income. 
“I saw these people getting into these drip irrigated exploitations. I saw they were making 
profits. A dounoum of watermelon would give a net return of 400-500 dollars”. Farmers were 
ready to cope with relatively expensive inputs – even before the rise in  the price of fuel, 
seeds and fertilizers – as suppliers were ready to lend and be paid after harvest. The diffusion  
of drip irrigation took place right after the civil war, which helped in the acceleration of 
adoption by farmers. The return of economic activity to “normal” – especially regarding 
liberty of movement between Lebanese regions – allowed input supplier companies based 
outside the areas to expand their business activities. They encouraged intensive cultivation in 
a kind of supply push marketing strategy, in which inputs were available on credit together 
with free technical advice and supervision. 
“We were making profits, the agricultural calendar protected us from there, prices 
were good. Things changed and people started losing”. Problems with intensive vegetable 
production started with the significant increases in domestic output accompanied by the 
opening of the Lebanese market to the Syrian, Jordanian, Egyptian and Saudi production. 
Market liberalization followed the implementation of the multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements with other Arab countries and the unilateral reduction of tariffs in 2003.  The 
combination of these factors led to a large decrease in domestic supply prices. The outcome of 
the season and the farmers‟ ability to repay their debts became dependent on a dynamic that 
was out of their control. “You sell for 500LBP a kilo at the beginning of the season and at 
150LBP a kilo at the end of the season, because the Jordanian import would of be in the 
 market. The farmers who harvest at the end of the season cannot repay their debt”74. 
Volatility in the domestic agricultural prices depending on the early, middle and late season 
time is a mechanism well known to Lebanese farmers. They were used to cope with it when 
competition was limited to domestic production and to some “smuggled vegetable pick-ups 
form Syria”. However, they are hardly able to sustain competition from abroad because of 
their higher costs of production. “The cost of a dounoum of tomatoes is around 500-600 USD, 
this year I had an overall cost of 28,000 USD, this money would of build me a house”. 
Paradoxically the main burden is irrigation, the problem that drip irrigation was supposed to 
solve. 
“Electricity is supplied only 12 hours a day sometimes 6. You can‟t stop from 
irrigating the watermelons 3 to 4 hours a day, every day just like prayers. If you don‟t your 
season is dead. You have to get the fuel for the water pump, the money, you have to”. The 
problem of course is not the drip irrigation technology but the lack of water supply 
infrastructure in the region. The great majority of farmers use artesian wells. Water pumps are 
powered either by electricity or by diesel, and at times both. Electricity is the less expensive 
but not always available.  
Watermelon farming is mainly done on leased land by landless farmers or farm 
owners leasing additional plots for watermelon production. Although the yearly cycle of 
production incorporates the use of a winter legume like fava beans or peas, it is never used as 
green manure but sold at the market. Since watermelon farming cannot be performed on the 
same parcel of land for more than a few years, as the land needs to relax from intensive 
production, leasing watermelon farmers tend to transfer their activities to different parcels . 
As planned crop rotation and soil fertility management  is not a common practice, land that 
ceases to be used for watermelon production is often left fallow.  
Often returns from fava beans compensate for the losses accumulated during the 
summer cash crop season – as a matter of fact, winter irrigation costs are limited.  
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 Facing competition from the Jordanian and the Syria production and the fluctuation of prices within the 
season is in an important concern for many farmers, regardless of the region and the type of crop.  In their study 
of Dayr al Lawz village in Northen Lebanon, Makhoul and Harrison (2002:614) reported a very similar  quote 
from an almond farmer: “A kilo of almonds is sold at 1500 LL (US$1), but when the Syrian and Jordanian 
[almonds] hit the market, the price goes down to 500 (US$0.35).” (Fifty-year-old farmer in Dar el Lawz).  
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Watermelon – or tomato – intensive production remains to be attractive as there is  
hope that “this year will be a good one”. In some case farmers are the victims of a vicious 
circle of “agricultural gambling” and debt. “Grow something else? Like what? Persil? It does 
not pay back the debt. Lettuce? It does not pay back the debt. But if I get a good watermelon 
season, I could. You cannot pay back 40-50 million LBP of debt if you do not get a good 
payment. Barley, wheat and whatsoever do not pay back”. Nevertheless, many farmers have 
completely abandoned this form of production or at least stopped relying on it as the main / 
unique aspect of their farming praxis. “I planted Watermelon two years, the first year I made 
money the second I lost. People sold their houses because of Watermelons. I stopped”. The 
main concern is to secure the season‟s income. Farmers in Hermel have expressed their 
interest in acquiring licenses to grow tobacco – which was primarily directed towards farmers 
in the south of Lebanon. As previously discussed in Chapter 1 Section 1.3, distribution of 
tobacco licenses is highly supervised by political leaders and is used as a means for political 
control. It is not necessarily given to farmers and a black market for license reselling exists. 
Even with this extra cost, and the overall low returns, it is still a secure crop to grow. Some 
farmers will grow tobacco - still cultivated using low inputs and traditional methods - and use 
the license as a collateral in order to get credit to grow intensive crops in parallel. This 
unofficial financial agreement is commonly done with national banks or inputs providers.  
Within that context, the re-introduction of olive and olive oil production by some extension 
services and cooperation projects has been widely accepted and adopted. 
5.4.2 Olive oil: Low cost and secure income 
 Public policies 
“Farmers are looking for an output that they can control, they don‟t want to be 
controlled by their output. The olive tree gives you and does not take from you” 
Olive production is promoted by most of the actors in the region: the ministry of 
agriculture
75
, Jihad Al-binaa, foreign donors and local grass-roots initiatives. Olive orchards 
are either promoted as a single crop with winter production of legumes, or within an olive-
nectarine system for the first years, in both cases for oil production. The MOA and private 
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 Public action is carried out in the framework of a cooperation project (Oil Lebanon), funded by the Italian 
cooperation agency and implemented by the MAI-B. The target group is olive oil cooperatives.  
 extension services, especially Jihad al-binaa promoted the introduction of olive orchards as an 
alternative for small and medium size farmers who are  unable to sustain high input 
productions. Public action is carried out in the framework of a cooperation project (Oil 
Lebanon) and is incorporating the participation of local stakeholders in the process. The 
project, targeting olive oil cooperatives, is funded by the Italian cooperation agency and 
implemented by the MAI-B.  
 Lessons from the apricot 
Policy makers in the region want to re-introduce a production similar to the apricot 
system; low utilization of fertilizers, low water requirements, and low pest control 
requirements due to specific natural conditions (high change in temperature between day and 
night). However, securing output markets remains the prominent issue and attention is given 
to quality and marketing strategies. In the 1960‟s and up to the 1980‟s, marketing of apricot 
was secured through export to the Arab gulf, but export channels were gradually closed 
because of the ongoing civil war. Marketing of apricot became a very difficult task because of 
the short-life of the fruits after ripening, “you have 5 days, to sell it. If it is not sold it falls 
form the trees”. It is striking that although apricot production was flourishing in the pre-civil 
war period, not a single processing and post harvesting industry for apricot was build; 
processing of apricot in Hermel was done only for home consumption. This raises the issue of 
the importance of financial capital from one side and the absence of the state form the other 
side. Apricot-farmers in Hermel did not have the capacity to accumulate capital and build 
processing plants. Furthermore, the export of apricot was monopolized by high-powered 
traders who were able to influence the policy-making process at the state level. Thus policies 
were directed towards trade and no credit was given/facilitated to entrepreneurs who wanted 
to establish processing plants or similar industrial activities. When traders lost economic 
interest in export, farmers faced large difficulties in marketing the production and prices 
collapsed. It became more profitable to subcontract the harvest to Syrian middlemen who 
would sell it at the Syrian market, than to directly sell at the Lebanese market. Farmers would 
agree with the middlemen on a lump sum payment after observing the orchards and 
estimating the volume of production. The middlemen would take care of the rest, harvesting 
and marketing. This mechanism is obviously not at the advantage of the farmers, but the lump 
sum received had the advantage or being secure. Although this could be technically 
considered as export, in the context of open borders between both countries, and the important 
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losses  borne by the farmers in terms of added-value share, prices received were definitely not 
comparable to those received when the production would be exported to the Arab gulf. Thus, 
farmers gradually abandoned apricot production. “We had different varieties of apricot. When 
one of the varieties started to ripen and fall you could not even go to the orchard to irrigate 
or spray the other trees because of the odor. We were forced to sell at any price; we did not 
want to see it fall. We found that the olive trees allowed us to sustain. You can wait to harvest, 
you can sell it green, and you can make oil. You control it, it doesn‟t control you.” 
With this background, specific attention is given to the marketing planning capacity 
building and quality focus on the production of high quality oil. “Our oil was chosen as the 
best extra virgin olive oil in Lebanon by the Italians [oil Lebanon cooperation project]”. 
These marketing strategies aim at mitigating the relative lower income from olive production 
compared to other crops.  However, many farmers prefer securing a relatively lower income 
that to risk losses, “We do not have choice, many people stopped farming, this year a part of 
the watermelon production was not even sold. At least with olives we get 10,000-12,000 
USD.” Nowadays, marketing of olives and olive oil are done through traditional channels 
either green at the wholesale markets or through middlemen, or as olive oil in plastic 
containers of 20 liters. A local initiative has led to the formation of olive oil producers 
cooperative that owns a modern olive oil press.   
In addition to olive pressing services, the cooperative is providing support to farmers 
on innovative production techniques. These innovations focus on close-cycled management of 
the olive orchards and the use of olive oil by-products such as the use of pressing residues for 
fertilization, which replaces conventional forms of chemical fertilizer use, and  substitute 
green manure as most Hermel‟s farmers would rather benefit from the additional income from 
winter crops.  
The cooperative is also building a marketing strategy based on the valorization of the 
products through both quality and packaging, and introducing a bottling line to its olive 
processing unit. Nevertheless, some farmers – that use the cooperative facilities for processing 
without being members – are still perplexed regarding the quality policy adopted by the 
cooperative, as the “quantity obtained is low”. The cooperative‟s ability to sustain production 
on high quality olive oil depends primarily on its ability to market it and compete at the local 
 market with the production from Lebanese regions where olive oil production is historically 
well established and better known by the local consumers.   
 The olive oil cooperative as a social expression 
The founders of the olive oil cooperative are middle-aged men with a leftist and Arab 
nationalist political background. Although their political action was never partisan and limited 
to socio-economic and cultural issues, they have been faced by pressure and inference, or 
simply lack of attention or support from public institutions and political forces. The 
experience of this group of activists allows for a  comparison and understanding of the social 
processes in which dominant forces perceived the formation of associations beyond their 
control, as marginal as they can be, as a direct political threat. It in the pre-civil war and the 
Syrian hegemony period (pre-1975 and 1992-2005), it was common for local political leaders 
and intelligence officers to pressure and/or intervene directly in the internal affairs of citizen 
associations.   
Nowadays, Hezbollah, being the dominant political player in a region where state and 
other political forces are weak, does not pressure or interfere in associative issues. 
Nevertheless, it works on marginalizing local initiatives that carry a political and social 
discourses that differ from his. This process of marginalization often takes place through the 
public institutions under the control of the party, such as the municipality, by simply  
disregarding their actions and refraining from  providing help and access to public funds. “We 
asked [the municipality] for a parcels of land to build the olive pressing unit. They said 
submit an official demand, we did. We waited for two years and they said no. After we found a 
piece of land and started building we asked them to fund the quality control lab. They said 
submit an official demand. Several months passed before they finally told us they stop funding 
associations.” As a matter of fact, support from the Hermel municipality to local associations 
is very selective. It depends on the social values carried by the association (e.g. secularism, 
gender mixed, and in general anything that comes in contradiction with local traditional social 
norms is not accepted) more that on its specific political stances on issues at the national 
level.  However, this marginalization of associations by the municipality is not transformed 
into social exclusion because of the strong bonding social capital present in the region.  
This process is not limited to the olive cooperative, but to all associations. Many of 
them have short-cut municipality support through gaining access to funds from foreign donors 
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and Beirut-based NGOs. Others have succeeded in finding support from the municipalities 
(like the Sindyana cooperative in Khwakh, see Section 5.4.5).  
The olive cooperative has been able to break local socio-political dynamic with the 
municipality through access to funds from Beirut-based donors, and has achieved success 
through this sustainable self-management. The latter helps the cooperative and the activists 
behind it in imposing themselves as main players in the Oil Lebanon project, and in rural 
development in Hermel. 
5.4.3 Dairy production: the randomness of public policies  
The policies of the ministry of agriculture regarding small and medium scale dairy 
production is a clear example of the ministry‟s lack of vision and planning, its dependence on 
international institutions, but most importantly of the political power of large enterprises in 
influencing the decisions of the government.   
A ministerial program supported by the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) was implemented from 1998 to 2004 in order to provide support to 
small-scale dairy producers. The project established 12 milk collecting centers throughout the 
country, and one of them was in Hermel. These centers are fully equipped for milk 
conservation and quality control and administrative operation. “They have been closed by a 
ministerial decision I don‟t know why. They say it is not economically viable, but the accord 
with IFAD stated that in order to sustain themselves the center could take up to 2% on sales. 
If they had done it would of worked”. 
These centers secured milk market for smallholders and controlled supply prices to 
processing units. “We were optimistic at the beginning with the opening of the center, 
because we could sell with good prices. When it closed 80% of dairy farmers sold their 
cows”. This center played an important role for both small-scale and medium scale farmers. 
Small-scale farmers could market the production of two or three cows. Then, the introduction 
of animal husbandry to their farming practices allowed them to have a weekly cash flow from 
milk sales, while the calves constituted additional income
76
. With the fall in milk prices they 
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 This is a specific condition of Hermel plain farmers. In the Jerd goat and sheep dairy production do not 
witness significant problems in marketing.   
 could not sustain high feed and veterinary costs, so they sold their cows. Medium-scale 
farmers faced a different problem. With the increase of their production they had to look for 
contracts with bigger dairy producers, especially large producers like Liban Lait or Tanayal 
farms in the Zahleh and Baalbak areas. In order to fulfill the quality requirements, large 
investments needed to be made (milk refrigerators, automatic milkers, more infrastructure 
with the increased number of animal). When prices fell after the shutdown of the center, they 
were not able to accumulated the financial capital needed for these investments (in addition to 
the absence of agricultural credits see Section 5.3.3). “I had 85 heads, I sold them, now I just 
have 3, just for fun.  I am losing I sale for 550LBP while in Zahle they sale for 850LBP”. The 
higher prices offered to Zahleh dairy farmers is due to their ability to supply a larger quantity 
of milk and to the closeness of large dairy industrial plants. Hermel medium scale farmers 
relied on the center for conservation and transport of the milk to Zahleh and Baalbak.  
The crawl in prices of milk was due  to two factors that were directly related to  the 
shutdown of the centers: the transfer of control over supply prices to the single cheese-maker 
in the region, and with the absence of an entity that guarantees quality control, lower quality 
milk came from Syria at lower prices. “Our biggest problem is milk coming from Syria, their 
it cost 400LBP, plus 100LBP transport. For us each Liter of milk cost us 700 LBP. This milk 
enters illegally and is not of good quality”. The center was the “dynamo of dairy production 
in Hermel”. 
The official reason for the shutdown of the milk centers was that they were said to be  
economically nonviable. Nevertheless, it seems that agro-industries, including large investors 
played an important lobbying role with the government in order to take this decision. 
Recently the MOA in cooperation with the FAO launched a new program to support re-
introduction of animal husbandry for smallholders, leaving the Hermel milk collecting center 
“fully equipped, including the quality control labs, fully equipped but closed”.  
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5.4.4 The Jerd: from drug cultivation to Organic farming and eco-tourism. 
“We planted hashish, it was common knowledge. Everybody planted it, especially 
people from the Jerd”. 
Drugs, cannabis mainly but also opium poppy tears, was historically cultivated in Jerd 
Al-hermel under the Ottoman Empires and the French mandate rules. It became a common 
agricultural practice in the late 1970‟s and early 1980‟s, covering almost all the Jerd 
agricultural land as well as a large part of the Baalbeck and Hermel plain. The cannabis “sub-
sector” of the Lebanese agriculture developed under the eyes of the Lebanese and Syrian 
armies, benefiting from the climate of civil unrest and the laxity of a weakened public 
administration caused by the ongoing civil-war. “The state wasn‟t in a condition that allowed 
it to come here, there was the Syrian army. But they were busy with politics and nobody 
would ask. On the contrary, Lebanese and Syrian officers were invited to lunch, they would 
come and wander around in the Hashish field and enjoy the Jerd‟s weather. They didn‟t have 
orders to stop us”. Cannabis growing was a source of important income for farmers of the 
region. It was also a source of wealth and capital accumulation for local elites – and clan 
leaders – who would seek –and bribe – protection from the Syrian army at the level of the 
Bekaa region and from Lebanese authorities and militia at Beirut airport and the illegal sea 
ports that were at that time spread along the Lebanese coast.  
The cannabis production created an economic cycle in the region, supplying large 
amounts of money to farming households. “One year we made we made 20,000 LBP77 it was 
a lot of money at that time. We bought a car and additional land, we married my brother and 
we furnished his house and got him a car, and my father still had money left. At that time we 
got a lot of money and prices
78
 would go up every year. We would do everything at harvest, it 
was known in Hermel that at harvest people will buy things, pay workers, furnish or build 
houses, and everybody will benefit indirectly form the hashish cultivation”. Production was 
labor intensive and it involved all the family members. Most of the time it was the unique 
source of income. Of course cannabis production did not make farming households rich, but it 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.5.2 the Lebanese currency witness a great devaluation in the late 
1980‟s. Late 1979 early 1980‟s which is time the interviewee is referring to, 20,000LBP would be equivalent to 
6,664 USD at 1979 exchange rate and purchasing power (1USD = 3.01 LBP). 
78
 The interviewee is referring to sale prices of cannabis.  
 allowed relative wealth and capital accumulation. The main beneficiaries were the local elite 
and family clan leaders, who enjoyed a substantial increase in their wealth and political 
power.  
The change came in the early 1990‟s with the end of the civil war and the increasing 
European and American pressure on the Lebanese and the Syrian government to stop drug 
production. The action against drugs in the Bekaa was fast, it came in a double conjuncture of 
return to peace in Lebanon, improvement of the Syrian and American relations, and the US 
“war on drugs”. The process was fast, the production stopped almost instantly in the Bekaa 
valley after the Syrian army did a onetime plow of the cannabis field there, while production 
in the Jerd became marginal. “Now people stopped, although some still do plant it. Because 
the state started to get stronger, and every year they come and plow the crops and prosecute 
the famers who plant it. Now that there is a state we decided to not cultivate it anymore, we 
don‟t want to be humiliated; we don‟t want to be “toffar79”. We leave our land fallow 
because with potatoes we will lose and not make money. Some years we lease it out for 200-
300 thousands LBP
80”.  
The UNDP program for alternative cultivation operated from 1996 to 2000, when it 
tried to introduce new crops and alternative production in the area. The program encouraged 
the development and valorization of local resources and varieties of fruits - especially pears, 
almonds and cherries. However, very few farmers had been organized in cooperatives and 
marketing remained as the main problem. Potatoes, fava beans and fruits production from the 
Jerd area received a premium price because they grow out of season and/or because of the 
specific variety of fruits such as pears, almonds and cherries. However, the main problem was 
not in the received prices, but in transportation, first from the Jerd to Hermel and then from 
Hermel to other market outlets. Most small holders cannot bear the transportation costs and 
use door to door and other forms of direct sales channels especially for fruits, which did not 
contribute much to increasing their income levels. “Some people take cherries to Zahle, they 
would have 20 boxes of cherries, in Zahle they will get a better price. But they are people who 
have a “van81”. They will take their cherries with them and come back with bananas from 
                                                             
79 Outlaws  
80
 Between 133-200 USD at 2010 Exchange rate and purchasing power (1 USD =1,500 LBP). 
81 Refer to mini-buses (10 to 15 passengers), they are used for private transport services and have become an 
important source of income in the region. . A person retired from the army would invest a part of its indemnities 
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Zahle”. Cooperatives present in the Jerd are restricted to families and close relatives. They 
were not able – and unwilling – to move across clan rivalries and power relations within the 
families. “They tear them down. They are relatives but then go into conflicts. One takes the 
tractor, one takes the pick-up, one takes the plow. They tear it down. There is no real 
agreement.”   
With the implementation of the political decision to stop drug cultivation and the 
failure of the UNDP project to provide a long-term sustainable alternative, the region has 
witnessed a significant decline in revenues and many people have left it. Many familites in the 
Jerd have gone from being  relatively wealthy farming households, to families struggling to 
provide their basing needs. “Marjḥīn and sawāḥ used to be full of people now there is no one 
there. I swear to you without the hashish, nobody would of live here, and nobody would be 
educated, and nobody would of know how to read and write. This is the truth. Now people 
have to choose between food and school”. Those who had the possibility to accumulate 
wealth and land during the 1980‟s have moved to Hermel. Those who stayed are farming for a 
little bit less than subsistence; “if I plant potatoes and some vegetables, I can guarantee a 
little income and the family mūnat82”. It is better that leaving the land fallow. People stopped 
planting hashish and now they farm just to not die of hunger”. 
Within that context, several local eco-tourism initiatives have succeeded in “bringing 
life to the area”. Paradoxically, in a region known for being marginal, clients of the Jerd eco-
tourism holdings are mainly European and north American expatriate living and working in 
Lebanon, in addition to occasional foreign tourists
83. “We started in 2004, with two rooms. 
And people started coming and encouraged us. 80% of my clients are foreigners. And I am 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
in a mini-bus and a licenses to use it for taxi services. He would rent it to a second person, and register it in the 
name of a family relative so the latter can beneficiate from the health insurance that comes with the license (the 
real owner of the mini-van beneficiating already from the army veteran social security). In Hermel 6.5% of the 
households own a mini-van, and 11.36% own a pick-up truck (sample data from the HLCS 2005 not mutually 
exclusive)  
82 Traditional Lebanese food prepared after autumn harvest and traditional preserved and consumed during 
winter 
83
 The demand for typical, regional and local identity and culture is primarily a social phenomenon present 
in European and North American countries. According to Murdoch and Miele (1999) it is primarily instigated by 
an urban middle and upper class trend for “going back to nature”. According to Bessiere (1998), nowadays rural 
space is seen as a place that compensates for a lost peasant identity. The return to the countryside is an unspoken 
desire for landscape appropriation and a life in valorized space where proximity, social recognition and 
participation are combined. This trend is growing with in Beirut‟s upper middle class, but still limited, as the 
majority of Lebanese who already migrated from the rural areas to the city in recent year, still go back to their 
own villages during week-end and/or holiday. Eco-tourism in Lebanon still mostly attract foreign expatriates.  
 getting more clients from word of mouth. I have a capacity to receive 60 people and I am 
often full, even during the week” Eco-tourism in the Jerd emerged from local initiatives 
supported by Beirut-based environmental activists and NGOs. These initiatives have faced 
difficulties to attract both Lebanese tourists and gain the support of public institutions  (MOA 
and Ministry of Tourism) “We do not exist on their map. They don‟t want us to. They need 
people to live in misery so they can keep giving them fish without teaching them how to 
catch.. For the other regions it is different, we feel it”. Attracting foreign tourists was easier 
than trying to overcome Lebanese prejudice about the region as well as local skepticism on 
the chance of success of such initiatives. “The eco-tourism projects are good. But not 
everybody benefits from it, just one or two families. The mentality in the Jerd does not help, if 
two people got into a fight and start shooting at each other, tourists will pack up and leave. 
People will do it on purpose, out of envy”. In the absence of public institutions at the national 
and local level – there is no municipalities or any kind of local elected authorities in the Jerd 
–, local initiatives dynamism could create a situation of social exclusion, where such activities 
would be limited to local people who are able to guarantee both security and protection to 
tourists, while others would remain dependent on subsistence. As a matter of fact, security 
and freedom of initiatives is guaranteed, but is fragile in a context of latent clan-clan and clan-
state conflicts. The ability of these initiatives to grow and create a local economic dynamic 
depends on the environment of security prevailing in the Jerd – and  people‟s perception of  
the region. More importantly, it is essential to rely on the local population‟s ability to build 
capacity and strengthen social linakges. Local activists see organic agriculture as a possible 
way to link eco-tourism projects, Jerd and Hermel farmers and Beirut consumers. Helped by 
the dynamic created through direct contacts with foreign and Lebanese clients interested and 
aware of environmental and rural issues, eco-tourism holders are already going in that 
direction “ I want to have an organic eco-tourism place. I want to give organic food. I opened 
a small processing plant for labneh, for organic goat labneh from the Jerd. I collect milk from 
people here, but I  have to use organic olive oil and that is expensive”.  
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5.4.5 Social capital at work: transfer of resources, women empowerment   
“Help us by hiring us for your receptions „catering need. Instead of your usual „petits 
fours‟ and concentrate juice, we will make you wild herbs healthy snacks. It is something new 
and people are going back to it now” (Kwakh cooperative member discussing her talks with 
the Hermel municipality). 
Just like in the Jerd, in Kwakh, a remote village north of Hermel city, a grass-roots 
initiative based on innovation  -“something new” - and on people‟s return to nature -“back to 
it”- has emerged. The initiative, per se, consists on the preparation of food products using  
local wild herbs. This production was later on linked to an eco-tourism lodge that revalorized 
and restored old traditional houses in the village. The project was called sīndyānat (oak) 
“because we have sīndyānat in the hills of our village, and because sīndyānat is female and is 
strong”. It has succeeded in improving the livelihoods of involved households. What 
characterized this particular initiative was on the one hand, its capacity to: (i) involve all 
interested women in the village; (ii) have an independent start-up; and (iii) succeed in linking 
with local, Beirut-based and international actors alike; in other words, it was able to fully 
utilize all forms of social capital. On the other hand, the initiative is imbued in the social and 
institutional local context and based on local resources.  
 Democratic participation, Capacity building  
“There is no one who doesn‟t have anything, all people have capabilities, they have 
aptitudes, but you have to program them, to prepare them so they can succeed”.  
The creation of a municipality in Kwakh was a critical turn, for it opened the door for 
local initiatives through the municipality‟s participative committees. It was also an official 
contact for Beirut-based institutions seeking to be active in the region. The founding of the 
Khwakh women‟s cooperative was spearheaded by a female local activist who was involved 
in the municipal committee. She initiated work with The Faculty of Agriculture Food and 
Nutrition of AUB on the valorization and sustainable management of “more than 350” local 
edible and medicinal wild herbs as well as mūnat. “We announced it through the mosque 
minaret, and we had the meeting, the next day we re-announced it, to be sure everybody knew 
about it”. The project idea was simple, women were trained to sustainably collect wild herbs, 
 and learn about the characteristics of the main ones. “We were taught how to sterilize, pack, 
increase quality of what we had always cooked for our children”.  
 Women empowerment and national small scale transfer of resources  
“Each one of us had to pay 100 Thousand lira84, but we delayed it, until we made 
some money. We wanted to pay it from the money we made. We didn‟t want to take it from our 
husbands or away from our children. From our work yes, from our houses no” 
The cooperative management was able to fund itself and be independent from both, 
male households heads, and from other sources of funding. The cooperative managed through 
its sales to sustain and grow. The marketing strategy could be described as a national small-
scale transfer of resources strategy. It relies on the direct sale of food products carrying a sign 
value from rural poor farmers to rich urban consumers within national boundaries. In contrast 
to fair trade, where the transfer of resources is made between developing country farmers and 
rich European consumers, in the Khwakh cooperative case the exchange is made directly and 
within the country. It differs from the European alternative supply chain in two elements: the 
concepts of local, traditional or quality are not regulated or standardized. Moreover, by 
escaping the processes of regulation this supply chain does not fall into the social process 
described by Shucksmith (2000 and 2004) - where territorial and cultural forms of rural 
economic development mask power relation processes and further the interest of the dominant 
class. As a matter of fact, the Kwakh cooperative as a form of endogenous rural development 
practice was able to redistribute (small scale) resources and (small scale) political power 
toward the less powerful: women living in marginal rural zones, changing everyday life and 
social habits and norms.  
“In the villages, if someone died their women relatives would stay home and not go 
out for two weeks (…) we said that we have to be done with this. If it were a man that had a 
work meeting he wouldn‟t cancel. But us because we are women we have to cancel it? And 
stay home and be sad. But we have work. So that day we went and buried the woman in the 
morning and we went to work. You can say that there was a change in work and social life in 
Khwakh”. Women‟s leadership and their ability to enhance their social condition have been 
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 66.66 USD (1USD=1500LBP) 
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also translated in the local political sphere by the election of the cooperative leader to the 
municipal council – the only one in the region.   
 Social capital at work  
Analysis of the different types of social capital provides insight into the process of 
development of the Kwakh Cooperative.  
The strong bonding social capital within social groups is a characteristic of the region, 
and was at the base of the strength of the Kwakh cooperative. Nevertheless, it differs from the 
usual relation present in the community that bond men together in a form of local solidarity 
that never became common action. Only when transformed into direct action, bonding social 
capital resulted in agency and empowerment.  
The Kwakh cooperative was able to progress  through continuous learning, capacity 
building and common action. “After we started, NGOs started to come to us”. From that 
point, it became easier to bridge with similar rural development groups in Lebanon.  Although 
these groups were Beirut or internationally-based, the Khwakh cooperative was able to 
negotiate and use the help provided by other Lebanese action groups. Building trust with local 
and international donors was an essential element for the growth of the cooperative,  while the 
ongoing capacity building allowed for sustainability. “They would give a certain number of 
food packaging. When they would come back, they would find that we had twice as much. We 
accept their donations, but we cannot rely on them all the time. We did get our own l from our 
work”. Further linkages with the municipality and with international NGOs allowed the 
cooperative to capture funds for the renovation of all the old houses in the center of the 
village and transform them into eco-lodges.  
The Khwakh cooperative was born from grass-roots initiatives and succeeded in 
growing  through good relations with the dominant political parties in the region as well as 
with the municipalities of both Khwakh and Hermel. The challenge however remains to be 
the ability to sustain growth and development within a difficult environment, where  conflicts 
between the municipality and the leadership of the association are emerging, local men are 
showing “envy and jealousy”, and public institutions might wish to take control of the 
cooperative.  
 5.5 Answers to the research question 
This case study investigated the dynamics of change and the main factors influencing the 
choices of farmers and rural activists on their agricultural and rural development praxis, i.e. 
their livelihood strategies.  
Sharecropping was predominant up to the 1950's, and is still present. It was characterized 
by the production of cereals and pulses in the summer, and by legumes as winter crops. 
Animal farming was limited to sheep and goat husbandry. This mode of production became 
gradually replaced by the export-oriented production of apricot fruits. Such export-oriented 
production was encouraged by the rising demand for Lebanese agricultural production from 
the emerging oil economies in the Arab gulf and the organization of the exporting channels by 
Lebanese traders. In 1975, with the start of the civil war, Hermel witnessed an increase in 
illegal drug cultivation and the war-economy of the region was influenced by the money flow 
resulting from this production. At the end of the civil war, increasing pressure from the state 
stopped the cultivation of illegal drugs, although it is still present in remote areas of the Jerd. . 
In the early 1990‟s, with the introduction of irrigation, the intensive production of summer 
vegetables – especially watermelon – was intensified. Output increase, price reduction and the 
lowering of agricultural tariffs in 2000 and 2003 all compelled farmers to look for alternative 
forms of production – ones that are less input intensive and more market secured. It was from 
this point, then, that form of collection rural action started to emerge. In parallel with the joint 
actions of the Ministry of Agriculture and international non-governmental organizations, local 
rural activist have promoted the re-introduction of olive oil production and new forms of rural 
development practices that revalorize local resources.  
From the above system of production, four different type of strategies can be 
distinguished. These strategies differs by the production technology and the marketing 
channels. As a matter of fact, the changes in the market is the main factors that influenced 
farmers decisions. Markets structure have been changing with change in the political and 
institutional environment.  
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Hereby the strategies are presented 
1. Export-oriented production: relatively low inputs production, with specific export or 
"illegal smuggling" marketing channels, apricots and illegal drugs (Section 5.4.2).  
2. Input uses intensification
85
: intensive production marketed domestically and suffering 
from volatile prices, watermelon and dairy cow production (Section 5.4.1 and 5.4.3) 
3. Low input production
86
: door to door marketing, in the phases of develop a specific 
marketing strategy, olive oil (Section 5.4.2) 
4. Transfer of resources
87
: rural development practices based on the valorization of local 
resources, and alternative modes of marketing (see Sections 5.4.4 and 5.4.5).  
In choosing their strategies, farmers were influenced by the dynamic interplay of changes 
in the political and economic environment, changes in institutional processes and 
organizational structures, and changes in capital assets, presented in Table 5-5 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
85 Correspond to the IUI simulation, see Chapter 4 Sub-section 4.3.6 and 4.3.5. 
86
 Correspond to the FUI simulation, as it changes the ration between labor and input use toward the use of 
less inputs and more labor, see Chapter 4 Sub-Section 4.3.4 and 4.3.5. 
87
 Correspond to the simulations FUI, Trm and FUItrm, see Chapter 4 Sub-section 4.3.6 and 5.3.5. 
 Table 5-5: Hermel farmer's strategies and their outcome 
Strategies 
Influencing factors 
Outcome Changes in the political 
and economic 
environment 
Changes in institutional 
processes and 
organizational structures 
(including market) 
Changes in capital assets 
Export-
oriented 
apricot 
production  
Started in the 
early 1950s 
in Hermel 
Plains with: 
Increase demand for 
Lebanese agricultural 
products from the Arab Gulf 
economy. 
Trade and services-oriented 
economic development of 
Lebanon 
Organization of efficient 
export marketing channels 
from the Bekaa to the Arab 
Gulf 
 Rise in farmers' income 
 
Gradually 
ended with 
changes in: 
Start of the civil war in 1975 Breakdown of marketing 
export channels, leading to a 
fall of prices through the 
difficulty in marketing 
 Gradual abandonment of 
apricot production by local 
farmers 
Export-
oriented 
illegal drugs 
production  
Started in the 
early 1980's  
in the Jerd  
by: 
The civil war and the 
weakening of State 
authority 
Illegal export channels   Important capital flow to the 
region  
Rise of political power and 
influence of the A'sheyr 
leadership 
Ended in 
1992 with 
changes in: 
Return of State authority Difficulty in smuggling 
production.  
Introduction of a UNDP-
funded program for 
alternative crops 
 Fall in politic power and 
influence of the A'shayer 
leadership 
Marginalization of the 
production  
Input 
intensification:  
Watermelon  
Started in 
1992 in 
Hermel 
Plains with: 
 Promoting by extension 
services and input providers 
 
Innovation in resources 
management technology 
(drip irrigation) 
Important profits for 
farmers 
Regressed 
with changes 
in: 
Unilateral abolition of tariffs 
in 2000 and 2003 
  Farmers’ debt accumulation 
because of losses due to fall 
of prices with increase of 
output 
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Strategies 
Influencing factors 
Outcome 
Changes in the political 
and economic 
environment 
Changes in institutional 
processes and 
organizational structures 
(including market) 
Changes in capital assets 
Input 
intensification:  
Dairy 
production 
Started in 
mid 1990's 
with: 
Promoted by MOA and 
international donors 
projects  
Encouraged by important 
investment in the sector in 
Baalbak and Zahle region 
Creation of milk collection 
center 
 Daily cash income for small 
farmers 
Good return for middle size 
investment 
Regressed in 
2004 with 
changes in: 
End of support programs  
Randomness of policies 
Closure of the milk 
collection center 
Support by international 
and local NGOs 
 Incapability to re-invest and 
to sustain production  
Farmers losses 
Low input 
production: 
Olive oil  
Boosted 
with: 
Promotion of this 
innovation by MOA and 
international donors’ 
projects 
  Secure income for farmers 
and low cost of production 
Increasing 
with changes 
in: 
 Support by international 
and local NGOs 
Increase in social capital 
and the creation of a well 
managed producer 
cooperative 
Increase in the adoption of 
the innovation 
Resources 
transfer  
Rural 
development 
initiative  
Started with:  Grassroots local initiatives 
Support by international 
and local NGOs 
Functioning marketing 
channels in Beirut 
Increase in social capital 
Valorization of local 
resources 
Improvement of farmers 
livelihood 
Sustained 
with changes 
in: 
  Increase in social capital 
Increase in human capital, 
know-how and capacity 
building  
Improvement of farmers 
livelihood 
 
 
 
 
  
6 Conclusion 
Using a mixed methodology approach based on a Computable General Equilibrium 
model and a qualitative case study, imbued in a political-economy and structural analysis of 
the Lebanese system, this research demonstrates that under-development in Lebanese rural 
areas is not due to a lack of resources, but rather is the consequence of political choices. It 
further suggests that agriculture – in both its mainstream conventional and its innovative 
locally initiated forms of production – still represents important potential for inducing 
economic growth and development.  
Chapter 2, on the Lebanese political economy, reviewed how the historical and 
political development of the country has created and deepened inequality between the 
different regions. It demonstrated that the pattern of uneven development has been repeated 
since 1943, to the advantage of the political elite who instrumentalize state institutions to 
perpetuate their political power. This inequality was confirmed by the structural analysis 
based on the Social Accounting Matrix for Lebanon 2005 (SAMLEB05) of Chapter 3, which 
also highlighted the labor structure, as well as the characteristics of the Lebanese industrial 
and agricultural sectors. It showed how important amounts of capital flows into the country 
have induced growth in the tertiary sector, while wages were kept low.  
The Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, (Chapter 4), studied the resulting 
alterations to the economy equilibrium induced by changes in agricultural production 
technology, in trade, and in taxes and tariffs polices. Finally, a qualitative case study (Chapter 
5) looked at the variations in farmers‟ livelihood strategies compelled by similar changes.  
 The findings of the four lines of analysis presented in this dissertation triangulate an 
answer to the research's hypothesis. 
 Underdevelopment is not due to lack of resources 
The Lebanese agricultural sector was discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.5 at the national 
level and Chapter 5 Section 5.3 in regard to the case study. The main issue that emerged from 
this analysis is the extent of the heterogeneity of the Lebanese agriculture, with high capital 
accumulation in competitive subsectors on one side and small-scale poor farmers‟ holdings on 
the other side. Although it does exist between regions, the heterogeneity is predominantly 
intra-regional. Farmers of areas marginalized by the Lebanese economic system – especially 
Akkar and Baalbak Al-Hermel – are poor. Indeed, factors related to land productivity and the 
lack of natural resources in these regions are a constraint to development, nevertheless, these 
are not the key issues for the region of Akkar. Moreover, the case study has shown that 
farmers in Hermel do not witness problems of production, but rather suffer from price falls 
due to the inability to market a large output. Finally, although water is definitely a constraint 
for agricultural production in Hermel, the obstacle was partially remedied by the farmers, as 
they have largely adopted – and invested in – drip irrigation networks and have since 
produced important quantities of highly demanding water crops, like watermelons and other 
vegetables.  
 Intensification of agricultural production 
The CGE simulation of the scenario of an increase in agricultural output through 
intensification of production – Neutral Technical Change (NTC) and Intensification of Input 
Uses (IUI) – shows that an increase of agricultural production would have a positive impact 
on the national economy, in terms of both real growth and employment. The economic growth 
created by the increase in agricultural output would have positive repercussions on the tertiary 
sectors, benefiting Beirut and Mount Lebanon and holders of capital and highly skilled labor, 
but would impact farmers and rural areas negatively. However, such a negative impact – due 
to the inability of the Lebanese economy to create jobs opportunity in rural areas – could be 
anticipated and thus responded to by the government, especially in terms of better linkages 
between agriculture and the agro-industry. However, the prior experience of agricultural 
intensification has shown that government policies are at present biased against farmers and 
rural areas.  
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Intensive production in Hermel is hampered by the high cost of irrigation – mainly an 
energy-related cost, as irrigation is done through artesian wells. The government has not yet 
undertaken a single irrigation infrastructure project in Hermel – including a dam on the 
Oronte river that has been a local economic demand since the 1950s. Local elite have not 
advocated for its execution, although according to local farmers a public irrigation network 
would increase agricultural activities and significantly reduce farmers' irrigation costs. There 
are no policies to support investment in agro-industry in the region, vegetable production has 
been hampered by the reduction of tariffs, and moreover, farmers have to competed with the 
state-supported Jordanian and Syrian production. The unilateral reduction of tariffs of 2000 
and 2003 has forced a significant number of farmers to begin high-cost intensive production; 
a further reduction in tarrifs would have a negative impact on the welfare of poor households 
in Baalbak al Hermel. In the same manner, investment in the dairy production agri-businesses 
was penalized by the inconsistence and randomness of public policies, as well as the lack of 
agricultural credits.  
Furthermore, Hermel‟s development of exporting fruits between 1950 and 1975 shows 
that region is also able to produce agricultural output with low water requirements in 
exportable quantities. The existence of this export channel helped the growth of production 
and brought about a positive change in welfare in Hermel. A similar NTC development, with 
an increase in export prices due to policies such as quality improvement (NTCexp), would 
have similar effect today.  
 Rural development initiatives and mechanisms of resources transfer 
All of the above has led farmers to look for lower input forms of production and 
innovative rural development practices. Relying on their human and social capital, they are 
able to increase their livelihood independently of state intervention. These models of 
production allow the empowerment of farmers and women by increasing their human, social 
and financial capital. The results of the simulations on the factor of use intensification, the 
decrease in domestic trade margins and the combination of both scenarios (FUI, TRM and 
FUItrm) show a slight economic growth at the national level. These scenarios induce a 
different allocation of added value between farmers and traders to the benefit of the all 
households groups represented in the CGE model, leading to a Pareto efficient change. 
 Furthermore, these models of production are developed and structured in a way similar to 
the growing alternative food network present in Europe. They act as a mechanism of 
resources transfer between poor rural areas and rich urban consumers. They are the expression 
of an upper class urban need for nature and authenticity, and the need of the rural poor 
revalorization of their local resources. This social and economic phenomenon is growing in 
Lebanon in a context of the absence of public intervention and the presence of a large number 
of rural activist and civil society organization.  
Nevertheless, these initiatives do have to confront the local elite, which often acts as 
barriers hampering such initiatives. Political dominant powers and institutions try to 
monopolize the management of donor flow and cooperation projects. Moreover, local 
development initiatives create changes in social relationships that challenge the patron-client 
relations that characterize Lebanese society. Grassroots initiatives must draw their own paths, 
often without public local and national support, relying on their own capacity and the sporadic 
support of International and Beirut-based NGOs. 
Policy recommendations 
Based on the triangulation of the main findings of the research's four lines of analysis, and 
the independent synthesis of each Chapter (Sections 2.8, 3.6, 4.6 and 5.5), this research has 
shown that agriculture can play an important role in economic development. However, such a 
development needs a change in the political-economy discourse and its biases against 
agriculture and other productive sectors. Under development in rural areas is the result of the 
very functioning of the state and its economic choices.  
Even if it is acknowledged that Lebanon‟s comparative advantage in terms of trade and 
financial services provides strong motivations for the economic choices of the state, the 
resulting biases against agriculture as well as agro-industry – and industry in general – cannot 
be economically justified and are socially unsound. Despite the many social and political 
changes that Lebanon has witnessed since its creation as a modern state in 1920, the 
underlying causes for the continued negligence of agricultural development remains the 
perpetuation of the political power of the national elite. The economic-dominant discourse has 
but slightly altered with changes in the ruling class, and the neo-liberal economic policies 
promoted by successive governments since 1992 closely resemble those of the Merchant 
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Republic (1943-1958). Within the same logic, post-war reconstruction efforts have focused on 
Beirut, hampering any opportunity to develop rural areas and thus preventing them from 
fulfilling their economic potential. These policies have impoverished a significant numbers of 
people, creating a highly vulnerable population with regard to food security. The fact that no 
serious political efforts have been made to alleviate this issue is cause for concern. Remedies 
occur as intermittent actions – often relying on local and international NGOs, and on 
associations linked to significant political interests. All of this seems set to continue as is, 
despite a growing academic and civil society movement advocating for a state-led policy.  
In order to create growth in rural area and to reduce national inequalities, Lebanon has to 
take full advantage of its human and territorial capital, by developing a rural development 
strategy based on two parallel sets of actions: one directed toward the support of local rural 
development initiatives, and the other directed toward intensive form of production. In 
addition to its economic returns, such a strategy would promote social and political stability. 
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ANNEX A:  
The Social Accounting Matrix for Lebanon 2005 
All figures are in Billions of LBP 
 Part 1: Sector of Activities 
 AGR AGIND IND CONS ENW TTCOM SER TRADE ADMIN 
CRL 65.494 249.984        
FRT 59.997 227.000     7.002   
INDCRP 29.013 140.000  4.990      
VEGT 33.006 90.000     7.000   
LIVES 23.000 495.000        
LIVESPR 4.004         
FISH 2.496         
FPR  29.004     10.000   
DAIRY  49.991     15.000   
FATOL  59.996     28.000   
PASTA  6.007     3.000   
SGCHS  107.997     50.000   
OTHER  35.002     28.000   
TABAC          
CIND 222.989 100.000 2996.000 2000.000 131.000 20.991 576.000 279.000 153.016 
CCONS          
CENW 21.999 25.000 526.000 28.000 1368.000 1214.000 361.000 15.000 92.000 
CTTCOM  8.002 25.000   889.000 903.000 439.000 24.000 
CSER 34.000 33.000 135.000 156.000 19.000 459.000 514.000 518.000 1011.000 
CAP  1013.733 956.640 1118.890 710.497 1456.000 4260.488 1922.367  
FARM 1262.809         
SELF  152.734 557.317 570.209  525.000 2658.473 1142.729  
HGSK  10.766 34.115 15.649 3.252 18.640 646.835 55.245 849.566 
WHCL  56.000 179.806 59.481 17.287 201.434 1529.657 332.456 214.876 
BLCL 182.915 168.795 534.790 316.838 45.955 82.935 893.100 790.358 284.827 
ARMED         796.715 
FGNLAB 264.279 14.000 44.322 502.943 0.000 0.000 398.445 109.845  
TOTAL 2206.001 3072.011 5988.990 4773.000 2294.991 4867.000 12889.000 5604.000 3426.000 
 
  
  Part 2.1: Agricultural commodities  
 CRL FRT INDCRP VEGT LIVES LIVESPR FISH 
AGR 94.001 804.000 103.000 625.000 303.000 221.000 57.000 
TRNCSTDOM 10.542 212.800 2.860 118.770 6.220 80.440 64.780 
TRNCSTEXP 
 
60.800 19.830 11.050 
 
7.570 2.360 
TRNCSIMP 23.240 30.400 29.310 30.180 5.780 1.990 71.860 
TAR 
 
20.000 12.000 64.000 
 
1.000 2.000 
ROW 201.000 89.000 133.000 142.000 223.000 5.000 61.000 
TOTAL 328.783 1217.000 300.000 991.000 538.000 317.000 259.000 
 Part 2.2: Agro-industrial commodities  
 FRMT FPR DAIRY FATOL PASTA SGCHS ALBVRG NALBVRG OTHER TABAC 
AGIND 820.013 144.000 275.000 259.000 659.000 226.000 47.998 345.000 333.000 22.000 
TRNCSTDOM 205.820 5.300 110.610 36.950 92.110 8.970 7.030 42.310 61.680 11.560 
TRNCSTEXP 1.780 8.340 2.040 5.580 5.640 4.820 6.480 4.470 9.240 1.830 
TRNCSIMP 23.400 13.360 107.340 24.470 18.250 9.210 14.490 1.220 27.080 111.590 
TAR 4.987 57.000 32.000 11.000 21.000 26.000 23.000 3.000 19.000 237.000 
ROW 92.000 141.000 262.000 149.000 123.000 151.000 55.000 9.000 126.000 183.000 
TOTAL 1148.000 369.000 788.990 486.000 919.000 426.000 153.998 405.000 576.000 566.980 
 Part 2.3: Other commodities  
 CIND CCONS CENW CTTCOM CSER CTRADE CADMIN 
IND 6093.990       
CONS  4858.000      
ENW   1330.991     
TTCOM    4942.000    
SER     13427.000   
TRADE      6142.000  
ADMIN       3426.000 
TRNCSTDOM 641.058  103.880     
TRNCSTEXP 675.850  0.790     
TRNCSIMP 1780.330  250.330     
TAR 1380.013  729.000     
ROW 8238.759  3209.009     
TOTAL 18810.000 4858.000 5624.000 4942.000 13427.000 6142.000 3426.000 
 Part 3: Factors of production 
 CAP FARM SELF HGSK WHCL BLCL ARMED FGNLAB 
AKMD_1  75.332 36.733 3.065 23.427 105.627 12.423   
AKMD_2 6.867 33.105 45.493 8.650 14.340 95.324 42.239   
AKMD_3  15.888 34.989 3.065 12.091 49.218 19.877   
AKMD_4 19.568 26.434 55.897 12.259 17.156 24.663 37.270   
AKMD_5 5.317 14.987 22.971 15.324 9.592 20.545 22.362   
AKMD_6 5.785  22.655 12.259 16.761 12.736 19.877   
AKMD_7 52.726 11.871 16.213 6.130 19.185 5.296 14.908   
AKMD_8 20.118 5.416 12.469 12.259 14.948 4.175 4.969   
AKMD_9  7.058 19.193 6.130  1.065 4.969   
AKMD_10 31.483  6.577 6.130 9.845 3.528    
TRIP_1 7.501 2.732 32.288 6.130 14.264 81.936 12.423   
TRIP_2 10.377 3.551 26.394  11.838 46.133 4.969   
TRIP_3  11.820 11.702 3.065 12.307 23.812 4.969   
TRIP_4  4.837 14.969 12.259 29.210 33.299 4.969   
TRIP_5 5.713  15.876 15.324 12.091 16.250 7.454   
TRIP_6 36.815  23.985 6.130 12.307 4.091    
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 CAP FARM SELF HGSK WHCL BLCL ARMED FGNLAB 
TRIP_7 7.647 7.179 19.802 3.065 9.845 6.052 9.939   
TRIP_8 11.628 6.916 12.922 15.324 16.761 7.996    
TRIP_9 23.530  25.125 39.842 14.300 10.166 2.485   
TRIP_10   7.195 21.453 7.384 1.764    
KZGB_1   1.145 3.065 2.461 12.633    
KZGB_2 8.786 4.730 6.098   1.065 2.485   
KZGB_3  20.786 4.964   11.681 2.485   
KZGB_4   4.084  2.208 9.049    
KZGB_5 13.829 6.492 7.937  11.451 19.131 2.485   
KZGB_6  24.815 4.584 6.130 9.592 21.323 2.485   
KZGB_7 14.678 15.805 11.372 9.194 2.461 14.317 9.939   
KZGB_8  13.693 9.563 9.194 2.461 16.346 4.969   
KZGB_9 19.587 23.303 31.376 8.650 4.923 10.490 14.908   
KZGB_10 155.259 16.837 30.803 26.625 48.042 16.354    
KSJB_1   1.480   2.820    
KSJB_2   0.757       
KSJB_3  6.815 1.879   7.390    
KSJB_4  5.797 10.760  7.868 12.571    
KSJB_5  14.338 13.899 2.449 19.298 28.018 3.972   
KSJB_6 24.913 2.150 38.653 2.449 7.182 25.373    
KSJB_7 21.889 7.206 65.888 14.849 13.396 19.725    
KSJB_8 55.561 8.505 97.515 18.830 48.377 36.137 9.929   
KSJB_9 132.617 3.474 101.455 21.610 44.264 15.698 7.943   
KSJB_10 910.056 19.689 390.138 68.780 100.077 50.467 3.972   
MATN_1   1.698   1.342    
MATN_2   1.182   12.720    
MATN_3   5.587  3.934 16.122    
MATN_4   8.360  7.352 33.017 1.986   
MATN_5  1.954 8.882 4.899 13.307 34.822 1.986   
MATN_6 22.763  29.219 11.481 28.932 38.049 15.886   
MATN_7 34.316 2.302 38.664 9.482 37.647 51.643 11.915   
MATN_8 118.169 13.608 67.310 21.279 52.480 57.411 9.929   
MATN_9 120.181 6.593 81.767 17.629 73.283 43.565 15.886   
MATN_10 833.108  248.979 76.839 88.852 32.400 5.957   
BRT_1      1.448    
BRT_2   10.322   7.016    
BRT_3   20.768  6.730 14.565    
BRT_4   12.910  7.891 15.696    
BRT_5   42.776 2.639 12.529 25.774    
BRT_6   26.411 2.639 31.427 38.654    
BRT_7 106.489  79.347 21.110 29.266 40.560 4.278   
BRT_8 267.627  114.164 23.280 49.688 56.572 6.418   
BRT_9 235.145  234.534 60.222 123.062 68.524 4.278   
BRT_10 2461.343  671.994 196.990 137.875 115.740 8.557   
BBDA_1   11.079  5.557 52.232 1.986   
BBDA_2 15.070  17.869 7.348 14.707 46.514    
BBDA_3 5.423  45.967 6.583 19.328 90.865 9.929   
BBDA_4 32.091  78.914 9.798 36.977 50.458 5.957   
BBDA_5 10.998 1.899 71.858 9.798 45.636 80.851 21.843   
BBDA_6 63.826 4.393 70.826 22.045 50.055 71.228 11.915   
BBDA_7 88.891  105.510 29.876 75.023 85.633 19.858   
  CAP FARM SELF HGSK WHCL BLCL ARMED FGNLAB 
BBDA_8 18.466  89.894 40.874 67.298 53.972 21.843   
BBDA_9 114.957  139.995 53.452 80.023 40.152 7.943   
BBDA_10 487.581  139.484 77.169 54.456 20.877 3.972   
CHAL_1   6.679  1.795 19.687    
CHAL_2 6.187 4.722 23.063 2.449 4.108 47.618 1.986   
CHAL_3 15.822  28.472 8.973 5.901 50.803 1.986   
CHAL_4 19.087 3.070 37.827 4.899 25.921 36.037 7.943   
CHAL_5 83.823 5.451 69.870 16.276 18.923 44.499 7.943   
CHAL_6 108.010 6.778 56.000 24.494 32.899 49.973 11.915   
CHAL_7 148.985 2.576 48.879 9.798 52.395 25.380 15.886   
CHAL_8 183.207 8.524 49.990 18.005 40.736 45.481 27.801   
CHAL_9 209.679 10.690 92.181 31.936 68.645 38.087 13.900   
CHAL_10 518.594 11.005 134.869 37.165 76.299 21.699 7.943   
SDJZ_1  1.320 14.456 2.086 8.229 60.359 1.691   
SDJZ_2 8.485  34.188 2.086 11.726 58.577    
SDJZ_3 2.952 4.239 36.540 6.258 17.619 46.263 5.073   
SDJZ_4 3.108 2.233 21.447 1.383 6.701 15.895 3.382   
SDJZ_5 17.562 4.823 26.826 8.343 16.114 23.489 5.073   
SDJZ_6 3.977 5.717 23.577 6.258 19.148 11.896 1.691   
SDJZ_7   21.126 16.893 19.515 12.439 5.073   
SDJZ_8 14.458 11.356 32.788 10.059 16.901 7.683 3.382   
SDJZ_9 21.338 8.791 45.037 9.777 8.229 13.439 3.382   
SDJZ_10 140.062  76.135 18.121 16.433 16.263 3.382   
NABA_1  1.058 0.415       
NABA_2  0.823 5.524  3.309 8.674    
NABA_3 3.783 2.460 10.596 1.467  4.115    
NABA_4  5.270 5.282  1.178 7.971 2.378   
NABA_5 8.099  8.439 1.467 4.590 9.374    
NABA_6 3.452 7.826 31.470 4.400 3.533 10.540 1.189   
NABA_7 3.545 5.359 43.731 10.266 12.956 8.926 4.756   
NABA_8 14.419 1.563 33.264 6.505 11.536 13.091 7.134   
NABA_9 33.474 3.660 29.936 14.405 15.173 7.520 2.378   
NABA_10 41.712  123.582 39.598 17.425 2.332    
SOUR_1   10.425   16.855    
SOUR_2  7.376 15.016  3.350 16.008    
SOUR_3 5.576 16.073 13.393  11.579 18.681 1.691   
SOUR_4  18.760 20.530 2.086 9.707 13.894 1.691   
SOUR_5 10.452 13.684 15.503 12.515 8.207 12.021 3.382   
SOUR_6  9.262 25.956 8.343 9.732 8.362 3.382   
SOUR_7 4.946 10.656 17.098 12.515 16.167 8.624    
SOUR_8 33.479 11.692 32.581 11.863 11.726 13.209    
SOUR_9 22.095 4.436 45.030 12.145 8.379 4.713    
SOUR_10 20.614 8.492 46.992 6.258 1.503 4.470    
BJMR_1  2.700 0.353   2.602    
BJMR_2  4.003 4.879  2.235 4.840    
BJMR_3 14.123 8.376 7.096   7.831    
BJMR_4 4.276 13.897 14.209 1.467 4.590 9.810    
BJMR_5 12.244 20.041 16.347 1.467 3.412 7.172    
BJMR_6 10.665 14.561 7.836 2.933 9.422 5.589 3.567   
BJMR_7 17.672 13.634 32.309 1.467 7.481 5.040 3.567   
BJMR_8 29.324 7.564 14.325 4.400 5.889 7.466 1.189   
BJMR_9 11.070 6.491 15.173 4.400 7.067 5.261 1.189   
BJMR_10 20.491 6.995 27.598 1.467 5.889 0.644    
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 CAP FARM SELF HGSK WHCL BLCL ARMED FGNLAB 
WBRA_1  2.954 0.684 1.322 2.031 13.285    
WBRA_2 3.033 9.227 5.376 1.322 0.969 14.154 2.144   
WBRA_3 3.443 11.650 6.120  4.063 9.854 2.144   
WBRA_4 16.778 11.065 7.463  3.093 3.868 9.648   
WBRA_5 4.520 7.651 10.385 3.967 8.294 16.427 12.865   
WBRA_6 11.046 7.102 7.913 3.967 9.526 6.177 7.504   
WBRA_7 32.752 10.301 9.731 5.289 9.449 2.798 8.576   
WBRA_8 78.473 9.039 14.872 16.721 11.480 10.919 12.865   
WBRA_9 62.132 39.329 13.453 7.934 8.387 9.868 7.504   
WBRA_10 89.075 12.894 11.996 9.257 5.310 2.103 6.432   
ZHLE_1  5.079 0.918  1.062 16.824    
ZHLE_2  7.839 2.902   6.613    
ZHLE_3 9.234 13.491 2.411 3.967 2.202 8.572 2.144   
ZHLE_4  4.106 6.631  2.015 8.288    
ZHLE_5 19.107 23.900 7.880 2.645 6.154 6.390 4.288   
ZHLE_6 3.563 6.163 14.795 4.876 5.217 5.133 6.432   
ZHLE_7 13.561 16.933 4.981 3.554 10.402 9.661 5.360   
ZHLE_8 30.446 29.434 11.109 3.967 9.263 7.758 5.360   
ZHLE_9 56.333 8.593 20.316 11.666 20.350 3.409 3.216   
ZHLE_10 228.852 38.733 43.946 16.097 21.006 4.176 10.720   
HERBA_1  16.985 1.872 2.645  14.400    
HERBA_2  23.083 5.496  1.062 8.770    
HERBA_3 4.193 36.564 6.158  4.248 9.133 4.288   
HERBA_4 12.153 36.444 8.365 2.645 4.139 11.942 3.216   
HERBA_5 16.737 28.432 8.443  3.186 5.075 9.648   
HERBA_6 7.315 29.673 11.746 6.612 3.186 5.548 10.720   
HERBA_7 21.997 22.692 8.197 17.191 4.139 3.234 5.360   
HERBA_8 14.478 7.235 9.737 1.322 4.248 1.522 2.144   
HERBA_9 33.914 11.443 6.867 3.967 4.139 0.725 1.072   
HERBA_10 29.440 4.463 6.793 1.322 3.077  2.144   
GOV 2166.499         
ROW        1333.833 
TOTAL 11438.615 1262.809 5606.462 1634.068 2590.997 3300.514 796.715 1333.833 
 Part 4: Trade margins 
 TRNCSTDOM IMP EXP 
CTRADE 1823.690 828.470 2573.830 
TOTAL 1823.690 828.470 2573.830 
  
 
 
 
 
  Part 5.1: Akka Mennieh/ Denniehr households deciles 
 AKMD_1 AKMD_2 AKMD_3 AKMD_4 AKMD_5 AKMD_6 AKMD_7 AKMD_8 AKMD_9 AKMD_10 
CRL 3.301 1.889 0.900 0.893 0.517 0.238 0.213 0.113 0.205 0.083 
FRT 14.198 12.957 6.649 8.418 3.016 3.636 1.809 1.160 1.421 1.159 
INDCRP 2.208 1.308 0.623 0.619 0.358 0.165 0.145 0.078 0.142 0.058 
VEGT 33.316 22.596 14.938 12.486 7.176 4.621 3.266 1.716 1.070 0.856 
LIVESPR 5.351 6.336 3.681 4.181 1.948 1.836 1.483 0.618 0.462 0.444 
FISH 8.579 4.840 2.956 2.608 1.646 1.237 0.702 0.350 0.549 0.365 
FRMT 20.769 24.591 14.285 16.228 7.562 7.127 5.755 2.400 1.795 1.723 
FPR 6.827 5.374 3.242 2.977 2.349 1.209 1.150 1.012 0.949 1.374 
DAIRY 16.326 13.348 7.416 8.440 5.534 4.045 2.059 1.494 0.839 1.149 
FATOL 13.572 14.000 8.037 7.193 8.341 3.914 2.155 2.974 2.411 0.532 
PASTA 40.965 27.903 12.542 14.228 7.321 6.211 2.576 1.794 1.073 0.809 
SGCHS 8.435 6.666 3.145 3.541 2.221 1.542 0.697 0.425 0.493 0.150 
ALBVRG 0.401 0.252 0.095 0.166 0.287 0.048 0.204 0.326 0.083  
NALBVRG 8.984 7.248 4.565 4.264 2.366 1.782 1.417 0.876 0.841 0.384 
OTHER 13.259 10.436 6.296 5.782 4.562 2.348 2.233 1.966 1.842 2.668 
TABAC 10.425 8.462 3.470 4.059 2.598 1.733 0.288 0.727 0.523 0.283 
CIND 83.274 96.147 63.148 64.287 39.117 39.964 23.582 15.035 10.290 36.109 
CENW 52.554 43.872 27.012 26.015 16.318 11.064 8.397 5.221 3.033 5.539 
CTTCOM 15.954 17.995 10.035 14.829 8.525 9.093 7.706 3.047 2.551 3.058 
CSER 117.211 108.048 81.302 80.597 50.015 40.229 29.861 15.608 11.009 10.381 
YTAX 20.794 24.175 13.542 18.944 10.915 10.229 12.998 7.829 3.561 6.537 
S-I 5.405 6.334 6.839 7.586 8.602 9.353 54.831 37.566 15.117 30.327 
TOTAL 502.108 464.777 294.718 308.341 191.294 161.624 163.527 102.335 60.259 103.988 
 Part 5.2: Tripoli households deciles 
 TRIP_1 TRIP_2 TRIP_3 TRIP_4 TRIP_5 TRIP_6 TRIP_7 TRIP_8 TRIP_9 TRIP_10 
CRL 0.686 0.340 0.253 0.182 0.156 0.101 0.140 0.113 0.185 0.058 
FRT 6.126 4.400 3.285 2.563 2.159 1.847 1.674 1.337 2.992 1.209 
INDCRP 0.475 0.235 0.175 0.126 0.108 0.070 0.097 0.078 0.128 0.040 
VEGT 9.855 7.007 3.782 3.462 2.989 2.028 2.317 1.595 3.894 1.051 
LIVESPR 2.001 1.687 1.128 1.323 1.180 0.613 0.685 0.401 1.547 0.440 
FISH 1.862 0.898 0.854 1.013 0.399 0.315 0.280 0.386 1.363 0.151 
FRMT 7.764 6.549 4.377 5.135 4.580 2.379 2.658 1.558 6.003 1.707 
FPR 3.560 2.107 1.428 1.405 1.213 0.779 0.834 0.801 1.154 0.872 
DAIRY 7.729 8.011 5.299 5.295 3.347 2.095 3.408 2.349 4.306 1.604 
FATOL 2.781 1.825 1.073 0.922 1.141 1.409 0.435 0.959 1.651 0.693 
PASTA 10.697 7.265 4.649 5.406 3.540 2.343 3.293 1.750 4.898 1.226 
SGCHS 1.782 0.925 0.530 0.665 0.396 0.403 0.295 0.215 0.285 0.271 
ALBVRG 0.178 0.106 0.027 0.069 0.006 0.064  0.010  0.718 
NALBVRG 3.256 1.966 0.894 1.083 0.946 0.726 1.053 0.405 1.335 0.457 
OTHER 6.913 4.092 2.773 2.729 2.356 1.512 1.619 1.556 2.242 1.694 
TABAC 9.655 8.556 3.531 5.581 3.432 3.126 2.889 1.583 2.768 0.371 
CIND 28.615 25.408 15.661 15.940 27.060 8.768 14.836 13.298 58.471 20.139 
CENW 16.328 10.675 7.149 7.535 6.038 3.948 4.731 4.631 11.022 3.767 
CTTCOM 10.827 7.988 3.960 9.408 5.066 5.865 6.136 5.317 16.108 5.741 
CSER 71.926 47.582 32.230 50.677 48.388 28.367 37.770 30.566 80.044 31.262 
YTAX 17.551 11.324 6.343 10.755 8.257 9.463 6.399 7.340 13.111 4.293 
S-I 4.703 6.114 6.784 8.329 9.234 24.233 12.361 24.772 19.020 25.616 
TOTAL 225.270 165.060 106.185 139.603 131.991 100.454 103.910 101.020 232.527 103.380 
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 Part 5.3: Koura/Zgharta/Batroun/Bsharre households deciles 
 KZGB_1 KZGB_2 KZGB_3 KZGB_4 KZGB_5 KZGB_6 KZGB_7 KZGB_8 KZGB_9 KZGB_10 
CRL 0.101 0.137 0.167 0.096 0.297 0.211 0.322 0.117 0.176 0.278 
FRT 1.325 1.484 1.495 1.511 3.566 3.438 3.454 1.711 3.278 6.996 
INDCRP 0.070 0.095 0.115 0.066 0.205 0.146 0.223 0.081 0.122 0.192 
VEGT 1.768 2.312 2.084 1.768 5.661 3.549 4.741 2.298 3.905 6.229 
LIVESPR 0.324 0.612 0.747 0.537 1.674 1.104 1.264 0.625 1.313 2.480 
FISH 0.381 0.468 0.294 0.419 0.906 0.556 0.550 0.782 1.395 5.822 
FRMT 1.256 2.373 2.901 2.083 6.495 4.285 4.907 2.425 5.097 9.626 
FPR 1.049 0.997 0.705 0.754 1.348 0.946 1.011 1.055 1.275 1.761 
DAIRY 1.776 1.409 2.056 1.807 5.254 3.060 4.121 2.694 3.385 5.228 
FATOL 0.552 0.822 0.535 0.954 3.044 2.542 1.353 0.779 1.511 2.594 
PASTA 2.324 2.622 3.249 1.868 5.040 3.296 4.394 1.682 4.400 5.091 
SGCHS 0.461 0.605 0.530 0.452 1.010 0.672 0.851 0.336 1.271 1.779 
ALBVRG 0.028 0.129 0.133 0.164 1.051 0.210 0.527 0.986 0.378 1.707 
NALBVRG 0.566 0.466 0.896 0.556 1.302 0.790 0.927 0.576 1.329 3.184 
OTHER 2.036 1.937 1.370 1.463 2.617 1.837 1.963 2.049 2.476 3.421 
TABAC 1.275 0.900 3.712 0.985 3.166 1.854 2.406 1.034 2.169 4.416 
CIND 7.191 7.993 7.032 8.051 20.137 14.647 25.837 16.290 33.664 150.595 
CENW 2.235 3.423 3.852 2.936 7.612 6.141 10.086 4.450 8.029 20.379 
CTTCOM 3.186 2.770 6.838 3.169 9.738 7.545 17.497 9.129 16.126 36.316 
CSER 7.408 9.590 20.871 14.432 27.908 30.292 39.967 25.744 44.562 117.034 
YTAX 2.192 2.093 2.172 1.742 6.227 5.010 7.036 4.830 10.213 31.467 
S-I 7.725 8.144 8.948 9.516 11.178 10.682 13.607 11.789 20.062 28.990 
TOTAL 45.229 51.381 70.702 55.329 125.436 102.813 147.044 91.462 166.136 445.585 
 Part 5.4: Keserwan/Jbeil households deciles  
 KSJB_1 KSJB_2 KSJB_3 KSJB_4 KSJB_5 KSJB_6 KSJB_7 KSJB_8 KSJB_9 KSJB_10 
CRL 0.005 0.004 0.054 0.130 0.164 0.170 0.218 0.402 0.338 0.630 
FRT 0.173 0.199 1.462 3.304 4.248 4.393 5.972 9.555 7.935 24.322 
INDCRP 0.004 0.003 0.037 0.090 0.114 0.118 0.151 0.278 0.234 0.436 
VEGT 0.073 0.140 0.840 2.263 2.406 3.179 3.492 7.189 6.285 14.320 
LIVESPR 0.057 0.092 0.353 1.107 1.310 1.519 2.150 3.994 3.016 7.689 
FISH 0.027 0.150 0.586 0.714 1.900 2.066 3.362 3.870 2.047 15.048 
FRMT 0.221 0.358 1.370 4.294 5.084 5.896 8.344 15.501 11.705 29.840 
FPR 0.167 0.538 0.593 1.165 1.250 1.296 1.549 2.328 1.780 3.231 
DAIRY 0.041 0.286 1.302 3.046 4.025 4.595 5.460 10.021 7.844 15.775 
FATOL 
 
0.108 0.780 1.667 2.165 2.460 3.064 3.636 1.827 4.159 
PASTA 0.108 0.271 1.318 2.691 3.659 3.771 4.715 9.437 5.550 17.224 
SGCHS 0.061 0.029 0.086 0.856 0.514 0.986 1.669 2.307 1.807 4.684 
ALBVRG 0.058 
 
0.027 1.140 2.411 1.514 3.484 5.565 3.356 11.375 
NALBVRG 0.033 0.096 0.284 0.740 0.951 0.986 1.310 3.313 2.667 10.993 
OTHER 0.325 1.044 1.152 2.262 2.428 2.518 3.008 4.522 3.457 6.274 
TABAC 0.005 0.070 0.165 0.417 0.636 2.055 1.225 2.442 2.805 7.456 
CIND 0.253 0.689 3.954 11.322 14.094 22.605 29.130 64.700 53.476 366.602 
CENW 0.239 0.361 2.091 5.182 8.371 11.961 13.085 24.651 26.431 72.376 
CTTCOM 0.108 0.483 1.793 4.508 10.114 13.364 20.814 38.917 41.799 144.497 
CSER 0.395 0.677 6.034 19.671 29.575 41.689 59.996 135.941 147.559 508.510 
YTAX 0.488 0.086 1.053 3.543 7.681 11.194 15.416 30.248 36.748 173.014 
S-I 5.638 7.143 6.678 9.467 8.780 10.535 11.768 13.889 20.706 421.302 
TOTAL 8.479 12.827 32.012 79.579 111.880 148.870 199.382 392.706 389.372 1859.757 
  
  Part 5.5: Maten households deciles 
 MATN_1 MATN_2 MATN_3 MATN_4 MATN_5 MATN_6 MATN_7 MATN_8 MATN_9 MATN_10 
CRL 0.022 0.030 0.080 0.121 0.178 0.327 0.464 0.454 0.571 0.839 
FRT 0.339 0.430 1.199 1.641 3.197 4.954 7.101 10.267 13.690 21.481 
INDCRP 0.015 0.021 0.055 0.084 0.124 0.226 0.321 0.314 0.395 0.581 
VEGT 0.245 0.573 2.072 2.381 3.613 5.376 7.874 9.921 11.894 15.234 
LIVESPR 0.060 0.177 0.404 0.564 1.077 1.627 2.325 3.273 4.093 5.523 
FISH 0.141 0.176 0.100 0.360 0.635 1.396 2.660 3.300 5.439 10.148 
FRMT 0.234 0.687 1.570 2.190 4.180 6.313 9.025 12.702 15.884 21.436 
FPR 0.209 0.301 0.821 1.047 1.389 1.965 2.496 2.797 2.880 3.426 
DAIRY 0.280 0.264 1.404 2.319 3.346 4.137 5.987 8.002 10.421 14.021 
FATOL 0.138 0.194 0.436 1.182 2.193 2.974 3.486 7.011 6.055 9.660 
PASTA 0.611 0.835 1.614 2.687 4.043 5.865 8.492 9.228 11.223 12.723 
SGCHS 0.099 0.068 0.221 0.434 0.717 1.256 2.034 2.081 2.423 4.168 
ALBVRG  0.050 0.014 0.075 0.165 0.487 1.874 2.959 4.898 8.853 
NALBVRG 0.121 0.290 0.797 1.219 1.789 2.763 4.414 4.587 5.734 7.715 
OTHER 0.405 0.585 1.595 2.033 2.699 3.817 4.847 5.433 5.593 6.655 
TABAC 0.142 0.013 0.604 0.798 1.275 1.898 2.443 5.121 6.646 6.082 
CIND 2.599 5.270 10.801 14.403 32.622 60.636 78.542 93.442 126.334 332.155 
CENW 0.907 1.458 3.742 6.453 10.202 15.449 19.612 26.859 28.199 51.574 
CTTCOM 0.158 0.300 1.581 6.988 10.786 17.134 27.824 38.460 50.780 84.440 
CSER 2.537 4.930 12.240 24.316 35.343 67.281 90.257 141.959 168.565 294.366 
YTAX 0.345 1.579 2.912 5.759 7.256 16.618 20.858 37.088 40.010 146.059 
S-I 5.175 6.110 6.493 7.746 9.574 10.105 11.279 13.334 16.151 451.365 
TOTAL 14.782 24.341 50.755 84.800 136.403 232.604 314.215 438.592 537.878 1508.504 
 Part 5.6: Beirut households deciles 
 BRT_1 BRT_2 BRT_3 BRT_4 BRT_5 BRT_6 BRT_7 BRT_8 BRT_9 BRT_10 
CRL 0.013 0.111 0.153 0.255 0.282 0.332 0.416 0.541 0.893 2.487 
FRT 0.175 1.422 3.019 3.399 5.816 7.643 8.675 14.884 27.327 55.685 
INDCRP 0.009 0.077 0.106 0.177 0.195 0.230 0.288 0.374 0.618 1.722 
VEGT 0.132 2.606 3.447 3.643 6.420 9.020 9.917 14.508 22.835 33.766 
LIVESPR 0.042 0.714 1.105 1.117 1.819 3.219 3.130 6.253 9.565 17.207 
FISH  0.278 0.314 0.581 0.628 1.578 3.274 3.654 6.095 22.764 
FRMT 0.161 2.770 4.288 4.333 7.061 12.495 12.148 24.269 37.122 66.778 
FPR 0.197 0.965 1.259 1.218 1.894 2.310 2.282 3.099 4.557 6.054 
DAIRY 0.337 1.945 3.106 3.032 5.057 6.094 8.831 13.057 23.474 36.461 
FATOL 0.035 0.945 1.196 2.113 1.418 2.428 2.687 7.941 9.345 42.214 
PASTA 0.187 2.530 4.825 4.271 7.796 10.131 10.742 15.867 23.344 41.608 
SGCHS 0.033 0.702 0.982 1.096 1.554 2.552 2.201 3.821 6.682 10.874 
ALBVRG  2.046 0.504 0.816 0.501 2.556 1.274 3.277 8.023 22.088 
NALBVRG 0.055 0.973 1.633 1.639 3.526 5.096 4.780 8.165 13.510 27.159 
OTHER 0.382 1.874 2.446 2.366 3.679 4.486 4.433 6.018 8.850 11.758 
TABAC 0.171 2.771 4.363 3.843 5.768 10.781 11.280 10.882 17.935 29.363 
CIND 1.140 9.609 12.173 15.139 31.427 42.453 64.257 96.612 164.018 627.490 
CENW 0.255 2.226 4.654 4.202 7.597 13.521 13.987 21.789 41.616 99.056 
CTTCOM 0.039 1.935 5.160 6.820 11.837 20.378 23.105 39.072 76.706 175.951 
CSER 0.943 13.966 24.080 23.808 68.077 95.552 96.159 172.111 366.018 1000.683 
YTAX 0.164 1.969 4.777 4.145 9.507 11.258 31.917 58.798 82.421 407.980 
S-I 3.826 9.496 7.771 9.288 11.227 11.109 12.660 30.013 17.727 1577.557 
TOTAL 8.296 61.930 91.361 97.301 193.086 275.222 328.443 555.005 968.681 4316.705 
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 Part 5.7: Baabda households deciles 
 BBDA_1 BBDA_2 BBDA_3 BBDA_4 BBDA_5 BBDA_6 BBDA_7 BBDA_8 BBDA_9 BBDA_10 
CRL 0.356 0.299 0.587 0.633 0.746 0.500 1.079 0.399 0.529 0.525 
FRT 1.955 3.120 7.394 8.069 9.216 9.964 14.817 14.095 16.466 16.432 
INDCRP 0.247 0.207 0.406 0.438 0.516 0.346 0.747 0.276 0.366 0.364 
VEGT 5.938 6.727 13.016 12.634 12.376 12.706 16.585 12.574 13.533 11.615 
LIVESPR 1.738 2.556 4.664 4.269 4.939 5.280 6.595 5.076 5.922 4.878 
FISH 1.222 0.741 0.854 2.732 3.668 2.630 4.061 4.776 9.123 6.509 
FRMT 6.746 9.919 18.102 16.566 19.167 20.491 25.594 19.698 22.985 18.932 
FPR 1.812 2.274 3.277 3.356 3.504 3.241 4.186 3.225 3.082 3.066 
DAIRY 5.621 6.282 11.463 11.050 12.446 13.688 15.908 14.274 16.050 13.402 
FATOL 0.923 1.273 3.646 3.308 3.496 4.584 6.295 9.246 9.878 6.389 
PASTA 8.375 8.212 14.795 12.504 12.570 12.428 16.462 13.111 13.326 13.279 
SGCHS 0.281 0.612 1.388 1.597 1.455 1.563 2.517 2.679 2.086 3.959 
ALBVRG    0.023 0.021 0.005 0.805 0.032 1.963 1.220 
NALBVRG 2.181 3.585 6.394 6.066 6.665 7.871 9.588 8.673 8.543 7.759 
OTHER 3.519 4.416 6.365 6.518 6.806 6.295 8.130 6.264 5.985 5.954 
TABAC 6.416 6.943 13.678 14.441 12.423 13.229 16.288 11.463 9.155 6.517 
CIND 15.093 24.582 52.603 47.923 55.642 72.257 98.942 111.920 155.867 203.780 
CENW 8.522 11.605 19.519 19.877 25.021 25.866 40.432 25.727 34.714 33.033 
CTTCOM 3.382 9.239 20.557 28.580 28.423 40.113 57.444 49.155 59.228 73.204 
CSER 40.385 67.391 114.433 125.360 162.413 158.253 235.441 201.126 235.646 398.155 
YTAX 8.046 11.528 20.225 24.325 27.367 32.922 45.970 33.200 49.574 88.982 
S-I 5.093 6.373 7.999 8.233 9.303 10.761 12.302 13.619 17.581 31.281 
TOTAL 127.851 187.884 341.365 358.502 418.183 454.993 640.188 560.608 691.602 949.235 
 Part 5.8: Shouf/Aley households deciles 
 CHAL_1 CHAL_2 CHAL_3 CHAL_4 CHAL_5 CHAL_6 CHAL_7 CHAL_8 CHAL_9 CHAL_10 
CRL 0.109 0.251 0.145 0.307 0.357 0.521 0.363 0.804 0.475 0.459 
FRT 1.218 3.798 4.531 4.672 7.230 9.491 9.198 14.397 13.822 15.733 
INDCRP 0.076 0.174 0.101 0.212 0.247 0.361 0.251 0.557 0.329 0.318 
VEGT 2.669 6.790 5.247 5.235 8.293 9.384 9.527 10.070 10.718 10.404 
LIVESPR 0.676 1.977 2.058 2.330 3.140 4.049 4.816 4.474 4.987 5.153 
FISH 0.141 1.404 1.331 1.539 2.908 2.686 1.758 2.483 3.759 4.689 
FRMT 2.622 7.673 7.989 9.043 12.187 15.715 18.689 17.364 19.355 19.998 
FPR 1.128 2.306 2.149 2.115 2.874 2.815 2.794 2.841 2.818 2.668 
DAIRY 1.738 5.085 4.786 4.965 7.268 10.270 9.395 10.793 10.956 10.171 
FATOL 0.178 1.740 1.396 1.576 3.285 6.030 5.741 6.419 9.604 20.676 
PASTA 3.863 7.720 7.509 7.128 9.694 11.808 9.578 11.317 12.677 11.422 
SGCHS 0.340 1.194 1.219 1.104 1.804 2.320 2.092 2.906 3.046 3.628 
ALBVRG 0.023 0.018 0.021 0.369 2.846 2.053 1.672 0.505 2.432 4.562 
NALBVRG 0.909 2.536 2.565 2.097 4.208 5.182 4.801 6.191 6.382 6.680 
OTHER 2.190 4.479 4.174 4.107 5.583 5.467 5.427 5.518 5.472 5.182 
TABAC 1.034 3.492 2.718 4.228 6.515 8.088 5.660 6.619 6.413 5.872 
CIND 8.070 30.253 37.076 42.729 74.267 75.963 84.535 116.026 158.051 253.350 
CENW 4.706 12.238 11.880 12.491 22.277 24.934 25.518 28.744 35.545 37.118 
CTTCOM 2.143 7.542 10.346 14.421 29.665 38.390 41.555 47.305 66.975 72.313 
CSER 22.328 67.586 66.400 70.643 97.204 127.613 127.669 130.706 186.416 283.617 
YTAX 3.198 9.700 12.714 14.958 27.407 32.172 34.219 41.476 51.607 90.462 
S-I 3.951 5.784 6.691 7.520 8.902 11.068 12.620 13.921 17.457 107.832 
TOTAL 63.310 183.740 193.046 213.789 338.161 406.380 417.878 481.436 629.296 972.307 
  
  Part 5.9: Jezzine/Saida households deciles 
 SDJZ_1 SDJZ_2 SDJZ_3 SDJZ_4 SDJZ_5 SDJZ_6 SDJZ_7 SDJZ_8 SDJZ_9 SDJZ_10 
CRL 0.255 0.313 0.293 0.133 0.183 0.171 0.134 0.207 0.160 0.183 
FRT 3.038 4.194 3.887 1.768 2.563 2.308 2.368 2.360 2.460 3.586 
INDCRP 0.176 0.217 0.203 0.092 0.127 0.119 0.093 0.143 0.111 0.127 
VEGT 6.612 8.477 7.094 3.579 4.097 3.261 2.856 3.067 3.016 3.718 
LIVESPR 2.317 3.257 2.884 1.426 1.683 1.271 1.284 1.457 1.112 1.674 
FISH 1.143 1.708 1.664 1.140 0.995 0.802 0.627 0.719 1.110 1.746 
FRMT 8.991 12.640 11.193 5.533 6.531 4.931 4.984 5.653 4.317 6.499 
FPR 2.155 2.618 2.133 1.268 1.474 1.122 1.111 1.235 1.042 1.168 
DAIRY 4.439 6.450 5.435 2.639 3.245 2.935 2.775 3.219 3.308 3.853 
FATOL 0.901 2.127 1.846 1.216 1.304 0.859 0.743 1.620 1.033 1.046 
PASTA 9.125 11.110 7.279 4.005 4.532 3.335 3.135 3.016 2.709 4.263 
SGCHS 0.931 1.376 1.069 0.570 0.607 0.401 0.571 0.704 0.352 0.921 
ALBVRG  0.046 0.101  0.031 0.019 0.017 0.129   
NALBVRG 1.247 2.192 2.169 1.235 1.358 1.102 1.218 1.663 1.430 2.030 
OTHER 4.185 5.085 4.143 2.462 2.863 2.180 2.158 2.399 2.023 2.268 
TABAC 4.027 5.746 4.559 2.527 2.657 2.399 2.210 2.108 2.520 2.136 
CIND 19.427 38.762 34.012 18.272 22.034 18.297 17.689 29.887 26.107 120.527 
CENW 9.761 15.055 11.905 7.880 10.669 10.544 8.340 11.177 9.270 12.245 
CTTCOM 5.650 13.267 15.269 8.213 10.780 8.230 8.732 13.384 12.619 21.863 
CSER 36.203 60.618 49.059 29.908 40.430 36.071 36.032 45.066 49.161 121.626 
YTAX 9.860 13.067 13.026 5.896 11.062 7.557 8.523 9.684 11.493 30.707 
S-I 4.489 6.238 7.207 7.591 8.199 9.718 10.462 12.871 14.945 30.863 
TOTAL 134.932 214.563 186.430 107.353 137.424 117.632 116.062 151.768 150.298 373.049 
 Part 5.10: Nabatieh households deciles 
 NABA_1 NABA_2 NABA_3 NABA_4 NABA_5 NABA_6 NABA_7 NABA_8 NABA_9 NABA_10 
CRL 0.019 0.141 0.147 0.340 0.152 0.352 0.269 0.340 0.178 0.356 
FRT 0.143 0.950 1.199 2.198 2.007 4.113 3.847 4.139 3.395 4.390 
INDCRP 0.013 0.098 0.102 0.235 0.105 0.244 0.186 0.235 0.123 0.246 
VEGT 0.335 2.191 2.121 2.432 2.624 4.563 4.412 4.642 2.999 3.734 
LIVESPR 0.053 0.600 0.545 0.790 0.808 1.667 1.756 1.799 1.226 1.672 
FISH 0.015 1.571 0.262 0.823 0.681 1.176 0.631 0.982 0.961 0.895 
FRMT 0.207 2.330 2.114 3.064 3.135 6.471 6.815 6.982 4.758 6.489 
FPR 0.219 0.839 0.907 1.069 0.960 1.458 1.361 1.498 1.092 1.276 
DAIRY 0.124 1.334 1.621 2.202 2.590 3.769 4.608 4.378 2.874 4.021 
FATOL 0.237 0.836 1.774 1.535 1.014 3.333 2.249 2.041 1.709 1.359 
PASTA 0.241 1.935 1.926 2.339 2.217 4.271 4.259 3.980 2.705 3.474 
SGCHS 0.012 0.371 0.458 0.645 0.421 0.950 0.899 1.205 0.801 0.856 
ALBVRG        0.069   
NALBVRG 0.050 0.688 0.770 1.130 1.084 1.978 2.077 2.158 1.696 2.110 
OTHER 0.425 1.630 1.761 2.077 1.865 2.831 2.644 2.909 2.120 2.479 
TABAC 0.218 1.149 1.043 1.298 1.875 3.069 2.067 2.770 1.861 1.403 
CIND 0.851 6.335 9.807 12.157 13.176 25.803 27.531 39.002 34.936 66.256 
CENW 0.881 4.714 5.397 6.783 7.022 13.338 11.562 13.020 9.454 11.775 
CTTCOM  1.739 2.218 4.098 4.723 9.882 12.528 16.586 13.819 18.604 
CSER 1.696 8.923 12.949 19.791 19.612 38.589 50.622 60.694 48.827 94.112 
YTAX 0.047 1.988 2.267 1.909 3.630 6.199 9.560 9.761 11.684 25.512 
S-I 4.860 7.565 7.537 9.686 10.252 11.987 12.313 14.365 16.818 36.629 
TOTAL 10.646 47.927 56.925 76.601 79.953 146.043 162.196 193.555 164.036 287.648 
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 Part 5.11: Sour households deciles 
 SOUR_1 SOUR_2 SOUR_3 SOUR_4 SOUR_5 SOUR_6 SOUR_7 SOUR_8 SOUR_9 SOUR_10 
CRL 0.163 0.177 0.449 0.548 0.312 0.220 0.169 0.139 0.089 0.084 
FRT 1.170 1.710 3.560 4.015 2.351 3.068 2.543 2.475 1.626 1.348 
INDCRP 0.113 0.122 0.311 0.379 0.216 0.152 0.117 0.096 0.062 0.058 
VEGT 3.289 3.673 5.793 5.433 3.756 3.418 2.694 2.640 1.830 1.408 
LIVESPR 0.824 1.121 1.813 1.903 1.397 1.378 1.168 1.048 0.799 0.528 
FISH 0.159 0.499 1.301 0.683 0.723 0.864 0.875 1.146 0.868 0.464 
FRMT 3.198 4.350 7.037 7.384 5.420 5.349 4.532 4.066 3.102 2.049 
FPR 1.087 1.042 1.588 1.365 1.357 0.968 0.954 1.065 0.959 0.811 
DAIRY 2.151 2.347 3.553 3.920 2.321 2.498 2.211 2.403 1.934 1.029 
FATOL 0.961 1.050 2.521 2.011 3.681 2.113 1.045 2.123 0.585 0.627 
PASTA 3.359 3.272 5.757 4.770 4.022 3.439 2.576 2.513 1.662 1.270 
SGCHS 0.635 0.833 1.473 1.467 1.050 0.934 0.791 0.871 0.684 0.689 
ALBVRG       0.052 0.430 0.041  
NALBVRG 1.105 1.371 2.519 2.285 1.845 1.770 1.503 1.109 1.027 0.726 
OTHER 2.110 2.024 3.084 2.652 2.636 1.881 1.853 2.069 1.863 1.574 
TABAC 2.351 2.390 5.224 4.283 2.940 2.838 2.171 1.614 0.787 1.212 
CIND 10.824 12.935 25.461 28.739 18.472 23.359 20.813 17.938 29.844 24.381 
CENW 5.363 5.606 9.320 9.861 6.218 5.895 5.753 5.096 4.383 3.419 
CTTCOM 1.435 5.171 6.318 10.536 7.121 10.045 12.425 8.343 6.700 7.558 
CSER 18.122 21.017 37.795 42.101 24.195 26.781 28.517 28.696 22.371 49.000 
YTAX 3.098 3.904 5.783 5.441 7.050 6.334 6.740 11.681 10.489 9.067 
S-I 5.239 6.269 7.807 9.112 9.305 10.496 12.076 47.761 31.095 28.873 
TOTAL 66.756 80.883 138.467 148.888 106.388 113.800 111.578 145.322 122.800 136.175 
 Part 5.12: Bent Jbeil/Marjaayoun/Hasbayya households deciles 
 BJMR_1 BJMR_2 BJMR_3 BJMR_4 BJMR_5 BJMR_6 BJMR_7 BJMR_8 BJMR_9 BJMR_10 
CRL 0.039 0.087 0.210 0.500 0.321 0.254 0.258 0.371 0.204 0.509 
FRT 0.286 0.919 1.774 2.448 2.085 2.293 2.672 2.357 1.784 1.628 
INDCRP 0.027 0.061 0.145 0.346 0.222 0.176 0.179 0.257 0.141 0.352 
VEGT 0.646 1.748 3.529 3.436 3.207 2.600 3.486 2.337 1.942 1.556 
LIVESPR 0.184 0.596 1.025 1.322 1.032 0.995 1.188 0.917 0.926 0.638 
FISH 0.116 0.566 0.453 0.958 1.177 0.801 0.921 0.672 0.630 0.243 
FRMT 0.714 2.312 3.979 5.129 4.005 3.862 4.611 3.560 3.593 2.478 
FPR 0.455 0.501 1.047 1.166 1.004 0.871 1.155 0.979 0.932 2.796 
DAIRY 0.527 1.231 2.565 2.975 2.339 1.955 3.179 2.395 1.853 2.155 
FATOL 0.346 0.514 1.296 2.186 2.148 1.643 1.721 2.403 1.813 2.426 
PASTA 0.757 1.537 2.828 3.295 2.462 2.020 2.572 2.070 1.387 0.965 
SGCHS 0.111 0.187 0.507 0.717 0.810 0.815 0.813 0.516 0.617 0.168 
ALBVRG     0.047  0.003 0.061 0.085 0.083 
NALBVRG 0.152 0.484 1.147 1.421 1.213 0.973 1.326 1.058 0.710 0.500 
OTHER 0.883 0.972 2.033 2.264 1.950 1.692 2.242 1.902 1.811 5.430 
TABAC 0.483 0.949 2.539 2.594 2.396 1.400 2.638 1.767 1.156 0.631 
CIND 1.760 6.357 13.717 16.359 21.183 17.188 22.763 21.942 18.206 19.596 
CENW 1.000 3.309 6.732 7.524 6.760 6.738 7.752 7.769 7.927 3.942 
CTTCOM 0.440 1.259 3.492 4.419 6.880 6.701 7.548 6.240 5.553 2.385 
CSER 2.536 7.377 12.733 19.386 16.401 20.919 22.061 20.205 22.300 14.165 
YTAX 0.336 1.357 3.299 3.901 4.616 4.544 7.670 7.108 5.015 6.370 
S-I 4.135 6.131 8.553 8.515 10.233 11.152 12.530 13.903 14.914 28.965 
TOTAL 15.933 38.454 73.603 90.861 92.491 89.592 109.288 100.789 93.499 97.981 
  
  Part 5.13: West Bekaa/Rashayya households deciles 
 WBRA_1 WBRA_2 WBRA_3 WBRA_4 WBRA_5 WBRA_6 WBRA_7 WBRA_8 WBRA_9 WBRA_10 
CRL 0.291 0.401 0.385 0.523 0.541 0.241 0.446 0.840 0.864 0.688 
FRT 1.077 2.067 2.472 4.698 4.755 5.927 4.475 4.571 5.816 4.560 
INDCRP 0.201 0.277 0.267 0.362 0.374 0.167 0.309 0.581 0.598 0.477 
VEGT 2.339 2.981 2.864 4.438 4.789 3.743 3.548 5.394 6.147 2.812 
LIVESPR 0.474 0.590 1.000 1.139 1.264 1.331 1.692 1.667 1.866 1.244 
FISH 0.246 0.524 0.741 0.571 1.125 1.282 0.994 1.373 1.277 1.246 
FRMT 1.838 2.290 3.882 4.419 4.905 5.164 6.568 6.470 7.243 4.829 
FPR 0.833 1.051 0.967 1.109 1.314 1.194 1.142 1.275 1.630 1.208 
DAIRY 1.678 1.801 2.227 2.592 2.361 3.379 4.332 5.080 5.791 2.552 
FATOL 0.651 1.464 0.942 1.206 1.739 2.486 3.380 1.853 5.119 3.371 
PASTA 2.386 2.722 2.676 3.687 4.747 3.539 2.980 4.356 4.714 2.802 
SGCHS 0.380 0.631 0.432 0.669 1.741 0.959 1.166 1.167 1.468 0.990 
ALBVRG 0.007  0.016 0.101 0.197 0.299  0.452 2.586 0.718 
NALBVRG 0.670 1.154 0.856 1.501 2.002 1.575 2.052 1.999 2.368 1.296 
OTHER 1.618 2.041 1.878 2.154 2.552 2.319 2.218 2.476 3.166 2.347 
TABAC 0.666 2.218 1.496 2.419 2.760 1.905 2.276 1.746 2.610 1.766 
CIND 8.230 11.058 14.054 24.243 26.760 28.932 30.287 47.643 63.356 60.528 
CENW 6.080 10.245 11.268 16.401 17.773 13.966 15.890 20.114 21.011 13.330 
CTTCOM 1.354 3.632 4.872 8.981 10.425 9.177 9.884 19.995 20.541 14.153 
CSER 13.867 16.927 22.803 32.228 39.052 34.066 39.705 57.414 77.475 71.503 
YTAX 1.967 3.066 2.910 4.639 6.412 5.239 7.790 16.505 12.410 14.102 
S-I 4.988 6.925 7.869 9.343 10.335 11.992 13.915 15.264 18.975 29.030 
TOTAL 51.841 74.065 86.877 127.423 147.923 138.882 155.049 218.235 267.031 235.552 
  
 Part 5.14: Zahle households deciles 
 ZHLE_1 ZHLE_2 ZHLE_3 ZHLE_4 ZHLE_5 ZHLE_6 ZHLE_7 ZHLE_8 ZHLE_9 ZHLE_10 
CRL 0.330 0.042 0.197 0.182 0.185 0.228 0.149 0.208 0.150 0.129 
FRT 0.528 0.289 1.581 1.981 3.201 3.666 2.668 3.503 4.925 7.727 
INDCRP 0.229 0.029 0.137 0.126 0.128 0.158 0.103 0.144 0.104 0.090 
VEGT 1.763 0.641 1.808 2.243 2.976 4.150 2.743 3.319 3.618 4.378 
LIVESPR 0.295 0.227 0.339 0.675 0.875 1.078 0.978 1.321 1.479 1.760 
FISH 0.080 0.040 0.294 0.462 0.575 0.488 0.974 1.047 1.149 1.977 
FRMT 1.146 0.882 1.314 2.620 3.394 4.184 3.797 5.126 5.741 6.831 
FPR 0.592 0.469 0.701 0.733 0.875 1.093 0.887 1.547 1.455 1.804 
DAIRY 1.086 0.634 0.785 1.274 1.940 1.950 2.043 2.800 3.212 5.116 
FATOL 0.455 0.212 0.769 1.089 1.398 2.270 2.018 2.110 3.081 2.623 
PASTA 2.189 1.072 1.740 2.692 3.147 3.390 2.401 3.168 3.989 6.087 
SGCHS 0.534 0.088 0.363 0.519 0.627 0.862 0.625 1.096 1.015 2.435 
ALBVRG 0.022  0.086 0.419 0.379 0.172 0.470 0.701 1.090 3.966 
NALBVRG 0.590 0.252 0.527 0.893 0.967 1.058 1.002 1.127 1.747 2.342 
OTHER 1.150 0.911 1.362 1.424 1.699 2.122 1.723 3.005 2.826 3.504 
TABAC 0.891 0.997 1.179 2.019 1.729 2.254 1.931 1.723 1.324 2.476 
CIND 5.520 4.357 8.602 12.070 19.594 22.578 23.615 28.843 42.270 93.382 
CENW 4.344 4.486 5.592 7.470 11.711 9.928 9.979 12.285 17.861 24.037 
CTTCOM 1.060 1.177 2.498 3.910 7.309 12.824 8.596 12.337 18.640 25.918 
CSER 7.795 5.588 10.416 14.182 21.653 34.411 28.333 31.192 59.927 80.315 
YTAX 2.135 1.081 3.240 1.923 5.277 4.544 5.397 7.711 13.093 36.885 
S-I 5.297 5.450 7.035 8.564 9.970 12.855 11.773 15.348 17.923 82.872 
TOTAL 38.031 28.924 50.565 67.470 99.609 126.263 112.205 139.661 206.619 396.654 
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 Part5.15: Hermel/Baalbak households deciles 
 HERBA_1 HERBA_2 HERBA_3 HERBA_4 HERBA_5 HERBA_6 HERBA_7 HERBA_8 HERBA_9 HERBA_10 
CRL 0.298 0.195 0.508 0.472 0.435 0.360 0.418 0.184 0.172 0.025 
FRT 1.944 2.401 3.252 3.597 4.266 3.855 3.365 2.113 2.111 0.787 
INDCRP 0.206 0.135 0.352 0.327 0.301 0.249 0.289 0.127 0.119 0.017 
VEGT 3.473 2.795 4.249 4.286 4.626 4.484 3.806 2.448 1.323 0.518 
LIVESPR 0.955 0.981 1.317 1.571 1.228 1.340 1.261 0.804 0.609 0.370 
FISH 0.678 0.566 0.971 1.049 0.938 1.012 1.261 0.496 1.195 0.372 
FRMT 3.707 3.808 5.110 6.096 4.767 5.201 4.892 3.121 2.364 1.437 
FPR 1.203 0.894 1.161 1.260 1.106 1.231 1.145 0.738 0.525 0.636 
DAIRY 2.081 1.376 2.029 3.641 2.749 3.525 2.245 1.358 1.021 0.517 
FATOL 1.179 1.626 2.254 1.938 2.252 2.166 1.424 1.196 0.512 0.322 
PASTA 3.307 3.324 5.686 5.487 5.080 4.134 3.469 2.744 1.471 0.819 
SGCHS 0.332 0.492 0.955 0.965 0.818 0.932 0.876 0.469 0.512 0.241 
ALBVRG 0.005 0.006 0.036 0.017 0.415 0.496 0.184 0.200 0.174 0.245 
NALBVRG 0.849 0.879 1.504 1.416 1.416 1.534 1.302 1.092 0.387 0.360 
OTHER 2.337 1.737 2.255 2.448 2.148 2.391 2.223 1.434 1.020 1.236 
TABAC 4.631 3.614 6.179 6.254 5.869 5.773 3.868 2.243 1.688 0.747 
CIND 16.441 13.998 22.903 28.423 23.049 29.292 26.742 21.641 15.173 13.253 
CENW 13.492 10.111 15.573 17.609 14.335 15.669 11.627 8.438 5.829 3.523 
CTTCOM 2.223 4.309 6.163 8.391 9.145 13.529 11.174 8.354 6.464 3.834 
CSER 19.148 17.109 25.964 28.998 29.311 31.857 30.558 26.641 15.913 11.078 
YTAX 2.148 1.741 3.182 4.822 4.893 5.125 6.827 3.799 5.756 4.858 
S-I 5.409 6.371 7.569 8.382 9.809 10.237 13.421 14.977 23.572 28.768 
TOTAL 86.046 78.468 119.172 137.449 128.956 144.392 132.377 104.617 87.910 73.963 
 Part 6: Other institutions 
 GOV YTAX ATAX TAR ROW S-I DSTK 
CRL     1.193  -40.000 
FRT     178.000   
INDCRP     90.000   
VEGT     52.000   
LIVES      20.000  
LIVESPR     19.000   
FISH     2.500   
FRMT     7.000   
FPR     88.000   
DAIRY     5.000   
FATOL     34.000   -71.000 
PASTA     38.000   
SGCHS     79.000   
ALBVRG     23.000   
NALBVRG     33.000   
OTHER     43.000   
TABAC     3.100   
CIND     3127.000 2258.000 109.000 
CCONS      4858.000  
CENW     10.000  -60.000 
CTTCOM     203.000   
CSER     383.000   
CTRADE     916.010   
CADMIN 3426.000       
AKMD_1 23.514    221.986   
AKMD_2 53.601    165.158   
AKMD_3 25.941    133.649   
AKMD_4 38.091    77.003   
  GOV YTAX ATAX TAR ROW S-I DSTK 
AKMD_5 34.430    45.766   
AKMD_6 32.674    38.877   
AKMD_7 26.979    10.220   
AKMD_8 18.656    9.325   
AKMD_9 9.692    12.152   
AKMD_10 20.974    25.451   
TRIP_1 15.352    52.645   
TRIP_2 11.811    49.987   
TRIP_3 12.017    26.493   
TRIP_4 16.465    23.595   
TRIP_5 12.769    46.514   
TRIP_6 7.063    10.063   
TRIP_7 17.703    22.678   
TRIP_8 17.564    11.909   
TRIP_9 29.681    87.398   
TRIP_10 24.423    41.161   
KZGB_1 4.359    21.566   
KZGB_2 4.487    23.730   
KZGB_3 4.734    26.051   
KZGB_4 6.896    33.092   
KZGB_5 11.379    52.732   
KZGB_6 11.227    22.657   
KZGB_7 18.085    51.193   
KZGB_8 17.527    17.709   
KZGB_9 24.041    28.858   
KZGB_10 107.825    43.841   
KSJB_1 0.982    3.197   
KSJB_2 2.193    9.877   
KSJB_3 3.638    12.290   
KSJB_4 6.082    36.501   
KSJB_5 12.223    17.684   
KSJB_6 4.822    43.327   
KSJB_7 5.201    51.228   
KSJB_8 20.143    97.709   
KSJB_9 45.291    17.020   
KSJB_10 284.425    32.153   
MATN_1 1.589    10.153   
MATN_2 3.464    6.975   
MATN_3 1.994    23.118   
MATN_4 3.966    30.119   
MATN_5 12.467    58.086   
MATN_6 25.333    60.941   
MATN_7 27.281    100.964   
MATN_8 31.088    67.318   
MATN_9 35.129    143.845   
MATN_10 194.003    28.366   
BRT_1 1.175    5.673   
BRT_2 2.916    41.676   
BRT_3 4.097    45.201   
BRT_4 2.852    57.952   
BRT_5 5.158    104.210   
BRT_6 6.832    169.259   
BRT_7 9.019    38.374   
BRT_8 21.347    15.909   
BRT_9 37.944    204.972   
BRT_10 690.775    33.431   
BBDA_1 6.328    50.669   
BBDA_2 5.132    81.244   
BBDA_3 15.159    148.111   
BBDA_4 12.055    132.252   
BBDA_5 25.087    150.214   
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 GOV YTAX ATAX TAR ROW S-I DSTK 
BBDA_6 31.886    128.819   
BBDA_7 41.886    193.511   
BBDA_8 53.405    214.856   
BBDA_9 33.980    221.100   
BBDA_10 39.774    125.922   
CHAL_1 1.213    33.936   
CHAL_2 12.891    80.716   
CHAL_3 11.582    69.507   
CHAL_4 15.012    63.993   
CHAL_5 20.200    71.176   
CHAL_6 27.216    89.096   
CHAL_7 38.808    75.171   
CHAL_8 47.147    60.544   
CHAL_9 49.903    114.276   
CHAL_10 137.775    26.958   
SDJZ_1 9.491    37.300   
SDJZ_2 1.915    97.586   
SDJZ_3 13.030    54.456   
SDJZ_4 10.444    42.760   
SDJZ_5 16.039    19.155   
SDJZ_6 7.040    38.329   
SDJZ_7 16.734    24.282   
SDJZ_8 17.474    37.666   
SDJZ_9 12.702    27.603   
SDJZ_10 32.463    70.190   
NABA_1 1.492    7.682   
NABA_2 4.224    25.373   
NABA_3 2.314    32.190   
NABA_4 6.777    47.745   
NABA_5 5.049    42.935   
NABA_6 7.483    76.150   
NABA_7 17.091    55.566   
NABA_8 17.721    88.322   
NABA_9 23.646    33.844   
NABA_10 34.975    28.024   
SOUR_1 5.665    33.811   
SOUR_2 3.277    35.857   
SOUR_3 7.806    63.668   
SOUR_4 8.206    74.014   
SOUR_5 10.970    19.654   
SOUR_6 8.632    40.132   
SOUR_7 11.821    29.752   
SOUR_8 17.521    13.251   
SOUR_9 10.921    15.081   
SOUR_10 11.917    35.929   
BJMR_1 1.883    8.396   
BJMR_2 6.636    15.861   
BJMR_3 2.626    33.551   
BJMR_4 6.417    36.195   
BJMR_5 13.223    18.584   
BJMR_6 20.273    14.746   
BJMR_7 15.170    12.948   
BJMR_8 10.924    19.708   
BJMR_9 11.715    31.133   
BJMR_10 13.469    21.429   
WBRA_1 4.960    26.605   
WBRA_2 5.555    32.285   
WBRA_3 5.845    43.758   
WBRA_4 12.298    63.209   
  GOV YTAX ATAX TAR ROW S-I DSTK 
WBRA_5 22.890    60.925   
WBRA_6 13.969    71.678   
WBRA_7 17.131    59.022   
WBRA_8 26.118    37.748   
WBRA_9 23.828    94.596   
WBRA_10 20.058    78.427   
ZHLE_1 1.626    12.522   
ZHLE_2 4.245    7.325   
ZHLE_3 4.732    3.812   
ZHLE_4 3.487    42.943   
ZHLE_5 10.776    18.469   
ZHLE_6 12.519    67.565   
ZHLE_7 11.330    36.423   
ZHLE_8 15.857    26.467   
ZHLE_9 16.647    66.089   
ZHLE_10 25.413    7.711   
HERBA_1 4.232    45.912   
HERBA_2 1.956    38.101   
HERBA_3 7.467    47.121   
HERBA_4 6.860    51.685   
HERBA_5 15.013    42.422   
HERBA_6 18.574    51.018   
HERBA_7 16.979    32.588   
HERBA_8 9.742    54.189   
HERBA_9 9.992    15.791   
HERBA_10 8.245    18.478   
GOV  2635.000 437.000 2642.000    
ROW 1775.650       
S-I -926.499    3518.650   
DSTK      -62.000  
TOTAL 7880.499 2635.000 437.000 2642.000 16702.251 7074.000 -62.000 
 
